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Abstract 
 
Much of the current scholarship on Tertullian’s attitude towards offspring in utero has 
examined the issue in light of the modern abortion debate. Traditionally, modern commentators on 
the history of abortion have discussed passages from Tertullian concerning the unborn child in 
isolation, paying no attention to their original context. Such reductionism has resulted in a 
diminution of Tertullian’s attitude towards the unborn child to a simplified dogma. Scholars have 
frequently constructed Tertullian as an absolutist opponent of abortion at all stages of pregnancy, 
overlooking the finer subtleties of his views. This thesis provides a more accurate picture by 
examining Tertullian’s rhetorical aims, his deft use of Greco-Roman medical sources, and his 
engagement with Christian and Roman cultural preconceptions regarding the foetus and embryo. 
Tertullian’s views on the unborn child should be considered in the context of his aims and methods 
as a writer of rhetoric. When Tertullian’s treatises are analysed in terms of their rhetorical structure, 
it becomes clear that abortion was never an over-riding concern for him. Rather, he used abortion 
and the figure of the unborn child to help prove or disprove specific arguments, none of which 
related to abortion directly.  
This study also considers the context of previous Christian writing on the status of the 
human embryo and foetus. When placed alongside earlier patristic authors, it is clear that Tertullian 
borrowed his denunciation of abortion as a form of infanticide from a pre-existing Christian 
tradition. Several Christian sources prior to Tertullian, such as the Didache, Clement of Alexandria, 
and Athenagoras had denounced abortion as an act of homicide on the basis of Scripture. Tertullian 
was innovative, however, in that he was the first Christian writer to construe abortion explicitly as 
murder for the entire duration of gestation. Though Tertullian was not the first Christian writer to 
argue against abortion, he was the first to incorporate ideas from medical authors in his rhetoric, 
especially Soranus of Ephesus. Yet Tertullian did not consistently follow any particular paradigm of 
prenatal development. Instead, he alternately borrowed, adapted, and rejected embryological 
theories according to their usefulness to support his arguments. At times, he freely borrowed from 
Aristotle’s theory of generation, arguing on this basis that the embryo only gained personhood 
during the process of gestation. 
Finally, the thesis argues that Tertullian’s condemnation of abortion owed something to the 
pagan as well as Christian world. As a Roman author, Tertullian wrote in a literary culture whose 
attitude towards abortion was overwhelmingly negative. Although Tertullian presented himself as 
being hostile towards Roman tradition, he often borrowed the Latin trope where women who defied 
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their husbands were characterised as practitioners of abortion. Moreover, Stoic opposition to 
abortion perhaps influenced Tertullian. It is also highly unlikely that Tertullian influenced the 
emperors Septimius Severus and Caracalla regarding the legality of abortion. This study thus 
demonstrates that, in order to understand Tertullian’s attitude towards unborn children fully, his 
works must be analysed in context and against the backdrop of Roman family tradition. 
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Introduction 
 
Scholars of Greek and Roman history have long adhered to the idea that attitudes 
towards children are not constant throughout history.
1
 Rather, the attitudes towards children 
that ancient authors express in their literature are subject to numerous factors, such as 
rhetorical precepts, religious concerns, medical theories, as well as social mores and ideas of 
family. It is particularly important for historians to recognise the mutability of views 
concerning children over time when studying ancient authors’ attitudes towards foetal and 
embryonic life. In any society, the degree to which a foetus or embryo possesses human 
identity is largely subjective. The foetus or embryo is incapable of defining or justifying its 
own identity. Therefore, the extent to which the offspring in utero can or should be viewed as 
a human being is inevitably determined by others, as is its value to society. The process of 
assigning value to an embryo or foetus is also inherently influenced by cultural perceptions of 
the body, the soul and the relationship between them. 
The literary works of Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus (c. AD 160–c. 225) 
represent an important epoch in the history of ancient attitudes towards the foetus and 
embryo. Though his ideas as presented on the page were far from consistent, Tertullian of 
Carthage was the first Christian writer to argue rigorously that human existence began at 
conception, and that abortion was therefore homicide for the entire duration of pregnancy. 
Moreover, he was the first surviving Latin writer to examine the unborn child at length. 
Despite the clear significance of this turning point in the history of the family, classical 
scholars have paid surprisingly little attention to Tertullian’s attitude towards the child in 
utero. The issue has hitherto mostly been addressed by theologians, and often with a view 
                                                          
1
 This theory finds its origins in the French historian Philippe Ariès’ 1960 book, L’Enfant et la vie familiale sous 
l’ancien regime, and in its 1962 English translation, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life. 
Ariès (1962: 125) went so far as to suggest that the concept and experience of childhood is a product of the 
modern period, and did not exist beforehand. Here he writes: ‘In medieval society, the idea of childhood did not 
exist.’ Lloyd deMause in 1974 picked up Ariès’ theory in his History of Childhood, arguing that parents of 
antiquity regarded their children without sentiment, and with an attitude of callous self-interest. In this work, 
deMause (1974: 1) summarised his viewpoint: ‘The history of childhood is a nightmare from which we have 
only recently begun to awaken. The further back in history one goes, the lower the level of child care, and the 
more likely children are to be killed, abandoned, beaten, terrorized, and sexually abused. It is our task here to 
see how much of this childhood history can be recaptured from the evidence that remains to us.’ The studies of 
Ariès and deMause sparked a new interest in the concept of childhood in antiquity, prompting subsequent 
generations of classical scholars to argue that childhood was indeed a concept known in antiquity, though the 
Greeks and Romans did approach their children with attitudes particular to their times and places, e.g. Néraudau 
1984: 13-18; Golden 1988: 152-163; Wiedemann 1989: 1-3; Dixon 2001: 9-11; Minten 2002: 9-12; Rawson 
2003: 1-13; Bakke 2005; 1-14; Laes 2010: 13-19; Beaumont 2012: 7-9; and Evans Grubbs 2013: 1-17.    
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towards swaying contemporary abortion policies in Western nations. The vast majority of 
current scholarship related to the topic concerns historical Christian attitudes towards 
abortion.
2
  
Inevitably, these discussions are heavily politicised, since historical attitudes towards 
abortion frequently play a large part in determining modern policy. The most famous instance 
is that of Roe versus Wade in the United States, in which the judges deliberately chose history 
as the basis for the court’s opinion. Theoretically, historical inquiry afforded the court an 
opportunity to examine the issue objectively, without the subjective presuppositions of 
philosophy or religion. As the court ruling determined:  
One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges 
of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward 
life and family and their values, and the moral standards one 
establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to 
color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion... Our task, of 
course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of 
emotion and of predilection. We seek earnestly to do this, and, 
because we do, we have inquired into, and in this opinion place some 
emphasis upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that 
history reveals about man's attitudes toward the abortion procedure 
over the centuries.
3
 
Yet the construction of historical narrative too may be skewed to persuade the reader towards 
a political viewpoint. Much of the existing scholarship on Tertullian’s attitude towards the 
unborn child gives attention only to those works in which his views can be reconciled with 
those of modern pro-life movements. Tertullian’s argument that human existence begins at 
the point of conception is alternately celebrated, defended and decried by participants on both 
sides of Western abortion and embryonic stem cell debates.  
Those considering Tertullian’s treatises concerning unborn children frequently fail to 
consider the context behind his works: that of his complete corpus, his life and times, and his 
broad knowledge of Greco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian literature. Instead, writers 
considering Tertullian’s views of reproduction often simply take one or two sentences from 
the nineteenth-century Ante-Nicene Fathers translations of Tertullian’s Apologeticum and De 
Anima. In doing so, they discard the subtle nuances of Tertullian’s arguments that might 
                                                          
2
 See: Arkle 1957: 558; Noonan 1970: 1-60; Connery 1977: 7-45; Gorman 1982: 91-101; Congourdeau 1984: 
103-116; Dunstan 1984: 38-44; Laale 1992-1993: 297-308; Lindemann 1995: 253-271; Jones 2005: 710-713. 
The tendency in scholarship to relate the issue of abortion in antiquity to the modern debate will be discussed in 
the literature review below. 
3
 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, p. 116. 1973. 
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undermine their own case. In fact, a close reading of Tertullian’s corpus reveals that he often 
argued on the basis of embryological theories that favoured a gradual process of embryonic 
hominisation. Unsurprisingly, authors who have upheld Tertullian as a kind of forerunner to 
modern opposition to abortion have not often considered these treatises. Moreover, isolating 
these passages from the broader content and structure of the treatises generates the illusion 
that abortion and the status of the unborn were major preoccupations for Tertullian. 
Reductionism of this sort has given rise to the misrepresentation of Tertullian as an absolutist, 
fighting stringently against a culture in which abortion was freely practised.  
The purpose of this study is to provide a fuller picture of Tertullian’s attitude towards 
the unborn child than has been previously achieved, separating him from the contemporary 
abortion debate. In order to accomplish this, Tertullian’s writings have been treated as works 
of ancient rhetorical literature. Thus they have been analysed in light of Tertullian’s rhetorical 
aims, his understanding of prenatal biology, and his engagement with Roman and Christian 
cultural presuppositions concerning abortion. The dissertation identifies Tertullian’s method 
and reasons for constructing his arguments concerning antenatal life, which include his 
sources for embryology, the literary traditions in which he engaged, and the various purposes 
his references to the foetus and embryo served. 
Throughout this dissertation, the progeny in utero is referred to as ‘the unborn child.’ 
It will suffice to adopt Shanzer’s 2009 definition: the term ‘unborn’ applies to ‘both the 
miscarried and the aborted, likewise those yet to be born.’4 In the modern world, an author’s 
choice to apply the term ‘unborn child’ to the embryo often denotes a judgemental or 
negative view of abortion. It appears frequently in anti-abortion rhetoric. In English, the 
application of the term attributes the value of a postpartum infant to the developing embryo. 
On an implicit level, calling the embryo an ‘unborn child’ thus equates its destruction with 
infanticide.
5
 No such value judgement is intended in this dissertation. The medical terms will 
be employed when it is possible to determine clearly whether an ancient author made a 
distinction between the unformed embryo and the more mature foetus; this is not always 
possible with ancient literature, as Playoust and Aitken (2008) identify.
6
 Unfortunately, Latin 
and Greek terminology for the foetus and embryo were very vague. There was no term in 
Latin that specifically applied to an unborn child. Rather, Latin authors referred to the child 
                                                          
4
 Shanzer 2009: 327. 
5
 Kapparis 2002: 37. 
6
 Playoust and Aitken 2008: 159-160. 
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in the womb idiomatically, applying general terms that were often synonyms for later stages 
of Roman childhood. In his 1985 dissertation on The Nomenclature and Stages of Roman 
Childhood, Gray-Fow argues that the absence of a noun specifically for an unborn child 
within the Latin vocabulary indicates a strong degree of uncertainty in the Roman mind-set 
concerning the nature of the foetus or embryo.
7
  Kapparis holds similar views about Greek 
vocabulary.
8
 
It is, however, worth bearing in mind the great difference between ancient Roman 
society and the current period. The technical language medical practitioners now use to 
describe unborn children simply did not exist. The medical terms ‘foetus’ and ‘embryo’ occur 
fairly frequently in common parlance today. The same was not true for the Romans. Without 
medical imaging technology such as ultrasounds, there was no way for medical practitioners 
to observe prenatal growth empirically. Moreover, the legality of abortion, questions of foetal 
rights or the reproductive rights of women were not politically contentious issues in Roman 
society as they are today. Scientific education in the principles of sexual reproduction was not 
part of the curriculum for children as it is in most Western societies of the twenty-first 
century. For the Romans, there was perhaps simply no need to develop a more complex 
nomenclature for the unborn child. 
Modern scholarship dealing with Tertullian’s attitude to the unborn child often carries 
an assumption, tacit or otherwise, that the Romans not only condoned but regularly 
participated in abortion, and that Tertullian’s views represented a strong departure from the 
dominant culture of Rome. However, there is considerable debate among classicists about the 
question of whether the Romans accepted or practised abortion so readily. There was little 
extended scholarship on the matter until the controversy of Roe versus Wade in the 1970s. 
Prior to this, the only major works on the subject were the German studies of Dölger (1934), 
Waszink’s short survey (1950) of the ancient sources in the Reallexikon für Antike und 
Christentum, as well as an English study of contraception in antiquity by Hopkins (1965).
9
 
Dölger and Waszink conclude that the Romans overall condemned abortion on moral 
grounds.
10
 However, they each indicate that abortion was probably carried out regularly 
                                                          
7
 Gray-Fow 1985: 57. The Latin terminology for the unborn child will be discussed more fully in the final 
chapter. 
8
 Kapparis 2002: 36-37. 
9
 Dölger 1934: 1-61; Waszink 1950: 57; Hopkins 1965: 124-151.  
10
 Dölger 1934: 1-5; Waszink 1950: 57. 
14 
 
behind closed doors.
11
 Unusually, Dölger argues that Tertullian would have endorsed 
abortion on therapeutic grounds, on the basis of Tertullian’s description of an embryotomy as 
a ‘cruel necessity’ in De Anima.12 
Hopkins’s 1965 article features an important excursus on abortion, in which he argues 
that abortion was probably a more common means of limiting family size than contraception 
in antiquity.
13
 However, Hopkins does not substantiate his speculation regarding the 
frequency of abortion. On the other hand, his arguments regarding the relationship between 
abortion and contraception are more substantial. Analysing a broad range of Greek and 
Roman medical sources, Hopkins suggests that there was considerable confusion among the 
Romans between the concepts of abortion and contraception.
14
 
Roe versus Wade sparked a new wave of Anglophone scholarship examining the 
historical, philosophical and theological foundations of Western opposition to abortion. This 
complex legal battle concerning the legality of abortion in the United States provoked an 
intensely divisive metaphysical debate in academia concerning the timing of hominisation in 
prenatal development.
15
 Much of the scholarship on abortion in antiquity from this period 
adopts a partisan stance, advocating anti-abortion viewpoints through the construction of 
historical narratives. It has been expedient for these commentators to cast the Romans as 
villains in an overarching story of good and evil. Often, these narratives are framed as 
triumphalist accounts of Christian family values overcoming the decadent excess of pagan 
Rome. Such narratives are often intended to rally modern Christians to follow the example of 
their ancient forebears and engage in political activism against the legalisation of abortion, or 
influence public opinion concerning the morality of abortion. However, as argued in this 
dissertation, the separation of early Christian attitudes from Roman is to some extent a false 
dichotomy fuelled by selective and uncritical use of evidence. Often, commentators overlook 
the fact that there was considerable overlap between Roman and Christian perspectives on the 
unborn child.  
John T. Noonan’s 1970 article, ‘An Almost Absolute Value in History,’ is an 
excellent example of this process. Noonan was a legal practitioner and professor of law, with 
a strong interest in the history of the legality of abortion. Noonan’s article is unapologetic in 
                                                          
11
 Dölger 1934: 6-13; Waszink 1950: 57. 
12
 Tert. An. 25.4-5; Dölger 1934: 46. 
13
 Hopkins 1965: 132. 
14
 Hopkins 1965: 124. 
15
 Riddle 1997: 2-3. 
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pursuing its agenda of persuading modern Christians of the immorality of abortion. Noonan 
argues that abortion, ‘according to contemporary observers, was practiced very generally in 
the Greco-Roman world.’16 He indicates that Roman parents often aborted their foetuses out 
of deference to motives of personal gain, and posits that this trend may have contributed to a 
decline in the population of the upper classes.
17
 Noonan believes that Christian views 
represented a major turning point in ancient values concerning the unborn child. He believes 
that the Roman culture was ‘generally distinguished by its indifference to fetal and early life,’ 
and that Christian views on the unborn child developed in opposition to this prevailing 
culture.
18
 Concerning Tertullian, Noonan briefly notes his anti-abortion arguments in the 
Apologeticum and De Anima. He links Tertullian’s ideas to those of the Didache, and does 
not consider a possible Roman influence at all.
19
 He also analyses the Latin terminology 
Tertullian uses to describe an embryotomy in De Anima, arguing against Dölger’s theory that 
Tertullian would have accepted therapeutic abortion.
20
 In Noonan’s view, the close 
association between the vocabulary for murder and that of abortion over-rode any 
consideration for the mother’s life in De Anima.21  
Like Noonan, Michael Gorman argues that the termination of life in the womb was so 
prevalent among the Romans that Tertullian actively campaigned against the practice in a 
manner akin to that of a modern pro-life activist. His 1982 book, Abortion and the Early 
Church: Christian, Jewish and Pagan Attitudes in the Greco-Roman World, is a very 
influential work. Gorman is cited by Riddle, Kapparis, Bakke and others as an authoritative 
study of early Christian conceptualisations of antenatal personhood.
22
 His work is very 
polemical. For this reason, Riddle (1997) encourages readers to treat Gorman’s views ‘with 
caution.’23 Gorman seeks to vindicate traditional Christian opposition to the practice of 
abortion. Moreover, Gorman suggests that modern Christians ought to follow early patristic 
                                                          
16
 Noonan 1970: 6. 
17
 Noonan 1970: 6-7. 
18
 Noonan 1970: 7. Noonan’s words proved to be influential in determining the outcome of Roe versus Wade, 
though perhaps not in the manner he had intended. Roe versus Wade resulted in the dissolution of Texas’ 
stringent anti-abortion laws as unconstitutional. The author of the Court’s opinion on Roe versus Wade, Chief 
Justice Harry Blackmun, briefly traces the history of abortion to highlight that the Texan laws were in many 
ways unprecedented in their severity. Citing Noonan, he notes that ‘Soranos, often described as the greatest of 
the ancient gynaecologists, appears to have been generally opposed to Rome's prevailing free-abortion 
practices.’ Blackmun’s point was that even in antiquity, the state did not attempt to regulate abortion. Thus, 
according to Blackmun, attempts to justify Texan legislation against abortion on the grounds of historical 
tradition were invalid. Roe v. Wade 410 US 113 p. 130. 1973. 
19
 Noonan 1970: 12. 
20
 Tert. An. 25.4-5; Dölger 1934: 46. 
21
 Noonan 1970: 13. 
22
 Riddle 1997: 181; Kapparis 2002: 251; Bakke 2005: 127. 
23
 Riddle 1997: 181. 
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writings as a model for entering political discourse concerning abortion. He makes these aims 
clear in his conclusion.
24
 While it should be noted that his religious agenda does not make his 
work inherently bad, this bias should be kept in mind because it gives rise to 
oversimplifications of Tertullian’s ideas. Gorman briefly restates Tertullian’s arguments 
concerning the unborn child in the context of a broader narrative concerning the development 
of early Christian views on abortion.
25
 He points out that Tertullian was the first Christian 
writer to make an explicit link between censure of abortion and examples from Scripture.
26
 
Gorman also argues that Tertullian was partially responsible for the criminalisation of 
abortion under the Severans. He argues that: 
Despite pagan influence on Christians, the late second and early third 
centuries also give evidence of an increasing Christian effect of 
Roman law concerning abortion. Although no direct connections 
between the Christian community and Roman anti-abortion laws have 
been established, several facts suggest at least some influence. First, 
the Christian position, so different from the Roman view, had spread 
through the empire’s geographical regions and social classes. 
Through the witness of Christians, many pagans were acquainted with 
their ethical perspective... Second, Christian apologists such as 
Athenagoras and Tertullian had addressed Roman emperors and 
governors concerning the standard Christian view... Is it only 
coincidental that the apologetic writings of Athenagoras and 
Tertullian immediately preceded the first Roman laws against 
abortions? ... Whatever the Roman motives may have been, it is 
difficult to resist the conclusion that Christians contributed to the 
third-century anti-abortion statutes.
27
 
Subsequent scholars have never cross-examined Gorman’s idea. Bakke (2005) takes a 
slightly more guarded approach, but overall he supports Gorman.
28
 This dissertation will re-
examine the evidence, but actively avoid taking a partisan stance in order to provide a more 
balanced perspective.  
Enzo Nardi’s 1971 philological study, Procurato Aborto nel Mondo Greco-Romano, 
is the first lengthy monograph solely dedicated to the topic of abortion in antiquity. In his 
literature review, Nardi traces several historians’ views on abortion in antiquity from the late 
eighteenth century until the 1960s. He points out that it was common for historians to accept 
                                                          
24
 Gorman 1982: 91-101. 
25
 Gorman 1982: 56-58. 
26
 Gorman 1982: 57. 
27
 Gorman 1982: 61-62. 
28
 Bakke 2005: 127. 
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narratives of abortion in the primary sources uncritically.
29
 He himself offers little comment, 
but collects the references diligently. Nardi meticulously gathers and classifies an exhaustive 
array of evidence into an immense catalogue of references. He includes relevant extracts from 
fragmentary sources, such as the Apocalypse of Peter. Of all the modern commentators to 
examine abortion in antiquity, Nardi analyses the broadest range of Tertullian’s treatises. He 
considers not only the Apologeticum and De Anima, but also Ad Nationes, De Carne Christi, 
De Exhortatione Castitatis and De Virginibus Velandis.
30
 This is to Nardi’s credit, as modern 
authors tend to focus upon the Apologeticum and De Anima exclusively. Nardi also places 
Tertullian within the context of Christian and Roman attitudes.
31
 He argues that Tertullian did 
not seek consistency in his views concerning the point of ensoulment in the antenatal child.
32
  
However, as Dickison identifies in her review, the main drawback of Nardi’s work is 
that he does not synthesise his material sufficiently.
33
 His work reads more like a sourcebook 
than an analysis. As Dickison says, Nardi’s work, ‘should hence be considered as a manual 
for future work, which should result in a more readable and synthesized treatment of the 
material.’34 His research is extremely valuable, however, in that he laid a strong foundation 
on which subsequent scholars may build. Any researcher dealing with the topic since Nardi 
owes him a debt. 
W.J. Watts’s 1973 article, ‘Ovid, the Law and Roman Society on Abortion,’ is 
another important work that emerged from the ethical quagmire of Roe versus Wade. Watts, 
like many of the other commentators on abortion of the 1970s, was inspired to investigate the 
issue in light of contemporary controversy.
35
 However, he is unlike many of the other modern 
commentators in that he does not advocate a partisan stance on the issue; his interest is purely 
academic. Thus, in his introduction, he states that ‘In view of the intense controversy now 
going on, it may be intriguing if not helpful to consider the legal and social background to 
Ovid’s two poems touching on this subject.’36 Though his main focus is indeed upon Ovid’s 
Amores, Watts’s article is also important in that he identifies a strong overlap between early 
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Christian and pagan views concerning the morality of abortion.
37
 He does not explicate his 
ideas in depth. In his words:  
Generally there was nothing in the pagan propaganda against abortion 
to which a Christian apologist might wish to take exception, inasmuch 
as those arguments were founded on “Natural Law” as it was then 
understood. But, to the Christian, the pagan views were strictly 
ancillary to one crucial consideration, that the fetus was possessed of 
a soul and the inalienable right to existence on earth and the chance to 
accept grace and thereby save that soul, damned through original 
sin.
38
 
Very succinctly, Watts links Tertullian’s view to his pagan education. He says that 
‘Tertullian, well read and forceful, adopted the language of his pagan predecessors in an 
impressive attack which gives evidence of his having consulted Soranus and other medical 
writers, though his interest is not clinical but ethical.’39 However, he does not explore the 
issue at length, and primarily considers the famous passage condemning late-term abortion in 
De Anima.
40
 Watts’s grasp of ante-Nicene Christian literature is sometimes less than certain. 
For instance, he suggests that ‘orthodox’ Christians would have found the idea of the 
corporeal soul anathema; as proof, he points to Tertullian’s De Anima.41 By examining this 
one passage in isolation, Watts seems to have overlooked the fact that Tertullian himself was 
actually arguing in favour of the corporeality of the soul. Furthermore, it is somewhat 
perilous to argue that Tertullian represented ‘orthodox’ opinion, since Tertullian antedated 
the orthodox code of the Nicene Creed, and would eventually be deemed a heretic himself by 
late antiquity.
42
 
A theologian, John Connery examines the issue in relation to Catholic dogma in his 
1977 book, Abortion: The Development of the Roman Catholic Perspective. Connery’s view 
is somewhat more moderate than that of Gorman or Noonan. He concedes that ‘Roman law 
recognised the ambiguity of the situation of the foetus,’ and made allowances for its 
inheritance.
43
 Yet he believes that abortions were regularly performed during the Imperial 
period. Connery constructs a narrative of moral decline, suggesting that the moral uprightness 
                                                          
37
 Watts 1973: 89. 
38
 Watts 1973: 98. 
39
 Watts 1973: 99. 
40
 Watts 1973: 99; Tert. An. 25.4-5. 
41
 Watts 1973: 99. 
42
 Jer. Apolog. Adv. Ruf. 3; August. Haer. 86. However it is worth noting that Powell (1975: 35), Rankin (1986: 
73, 1995: 27), Trevett (1996: 69), Tabbernee (1997: 54), Osborn (1997: 176), and Dunn (2004: 4) have argued 
that there is little evidence that Tertullian’s conversion to Montanism represented a true schism from the Church 
of the late second and early third centuries. 
43
 Connery 1977: 22. 
19 
 
of the paterfamilias in the early Republic was sufficient to restrict access to abortion. ‘But 
when the family began to break down, morality, which depended so heavily on family 
authority, also broke down, and moral licentiousness began.’44 He believes that the upsurge 
of references to abortion in the Imperial period indicates ‘a practice of abortion widespread 
enough to attract the attention and criticism of the leading writers of the time.’45 Concerning 
Tertullian, Connery cites the Apologeticum, De Anima, and De Virginibus Velandis, placing 
them in the context of prior Christian writings.
46
 Unlike Noonan and Dölger, Connery is 
hesitant to offer an opinion on Tertullian’s attitude towards therapeutic abortion, simply 
pointing out that Tertullian did not mean to argue against abortion specifically.
47
 
However, writers on both sides of the debate have attempted to use Tertullian’s ideas 
concerning the human embryo to promote modern agendas concerning abortion. Arkle (1957) 
is one of the first commentators from the medical community who uses Tertullian to make a 
statement on the modern abortion debate. In his British Medical Journal article, ‘The 
Termination of Pregnancy on Psychiatric Grounds,’ Arkle provides a brief historical sketch 
of Christian conceptualisations of the unborn, in order to provide an historical context for his 
view that ‘the Christian opposition (to abortion) is based to some extent on a mistranslation 
of the abstract laws of the ancients.’48 To this end, Arkle briefly suggests that Tertullian 
adopted Aristotle’s view that the embryo gained the status of personhood gradually.49 
However, Arkle does not mention Tertullian’s vitriol against abortion. Nor does he consider 
De Anima, wherein Tertullian adopted the opposite view. He thus implicitly insinuates that 
Tertullian on some level accepted abortion. In fact, he does not cite any specific treatise by 
Tertullian. 
Arkle’s article was not unanimously well received by his peers. Just over a month 
after Arkle’s article was printed, the British Medical Journal published a letter to the editor 
by a certain M.D. Nunan, in which the correspondent pointed out that the article contained 
numerous problems.
50
 In particular, Nunan’s letter asserts that Arkle is clearly less than 
familiar with Tertullian, since Arkle suggests that Tertullian wrote in Greek rather than 
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Latin.
51
 Moreover, Nunan is of the opinion that Arkle misrepresents the history of Christian 
attitudes regarding abortion, on the basis that Christian literature had consistently deemed 
abortion as a sin from the first century AD.
52
 Indeed, Arkle does not consider any Christian 
literature preceding Tertullian, but moves straight from the Septuagint to Tertullian. He does 
not consider the immense length of time or Judaeo-Christian literary output between the 
translation of the Septuagint and Tertullian’s writing. Arkle thus removes Tertullian from the 
context of his Christian forebears. 
Similar problems apply to a series of articles published in the Journal of Medical 
Ethics from the 1980s onwards. The late Bishop of Oxford G.R. Dunstan’s 1984 article ‘The 
Moral Status of the Human Embryo: A Tradition Recalled’ suggests that the Roman Catholic 
stance on the treatment of the unborn child is a product not of long-held Christian traditions, 
but of papal policy in the nineteenth century AD.
53
 Dunstan argues that stem cell research 
that results in the destruction of the embryo should therefore be acceptable for Protestants.
54
 
Perhaps due to his greater familiarity with medieval literature, Dunstan focuses far more upon 
medieval and early modern views of antenatal development than those of the ante-Nicene 
fathers.
55
 Interestingly, Dunstan describes Tertullian’s views on abortion as ‘dissentient’ from 
Christian tradition.
56
 He also suggests that Tertullian’s views on the human embryo were 
‘unorthodox’ and ‘tainted by heterodoxy.’57 He cites the evidence of Tertullian’s 
Apologeticum, in which Tertullian claimed that Christians considered abortion homicide.
58
 
However, Dunstan does not consider any of Tertullian’s other treatises, or contextualise this 
passage of the Apologeticum. 
However, Dunstan has been contradicted by others. The bioethicist David Albert 
Jones opines in his 2005 article ‘The Human Embryo in Christian Tradition: A 
Reconsideration’ that Dunstan is highly selective in his use of evidence.59 By removing 
Tertullian from the context of prior Christian literature, Dunstan to some extent misrepresents 
Tertullian’s arguments on the unborn child as divergent from traditional Christian thought. In 
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Jones’s view, Dunstan presents a small sample of evidence, which does not represent the 
general views of the early Christians.
60
  
Yet as R. Gill (2008) points out in his subsequent article, ‘Response to: The Human 
Embryo in the Christian Tradition,’ Jones in turn oversimplifies Christian views for equally 
political reasons.
61
 While he makes many valid historical claims, Jones’s 2004 book, The 
Soul of the Embryo: An Enquiry into the Status of the Human Embryo in the Christian 
Tradition explicitly aims to show that from the religion’s earliest days, Christians considered 
‘deliberate destruction of the human embryo, apart from medical interventions to save a 
mother’s life... gravely wrong.’62 Therefore, as he argues, ‘it is difficult to see how the 
systematic use and destruction of human embryos in scientific research can be regarded as 
ethical.’63 Gill points out that Jones is himself sometimes selective in his use of evidence, and 
approaches the issue from a partisan perspective.
64
 
Like most of the scholars considering Tertullian’s contribution to Christian thought on 
abortion, Jones deals with him in passing. This is due to the wide scope of his work, which 
examines Christian views of ensoulment and abortion from antiquity to the present. It would 
have been difficult for him to provide an in-depth examination of Tertullian in such a broad 
study. Jones iterates Tertullian’s views as presented in De Anima and the Apologeticum, 
though he does not mention any of Tertullian’s other works that condemned abortion, such as 
De Virginibus Velandis or Ad Uxorem. He argues that the two works present consistent views 
on the morality of abortion; he indicates that although their views on the timing of 
ensoulment varied, the Apologeticum and De Anima each argued for the preservation of the 
embryo as a human being from its inception. Jones also asserts that Tertullian’s argument for 
the corporeality of the soul meant that his views on abortion would not have been accepted by 
the early Christian community.
65
 However, there is limited evidence of the contemporary 
reception of Tertullian’s work concerning the unborn child. 
Yet Jones makes some generalisations about Tertullian that do not entirely withstand 
scrutiny. He considers only those works where Tertullian made no distinction between the 
early-stage embryo and the more developed foetus. As he suggests:  
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The earliest witness to the Christian ethical tradition from the 
Didache, Letter of Barnabas, Apocalypse of Peter and Apocalypse of 
Paul to the writings of Athenagoras, Tertullian, Minucius Felix, 
Clement, Cyprian and Hippolytus, to the canons of Elvira, Ancyra 
and Basil, treated abortion as homicide with no distinction as to 
formed or unformed.
66
 
Jones thus does not include works such as De Carne Christi or Adversus Marcionem in his 
analysis. In these works, Tertullian quite openly argued on the basis of a distinction between 
the unformed embryo and later-stage foetus.     
However, Jones makes a valuable contribution in that he places Tertullian’s views on 
the human embryo in the context of previous and contemporary Christian literature. He notes 
a ‘consensus’ among the various Christian communities that progeny ought to be protected in 
utero, though he does concede that there was a considerable level of debate whether or not 
this protection applied from conception.
67
 He also notes the similarity between Tertullian’s 
views and those of Clement of Alexandria.
68
 Jones therefore effectively refutes Dunstan’s 
earlier suggestion that Tertullian’s arguments concerning the humanity of the embryo were 
unprecedented or unorthodox. However, there are significant gaps in his treatment of 
Tertullian and his elaboration upon the arguments of prior Christian writers; this dissertation 
serves to fill the lacuna in the scholarship. 
The classicist Emiel Eyben’s 1980 article, ‘Family Planning in Antiquity,’ follows up 
on Hopkins and Watts, surveying ancient methods of regulating reproduction. He considers 
Greek, Roman, Jewish and Christian attitudes towards contraception, abortion and 
infanticide. Eyben argues that families in antiquity had numerous forms of family planning 
available to them, which explains the tendency toward smaller families and demonstrates that 
family planning was accepted through antiquity.
69
 He accepts the idea that the Romans 
practised abortion as a customary means of family planning, while noting the strong 
disapproval of abortion in many of the ancient sources.
70
 In his view, ‘the vehemence with 
which the Church Fathers railed against the practice cannot be dismissed as mere empty 
rhetoric; on the contrary, it proves that Christianity had not succeeded in changing the 
attitude of contemporary man.’71 As he points out, early imperial writers were often amenable 
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to the foetus, so long as its preservation was in the interest of the father.
72
 Focusing upon the 
Younger Seneca and Musonius Rufus, he also notes that adherents of Stoicism often rejected 
abortion categorically. He links their ideas to those of the Christians.
73
 
However, Eyben’s treatment of Christian literature shares many problems with that of 
Watts. His survey of Christian literature is not comprehensive. Instead, he deals with a 
‘selection’ of Christian sources from the New Testament to Augustine.74 Unfortunately, this 
has the detrimental effect of de-contextualising the sources, which gives rise to some 
anachronisms. For example, he treats Clement of Alexandria as a spokesperson for the views 
of the ‘official Church’ concerning Christian attitudes towards the unborn.75 As in the case of 
Tertullian, Clement antedated the Nicene Creed, and his views would later be classed as 
heterodoxy. Furthermore, Eyben’s examination of Tertullian is perfunctory. Unlike many 
other commentators, Eyben seems to characterise Tertullian as holding a moderate stance on 
abortion.  He provides an overview of Tertullian’s views as expressed in De Anima, and notes 
that in this work, Tertullian occasionally contradicted his own views on the timing of 
hominisation.
76
 Based upon a single quotation from De Anima, Eyben follows Dölger’s 
suggestion that Tertullian would have condoned therapeutic abortion.
77
 However, he does not 
consider Tertullian’s views as expressed in other works, leaving aside other instances where 
Tertullian rejected abortion more harshly. Eyben also does not consider Noonan’s argument 
that Tertullian’s choice of pejorative vocabulary to describe the embryotomy indicates moral 
disapprobation.
78
 
Suzanne Dixon was the first classical scholar to challenge seriously the long-held 
assumption that abortion was practised regularly in the Roman world. Though she does not 
deal with the topic at length, Dixon has pointed out in her books The Roman Mother (1988) 
and Reading Roman Women (2001) that the evidence in Latin literature for the frequency of 
abortions was more informed by moral anxieties than reality. She goes so far as to suggest 
that literary sources about abortion ‘are useless as historical information.’79 Utilising feminist 
theory, Dixon argues that Roman authors mentioned the practice of abortion as a means of 
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illustrating their fears about female transgressions, and as a means of besmirching the 
characters of women as being capricious or sexually promiscuous.
80
 Abortion is not the main 
focus of Dixon’s work, however. She mentions it briefly as part of her broader survey of the 
role that women played in pagan Roman society, and their construction in Latin literature. 
She does not deal with Christianity at all, but focuses exclusively upon pagan sources, as 
Christianity is outside her area of study. Nevertheless, Dixon’s contribution remains an 
important turning point in scholarly understanding of abortion in antiquity. Even so, her ideas 
have not been explored thoroughly; Kapparis (2002) acknowledges the existence of her 
theories, but does not employ them himself.
81
 
Hans Willer Laale (1992-1993) makes an unusual contribution to the discussion. He 
suggests that the Romans abstained from abortion altogether out of respect for the 
personhood of the unborn. In his article, ‘Abortion in Roman Antiquity: Monarchy to Early 
Empire,’ Laale surveys Roman sources up to the Augustan period. However, he too writes 
with a view towards the modern abortion debate. Laale appears to uphold Roman authors 
who opposed abortion as moral exemplars on embryonic stem cell research. He describes 
Roman attitudes towards the unborn in terms which verge upon utopian. In Laale’s view:  
The Romans of antiquity, including the physicians Celsus, Soranus, 
and Galen, did not view human development from the perspective of 
modern scientific reductionism. They did not, in the words of William 
Wordsworth, “murder to dissect.” They cared little about dissecting 
the unborn tiny vessel into its component tissues, and they cared less 
about how to dissolve these components into mechanisms emptied of 
all poetry. They respected the innocent human life in-the-making, and 
they raised their voices in almost universal outcry of protest against 
social conditions permitting the heartless destruction of foetal and 
infant life by induced abortion and exposure.
82
 
Laale is correct to point out that abortion was not universally accepted among Roman 
authors. However, Laale’s views are very difficult to sustain from the primary sources, which 
made it clear that the preservation of the foetus was never the authors’ main concern. No 
subsequent commentator has made use of his findings.   
Andreas Lindemann’s 1995 theological article, ‘“Do Not Let a Woman Destroy the 
Unborn Babe in her Belly:” Abortion in Ancient Judaism and Christianity’ examines a broad 
range of Jewish and Christian literature from Philo (20 BC- AD 50) to Minucius Felix (c. AD 
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150-270). He suggests that Judaeo-Christian writers consistently rejected the practice of 
abortion due to their awareness of creation theology, but did not always explicitly reference 
it. He goes on to conclude that ‘there were no particular Christian reasons for the 
condemnation of abortion in early Christianity,’ and that Tertullian was the first Christian 
author to seek a theological basis for his arguments concerning abortion.
83
  
However, like much of the other literature examined thus far, Lindemann takes a 
political stance on the current abortion debate, and uses his examination of the historical issue 
as a platform to promote his views. In his conclusion, he offers his opinion that early 
Christian literature ought not to influence current German law concerning the timeframe in 
which an abortion may be legally performed. Lindemann argues thus for the following 
reasons. First, the ancient authors represented exclusively male perspectives that silenced the 
opinions of women, whereas in the present ‘the moral dilemma has to be solved primarily by 
women and not by their husbands as used to be the case in ancient times.’ Next, he says, ‘we 
have to admit that the most frequently used argument in antiquity (that abortion constituted 
homicide)—is no longer acceptable. Today we may rather argue in the opposite direction.’ 
Finally, he argues that Tertullian’s view, homo est qui est futurus, has been proven 
physiologically unsound, as there is a marked physical difference between a newly fertilised 
zygote and a newborn.
84
   
Concerning Tertullian, Lindemann’s work is unfortunately brief. He paraphrases the 
arguments found in the Apologeticum and De Anima concerning the question of when human 
life begins, but does not address Tertullian’s other works on the topic. He follows on from 
Gorman and points out Tertullian’s vigorous employment of biblical exempla and reliance 
upon the Septuagint. Lindemann observes shrewdly that Tertullian did not mainly focus upon 
abortion, ethics, or criminal law. Rather, Lindemann argues that Tertullian sought to question 
‘the nature of human existence.’ He does not consider the impact of rhetoric upon his work. 
Lindemann asserts that Tertullian eschewed ‘any speculation regarding the precise beginning 
of human life.’85 He offers little explanation for this statement. It is difficult to reconcile the 
idea that Tertullian did not attempt to explain the beginnings of human existence with the 
evidence that will be discussed below. 
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John Riddle combines historical and pharmaceutical research to produce significant 
findings about abortion in the ancient world. Riddle’s contributions to the topic are embodied 
in his books, Contraception and Abortion from the Ancient World to the Renaissance (1992) 
and the 1997 Eve’s Herbs: a History of Contraception and Abortion in the West. On the basis 
of his pharmaceutical research into the abortifacients attested in the ancient sources, Riddle 
argues forcefully that abortion was regularly practised in antiquity.
86
 However, as Ferngren 
points out, Riddle’s work is also highly speculative. For instance, it is difficult to provide an 
accurate summation of the efficacy of silphium since the plant is now extinct.
87
 Moreover, 
Riddle is rather selective in his evidence. He focuses only upon means of inducing 
miscarriage that would have been medically effective. In doing so, he eschews mention of the 
numerous magical or folk remedies whose effectiveness was doubtful.
88
 Overall, Riddle’s 
work is of limited value concerning Tertullian himself, since he does not provide a sustained 
analysis of Christian literature prior to Augustine. Riddle generally surmises that Tertullian 
was ‘zealous’ in his arguments against the practice of abortion, but does not go into detail.89 
This is understandable, as his work has a wide temporal scope. 
Konstantinos Kapparis’s 2002 book, Abortion in the Ancient World, has done much to 
advance knowledge on Greek and Roman attitudes towards abortion. Kapparis analyses an 
extremely wide range of medical, philosophical, and historical narrative sources from the 
fifth century BC up to the fifth century AD.
90
 However, his main focus is upon the classical 
Greek world.
91
 Overall, Kapparis highlights the need for modern scholars to avoid making 
hasty judgements concerning abortion in antiquity, since the evidence is lacunose and 
incomplete.
92
 Moreover, he also points out the need to avoid over-generalisations.
93
 There 
was never a single, unified ideology in the Greek or Roman worlds concerning abortion, 
since the evidence comes from a very diverse range of cultures and communities.
94
 One of 
Kapparis’s most valuable contributions to the subject is his conscious decision not to engage 
in the modern abortion debate. He says: 
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I am aware that this still is a very controversial subject, and that one 
person’s strongest convictions may be absolute anathema to someone 
else. My main objective has been to investigate the historical data 
with an open mind, beyond entrenched positions or confrontational 
politics. Objectivity, even if unattainable, is perhaps the most 
desirable quality in a historian.
95
 
Kapparis thus approaches one of the main problems with previous scholarship on abortion in 
Greco-Roman antiquity—namely, that it has almost universally been influenced by partisan 
views concerning the moral and legal acceptability of abortion in today’s world. Kapparis’s 
approach is more balanced, as he deliberately avoids this tendency. This dissertation aims to 
adopt Kapparis’s method of avoiding a polemic stance. 
Kapparis suggests that the efficacy of abortifacient drugs and the success rate of 
invasive means of procuring abortion in antiquity are questionable.
96
 Regardless, it appears 
that abortion was available to many women in antiquity, but expelling the embryo or foetus 
would have posed serious risks to the health of patients.
97
 Kapparis also argues that 
philosophical questions over the point at which human existence began would have been 
irrelevant to most people contemplating abortion. Philosophical opinions were divided over 
questions regarding the precise point of human ensoulment and the ethical issues this 
entailed. However, these discussions would have been largely intellectual, and would have 
had little impact on parental decisions regarding pregnancy.
98
 Non-Christian religious 
authorities avoided active interference in propagation as in most aspects of family life.
99
 
Legal authorities had little to say on the subject until the anti-abortion rescript issued under 
Septimius Severus and Caracalla.
100
 Regardless, Latin authors of the first three centuries AD 
stigmatised women who ended their pregnancies without permission from their husbands.
101
 
Though his work is important for establishing the context of Tertullian’s world, 
Kapparis’s treatment of Tertullian is somewhat lacking. Kapparis only briefly deals with 
Tertullian and Christian attitudes in general. This is perhaps inevitable, since Kapparis’s main 
focus is upon the classical Greek world, ‘with frequent parallels and references to comparable 
practices and attitudes in Rome.’102 Kapparis suggests that Tertullian was the first of a 
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succession of Christian authors to express ‘sympathy and pity for the unborn, which would be 
robbed of the gift of life by its cruel mother.’103 As discussed in Chapter Two of this 
dissertation, this was hardly the case, for Tertullian’s expression of empathy for the unborn 
was not without precedent among early Christian writers.  
Marie Congourdeau has done a great deal to increase modern understandings of the 
intellectual underpinnings of early Christian thought on the embryo. Congourdeau’s 1984 
article, ‘L’embryon est-il une personne?’ was written for the Catholic journal Communio, 
examining the ethical and social ramifications of therapeutic abortion and use of the embryo 
for genetic research in light of Plato and Aristotle. It is a theological, rather than an historical 
work. Like Gorman and Noonan, Congourdeau’s early research examines the issue in 
response to the current abortion debate.
104
 On the other hand, Congourdeau’s 2007 book, 
L’embryon et son âme dans les sources grecques offers a more comprehensive examination of 
the various Greek philosophical schools and their influence upon Christian theology, and 
does not engage with the current abortion debate. Congourdeau examines Tertullian within a 
very broad history of ideas pertaining to the soul of the human embryo in Greco-Roman and 
Judaeo-Christian antiquity. However, Congourdeau’s work pays considerably more attention 
to the Christian material than Kapparis. In particular, Congourdeau emphasises Tertullian’s 
role in the development of Christian views on the nature of the soul.
105
 Congourdeau also 
closely analyses the complex relationship between Tertullian’s views on the embryo and 
those of the philosophers, particularly the Stoics.
106
  
Though Congourdeau’s research advances scholarship on Tertullian’s attitude towards 
human embryos considerably, her work does have some drawbacks. Her treatment of 
Tertullian is arguably superficial, as she details neither the literary context of Tertullian’s 
ideas nor his aims as a rhetorician. Such shortcomings are understandable, as Tertullian is 
hardly the main focus of Congourdeau’s research. Congourdeau is also like many of the other 
commentators, in that she imposes a somewhat artificial barrier between Tertullian and other 
classical authors. She considers him purely as a patristic author, as Lepicard identifies in his 
review.
107
 This is problematic since, as discussed below, Tertullian’s ideas were frequently 
drawn from pagan sources. Moreover, many of his works, including the highly relevant 
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Apologeticum, were intended for non-Christian readers. Nevertheless, Congourdeau provides 
a strong foundation from which to build. 
Thus far, this study has identified that scholars primarily interested in the modern 
abortion debate have made little attempt to connect Tertullian’s attitude towards the unborn 
child with his writing style, which was heavily influenced by classical rhetoric. The influence 
of rhetoric must be acknowledged more fully in order to understand how and why Tertullian 
chose to use the unborn child in his writings. Scholars of Tertullian have long recognised that 
he is best interpreted as an author of rhetoric. Before this consensus emerged, Tertullian’s 
works were commonly characterised as ‘random and haphazard.’108 Tertullian’s corpus was 
described this way due to his loquacious syntax, his seemingly slapdash definition of topics, 
and also his frequent self-contradictions.
109
 Even in late antiquity, Tertullian attracted 
criticism for the difficulty of his prose.
110
 To one unfamiliar with the cultural context and 
techniques of Latin oratory, Tertullian can indeed be hard to follow. He has been described as 
irrational or even ‘violent’ in his writing.111 However, from the 1970s onwards, it has been 
widely accepted that the precepts of Greco-Roman rhetoric played a vital role in shaping 
Tertullian’s literary output. Though Tertullian was certainly creative in his manipulation of 
its conventions, he carefully observed the structure of Latin oratory in most of his works.
112
 
The key to approaching any aspect of Tertullian’s work, therefore, is to examine him in light 
of the manuals on rhetoric by Aristotle, Cicero, and especially Quintilian. 
The first concerted effort to approach Tertullian’s work in terms of rhetoric is Sider’s 
1971 Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian. Some commentators, such as Petre and 
Evans, had identified rhetorical flourishes in their commentaries on individual works 
including the Apologeticum, De Resurrectione Mortuorum, and De Carne Christi.
113
 Yet 
there had not been any attempt to synthesise their findings or provide a broad survey of 
Tertullian’s rhetoric. Sider’s book begins to fill this gap in the literature. He places 
Tertullian’s work in the context of the intellectual world in which he wrote. Sider provides an 
excellent survey of Tertullian’s engagement in forensic, epideictic, and deliberative rhetoric, 
examining a broad range of treatises. He concludes with the suggestion that Tertullian 
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effectively fused the Christian and classical cultures in a well-reasoned and complex 
manner.
114
  
Simultaneously, others arrived at the same conclusion, independent of Sider. Around 
the same time, Barnes (1971) published his seminal work, Tertullian: A Historical and 
Literary Study. Barnes’s work is extremely valuable to the study of Tertullian’s rhetoric, in 
that he provides a relative chronology of Tertullian’s treatises through a careful analysis of 
Tertullian’s inter-textual references.115 The accuracy of Barnes’s proposed chronology is 
occasionally debatable, especially his sometimes arbitrary attribution of treatises to 
Tertullian’s Montanist period.116 Barnes’s work nonetheless remains the best working 
chronology thus far. It allows scholars to track the evolution of Tertullian’s rhetoric over 
time.  
Shortly after the publication of Sider’s and Barnes’s books, Fredouille (1972) 
published Tertullien et la Conversion de la Culture Antique. His book was based upon his 
doctoral dissertation, which was completed well in advance of Sider’s work.117 Like Sider, 
Fredouille focuses upon Tertullian’s engagement with classical rhetoric. However, 
Fredouille’s analysis of the influence of rhetoric was part of his larger aim to redefine 
Tertullian’s aforementioned characterisation as an anti-intellectual zealot.118 Fredouille 
argued that Tertullian retained the intellectual integrity of his pagan education in rhetoric, 
history and philosophy. In Fredouille’s opinion, Tertullian harmonised Christian culture with 
the rhetoric of the Roman elite in a manner hitherto unknown.
119
 However, as Frend’s review 
shows, Fredouille’s work features certain shortcomings. He does not seriously consider the 
sway that Tertullian’s apocalypticism held over his thought, or the historical context of the 
Severan persecution in Roman North Africa. Frend suggests that in this violent social milieu, 
Tertullian’s conversion to Christianity and later adoption of Montanism may have been more 
sudden than Fredouille infers.
120
  
The methodology of interpreting the Church Fathers through the lens of rhetoric has 
met with some criticism. Otten (1997) opines that it is fallacious to evaluate early Christian 
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treatises according to their practice of rhetoric.
121
 She employs the principles of postmodern 
literary criticism to Tertullian’s De Carne Christi, suggesting that it is impossible to 
reconstruct Tertullian’s original intentions objectively.122 On this basis, she heavily criticises 
Sider’s work.123 According to Otten, the use of rhetoric as an interpretative tool lends modern 
critics the appearance of impartiality, but it is nonetheless impossible for the modern reader 
to avoid subjectivity.
124
 She suggests that any attempt to do so may be effectively refuted by 
current reader-response theory, which holds that the individual reader’s interpretation is of 
greater relevance than the author’s original intent.125 Otten believes that it is impossible to 
reconstruct Tertullian’s authorial intentions without impressing theological ‘baggage’ upon 
them.
126
 She also suggests that it is unwise to separate Tertullian’s rhetoric from his theology, 
on the basis that the form of Tertullian’s argument was inseparable and therefore indistinct 
from the argument itself.
127
 Instead, Otten urges readers to accept Tertullian’s views as 
presented in De Carne Christi without ‘imposing yet another rhetorical structure upon it.’128  
Specialists in Tertullian have not adopted Otten’s method of analysing early Christian 
writings. Otten’s objections to the use of rhetoric are problematic, as Dunn (2005) points 
out.
129
 First, Otten seems to misunderstand the genre of rhetoric and underestimates its 
impact upon Tertullian’s treatises.130 Otten does not deny that rhetoric informed the shape of 
Tertullian’s treatises, but proposes that it is irrelevant to their modern-day reception. 
However, Otten appears unconcerned with the anachronistic interpretations that inevitably 
arise when Tertullian is removed from his historical context. Tertullian never aimed to write 
objectively, but to persuade. His work is inherently subjective. It is therefore erroneous to 
disregard his aims as a rhetorician.
131
 Dunn also critiques Otten’s methodology, on the basis 
that Otten herself occasionally refers to De Carne Christi in terms of its rhetorical 
structure.
132
 Finally, Dunn points out that although Tertullian’s presentation of his theology 
was closely associated with his rhetoric, it is incorrect to suggest that the concepts of rhetoric 
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and theology were one and the same.
133
 Dunn suggests that Tertullian developed theological 
viewpoints which he presented and defended through the ‘vehicle’ of rhetoric.134    
Though Sider, Barnes and Fredouille laid the pattern for subsequent Tertullian 
scholars to follow, much work remains to be done regarding Tertullian’s rhetoric. As Dunn 
suggests, increased awareness of the importance of rhetoric to Tertullian’s work should prove 
a fruitful avenue for future enquiries.
135
 Knowing that Tertullian wrote with a rhetorical 
purpose now discourages the tendency towards reductionist approaches to Tertullian’s 
corpus. The common practice of taking Tertullian’s passages out of context is now widely 
considered a methodological shortfall.
136
 Tertullian did not mention anything arbitrarily, but 
always to support the central thesis of his work. Moreover, he was perfectly willing to 
contradict himself between treatises, so long as each work held internal consistency. Attempts 
to simplify his views are therefore problematic. Studies continue to emerge on Tertullian’s 
approach to individual subjects, with an eye towards his agenda of persuading his reader to 
adopt an argument.  
To date, there has been very little attempt to consider Tertullian’s arguments 
concerning the unborn child in relation to his use of prenatal biology. Indeed, modern authors 
have only examined Tertullian’s use of medical sources sporadically. A minority of scholars, 
including Kudlien (1974) and Nutton (1984), have argued that Tertullian completely rejected 
medicine in favour of charismatic healing.
137
 However, general consensus holds that 
Tertullian was amenable to medicine, medical writers, and practitioners. Harnack, the 
renowned nineteenth-century German theologian, was the first modern commentator to 
remark that Tertullian was well acquainted with science, and that in De Anima he often cited 
works of medicine and natural philosophy as exempla to furnish his rhetoric.
138
 Subsequent 
scholars, such as Labriolle, Waszink, Rialdi, Polito, and Amundsen, have concurred with 
Harnack’s assessment.139 Indeed, Labriolle as early as 1906 suggested that medicine was an 
over-riding concern for Tertullian.
140
 J.H. Waszink’s extraordinarily detailed 1947 
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commentary on De Anima makes a particularly valuable contribution to the discussion, 
though by necessity Waszink focuses on this single work. 
Yet both sides of the discussion are alike in that they often do not look at the context 
of the passages they cite, or Tertullian’s use of medicine as material for his rhetorical 
treatises. They tend to construe their arguments on Tertullian’s attitude towards medicine 
from small, illustrative extracts.
141
 As Barnes and Dunn point out, Tertullian’s rhetorical 
artistry renders such reductionist approaches problematic, since he could and did provide 
self-contradictory views when it suited his arguments.
142
 Moreover, Tertullian was not so 
much interested in formulating coherent dogma as he was in competing in the arena of 
persuasive polemic.
143
 Therefore, it is difficult for scholars to provide any definite 
conclusions about his views on any particular issue through literal interpretation of his bare 
words, and impossible to do so accurately without carefully considering his entire surviving 
literary output.    
However, the study of Tertullian’s understanding of medicine has achieved something 
of a breakthrough with Heyne’s 2011 article, ‘Tertullian and Medicine.’ Through a 
comprehensive analysis of Tertullian’s entire corpus, Heyne presents a more balanced 
approach. Heyne convincingly suggests that Tertullian had a sound knowledge of medicine, 
gleaned mostly from Soranus of Ephesus and the Elder Pliny. He demonstrates that Tertullian 
consistently showed respect towards physicians and medical authors throughout his literary 
career.
144
 Heyne also argues that Tertullian’s knowledge of medical science was cumulative, 
increasing gradually over time.
145
 Yet Heyne points out that medicine was hardly a 
preoccupation for Tertullian, as his primary focus was rhetoric; his general knowledge of 
medical theory was that of an enthusiastic amateur.
146
  
Perrin’s 1991 book chapter, ‘Un exemple de l’utilisation de la medicine chez les 
penseurs Chrétiens: Tertullien et l’embryologie,’ is the only published study focusing on 
Tertullian’s use of embryological sources.147 However, Perrin contributes little beyond 
                                                          
141
 Heyne 2011: 133. 
142
 Barnes 1985: 217; Dunn 2004: 20. 
143
 Sider 1971: 10. 
144
 Heyne 2011: 169. 
145
 Heyne 2011: 140. 
146
 Heyne 2011: 164. Heyne’s forthcoming work concerning Tertullian’s understanding of obstetrics promises to 
make a valuable contribution to the topic. However, this article is not yet published and I am unaware of its 
precise contents. 
147
 Perrin 1991: 91-110. 
34 
 
restating Waszink’s ideas on Tertullian’s reliance upon Soranus for his understanding of 
embryology and obstetrics. Nor does he go beyond Tertullian’s De Anima. This dissertation, 
by taking a much more thorough and holistic approach, will therefore fill a gap in current 
scholarship by considering Tertullian’s use of the unborn child in light of his rhetorical aims, 
his understanding of prenatal biology, and his engagement with Roman and Christian cultural 
attitudes concerning abortion. 
Chapter One deals with the first theme highlighted in the opening lines of the 
dissertation, namely rhetoric. The works by Tertullian considered in this chapter include Ad 
Nationes, the Apologeticum, Ad Uxorem, De Exhortatione Castitatis, De Virginibus Velandis, 
De Anima, De Carne Christi, and Adversus Marcionem. This chapter contributes to new 
knowledge in that it analyses Tertullian’s arguments concerning the unborn child by placing 
them in the greater context of each treatise’s rhetorical structure and content; to date, the 
rhetorical superstructures of works such as Ad Nationes have not been explored by other 
scholars in this way. Presenting summaries of the treatises will serve two purposes. First, it 
will allow the reader to gain a more realistic impression of the extent to which the unborn 
child actually occupied Tertullian’s interest. It will also serve to orientate the reader regarding 
each treatise. By comparing and contrasting the individual treatises, it will become clear that 
Tertullian employed the unborn for his rhetoric in a variety of ways, and that his views as 
presented in his written work were more subtle than has been previously supposed.  
Chapter Two turns to the theme of religion, exploring the extent to which Tertullian 
was relying upon traditions found in previous Judaeo-Christian literature concerning the 
unborn. The chapter opens with a discussion of the impact of Scripture upon Jewish and 
Christian ethics. In particular, the differences between the Hebrew, Septuagint, and Old Latin 
versions of Exodus 21.22-23 are highlighted, and the effect that the differing translations had 
on various authors’ views regarding abortion. The Jewish sources include Josephus and Philo, 
as well as rabbinic opinions collected in the Mishnah. After that, the dissertation turns 
towards anti-abortion sentiments expressed by early Christian sources, including the Didache, 
the Letter of Barnabas, the Apocalypse of Peter, Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, and 
Minucius Felix. After these sources are examined, the focus of the chapter shifts to 
Tertullian’s treatises. In this section, the chapter offers three major new contributions to 
understanding Tertullian’s attitude towards the unborn. The dissertation provides the first 
detailed analysis of Tertullian’s approach to Scriptures which mentioned the unborn. Where it 
is relevant, the possible impact of the Old Latin translation of the Bible is evaluated. Next, 
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the dissertation deepens scholarly understanding by analysing the treatises in which 
Tertullian expressed the view that the unborn was not human from the point of conception. 
Including this view in the analysis has particular significance for the question of whether 
Tertullian would have believed the unborn child held a place in the afterlife. Lastly, the 
chapter provides the first concentrated comparison of Athenagoras and Minucius Felix to 
Tertullian’s Apologeticum on the matter of the unborn. Through a detailed comparison with 
these authors, it becomes clear that Tertullian was consciously engaging with other Christian 
writers in his arguments against abortion. 
Chapter Three deals with the themes of medicine and biology. In doing so, the 
dissertation contributes to the growing literature about early Christian thought on medicine 
and the human body. The chapter opens by identifying Tertullian’s sources on the biological 
processes of reproduction, and his reasons for using them. The chapter offers the first major 
scholarly exploration of Tertullian’s habit of using biology to underscore his scriptural 
exegeses concerning the unborn. The chapter focuses especially upon Tertullian’s use of 
Soranus of Ephesus and Aristotle, evaluating the extent to which he accepted or modified the 
ideas of each. In particular, it focuses upon the timing of hominisation in each author’s view, 
aiding the interpretation of difficult passages of De Anima, De Carne Christi, and Adversus 
Marcionem. The chapter closes with the first attempt to evaluate Tertullian’s arguments about 
the timing of hominisation in terms of their chronological order, in order to see whether he 
did consistently hold a particular understanding of antenatal biology. 
In the fourth and final chapter, the focus shifts towards the last themes of the 
dissertation, social mores and the family. As noted above, many scholars have argued that 
Tertullian’s attitude towards abortion was the binary opposite to that of the pagan Roman 
society in which he lived. Here, pagan opposition to abortion is considered parallel to that of 
the early Christians. This approach challenges the consensus that Tertullian and other 
Christian writers developed their views of abortion as a reaction against a permissive attitude 
among the Romans. In particular, this dissertation chapter provides the first scholarly cross-
examination of Gorman’s theory that Tertullian influenced the criminalisation of abortion 
under the Severans. In exploring attitudes towards the unborn among Roman authors, the 
dissertation also makes substantial contributions to the study of the Roman family. First, the 
study gives a thorough explication of the unborn child’s place in Roman law, filling a lacuna 
in modern scholarship by considering the limitations of the Digesta as a source of evidence 
for the laws related to the foetus and embryo. The chapter also makes a major contribution in 
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that it considers the impact of parental sentimentality upon the Romans’ views of their 
children in the womb, employing the evidence of Pliny the Younger, Cicero, and 
Artemidorus for the first time to gain a fuller appreciation of the unborn child’s place in the 
Roman family. Anti-abortion sentiments expressed by Roman poets and Stoic philosophers 
are compared to Tertullian’s ideas on the subject for the first time. It is hoped that the chapter 
will impress upon the reader that the divide between pagan and Christian thought on abortion 
was not as great as an uncritical reading of Tertullian would suggest. 
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Chapter I:  Rhetoric and the Unborn 
 
This chapter assesses Tertullian’s views on the unborn child in the context of his 
rhetorical intentions and technique. The chapter begins by considering Tertullian’s place in 
the world of second-century rhetoric and his local surroundings, and discusses the format in 
which he normally presented his ideas. Next, the chapter examines the rhetorical structure of 
his discourses that mentioned the embryo and foetus. Through an analysis of the structure and 
rhetorical devices used in each of the relevant treatises, it is argued that abortion was clearly 
never a strong focus of Tertullian’s works. Tertullian mentioned the unborn child in the 
bodies of his tracts solely as evidence to reinforce his central thesis stated in the treatise 
introduction. He creatively and forcefully used a wide range of rhetorical techniques in his 
discussion of antenatal life. Tertullian mentioned the termination of pregnancy in his forensic 
treatises to suggest that the Christian ethos concerning the valuation of humanity was finer 
than that of pagans. On the other hand, in deliberative works written with Christian readers in 
mind, Tertullian questioned the motivations for abortion. In his later invectives directed 
against heretics, Tertullian leaned heavily upon artificial evidence drawn from embryological 
theory to prove theological points.  
It is often said that by Tertullian’s period, Latin rhetoric had more or less given way 
to the Greek literary phenomenon known as the Second Sophistic movement.
1
 Only a handful 
of examples of second-century Latin literature survive. These include the works of the 
Younger Pliny, Tacitus, Fronto, Florus, Aulus Gellius and Tertullian’s fellow North African, 
Apuleius. However, the low number of surviving Latin works from this period may not have 
been so much due to the diminishment of Latin rhetoric. Though little of their work has 
survived, it is clear that Latin oratory continued to thrive through the second century. After 
all, Latin rhetoric continued to be one of the foundational disciplines of the Roman 
educational system; there is no indication that the state-sponsored schools of rhetoric founded 
under the emperor Vespasian ceased to function.
2
 Panegyrics continued to be performed in 
praise of emperors, such as those of Pliny and Fronto.
3
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The low rate of survival for second-century Latin sources perhaps owed more to the 
selective interests of medieval copyists, rather than an actual decline in Latin letters. As 
Kaldellis (2012) points out, Byzantine producers of manuscripts had a stronger predilection 
for works written in Greek than Latin. It was thus not their interests to preserve Latin works, 
since Latin was not their native language.
4
 In the Latin-speaking West, on the other hand, 
preservation and transmission of texts was even less methodical, in part due to unstable 
political and economic conditions in the centuries following the fall of the Western Roman 
Empire.
5
 Manuscript production of non-Christian Latin authors was particularly sporadic. 
This is unsurprising, given that the Church was responsible for the vast majority of book 
production, and was rather hostile to the literary output of pagan Rome.
6
 The Church did not 
necessarily discard second-century Latin works deliberately, since they were not destroyed in 
any systematic way.
7
 Medieval interest in pagan Latin texts was often primarily 
grammatical.
8
 Therefore, manuscripts of works from the so-called ‘golden age’ of Latin, the 
late Republican and early Augustan period, received much more intense interest from the 
copyists, yet even their survival was often accidental.
9
 The preoccupation with Christian 
literature and Latin’s golden age came at the expense of second-century writers. The example 
of Fronto’s manuscript tradition demonstrates the limited medieval interest in second-century 
authors. The remains of Fronto’s correspondence with Marcus Aurelius survive only from 
meticulous reconstruction of fragments left on three palimpsests. His text was scraped off the 
page and over-written.
10
 
Tertullian’s home province of North Africa had an especially strong tradition of 
education in Latin rhetoric. Juvenal in the early second century complained in his Saturae 
that Africa had replaced Rome as the ‘nurturer of advocacy.’11 The emphasis upon Latin 
rhetoric among Africa’s provincial elites perhaps resulted from their anxiety to demonstrate 
that they held a Roman identity, rather than a Punic one.
12
 There was therefore considerable 
opportunity in Carthage for a Latin rhetor. Apuleius, Tertullian’s closest predecessor in the 
North African canon, said in his Florida that he had been professionally declaiming at 
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Carthage in Latin for six years.
13
 Apuleius could never have achieved this unless he was 
working in an environment receptive to Latin declamation. By Tertullian’s lifetime, Latin 
rhetoric had long been formally taught in Carthaginian schools. Tertullian’s Adversus 
Valentinianos contained an accidental reference to a Latin rhetorician named Phosphorus, 
who ‘was in the schools of Carthage.’14  
With the possible exception of Minucius Felix, Tertullian was the first to publish 
Christian rhetoric extensively in Latin.
15
 There had been a limited number of Christian 
rhetorical authors by Tertullian’s period.16 Arguably, the foundations for Christian rhetoric 
were laid in the Greek New Testament. Paul and Luke’s arguments in favour of Christianity 
provided the model for subsequent Christian authors to follow.
17
 However, Christian rhetors 
prior to Tertullian had primarily consisted of apologists who wrote eloquent defences of 
Christianity in Greek, mostly intended for non-Christian readers.
18
 They sought to vindicate 
Christianity’s place in the Roman Empire upon a rational, rather than fideist basis.19 Notable 
examples included Justin Martyr and Athenagoras. Other writers, such as Irenaeus, wrote 
polemics dealing with controversies within Christianity.
20
 Though Christians were beginning 
to enter rhetorical discourse by the late second century, Christians had overall been somewhat 
sporadic in their output of rhetoric. Tertullian was the first prodigious Christian rhetor, with 
thirty-two treatises surviving.
21
 
 There is an historical tradition, based on Eusebius (c. AD 260-c. 339) and the 
Justinian Law Code, that Tertullian was a great legal expert. Eusebius’ Historia Ecclesiastica 
mentioned that Tertullian knew ‘the Roman laws extremely accurately.’22 Justinian’s Digesta 
and Codex also quoted legal works by a jurist named Tertullian.
23
 Quasten and Frend have 
suggested that the jurist Tertullian quoted in the Digesta and Tertullian of Carthage were one 
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and the same.
24
 However, Barnes suggests that there is no concrete evidence of a connection 
between the jurist Tertullian and the Christian Tertullian.
25
 It is easy to see how Quasten and 
Frend came to this conclusion, though it is far from watertight. The cognomen Tertullianus 
was far from common among Latin authors, thus increasing the probability that Tertullian 
was the jurist of the Digesta.
26
 In Barnes’s view, this is an insubstantial argument. After all, 
though the cognomen was uncommon among published authors, it was not entirely unusual 
on inscriptions throughout the empire.
27
 Although the idea of two authors sharing this name 
might be strange to modern readers, it would not have been for Tertullian’s contemporaries.   
Moreover, Barnes believes that Eusebius was not a reliable source on Tertullian’s 
background. Eusebius’ prime concern was not the Latin-speaking Western Church, but the 
Greek-speaking Eastern Church. For Eusebius, Latinate Christians such as Tertullian were of 
interest only when they affected the East. Eusebius’ references to Tertullian are hence very 
limited.
28
 Indeed, among Tertullian’s treatises, Eusebius appears aware only of the 
Apologeticum, and that in its Greek translation.
29
 Tertullian did indeed discuss the 
vicissitudes of Roman law in the Apologeticum, citing a precedent in which the emperor 
Tiberius supposedly threatened to punish anybody who accused Christians with death.
30
 This 
passage was perhaps the main reason Eusebius called Tertullian an expert in Roman law, and 
is in itself insufficient as a basis on which to identify him as a jurist.
31
  
The similarity of Tertullian’s rhetoric to courtroom speech has also led some to 
suggest that he had a professional legal background. However, Barnes believes that this too is 
spurious since rhetorical training was hardly restricted to legal practitioners in the Roman 
world.
32
 For Roman males from wealthy families, some degree of training in law and oratory 
were cornerstones of education, as Tacitus and Quintilian had attested.
33
 Thorough grounding 
in rhetoric was an essential component of the ‘acculturation’ of a Roman youth, as Habinek 
(2005) identifies. The ability to compose and perform speeches skilfully was essential to 
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navigating the elite circles of the Roman world, ensuring success in political, legal and 
literary life.
34
 The applications of an education in rhetoric went well beyond the actual 
performance of orations in the courtroom. The publication of prepared speeches, whether 
they had actually been performed or not, allowed a rhetor to publicise himself and his 
intellect. This occurred in a highly competitive manner, with authors vying to display their 
mastery of the techniques of rhetoric.
35
 It was thus perhaps inevitable that Tertullian’s work 
should carry litigious overtones, as did many other works of Latin literature not composed by 
practitioners of law.
36
  
While Barnes has given scholars good reasons not to be hasty in identifying Tertullian 
as a jurist, it should be noted that he has not by any means conclusively disproven the 
identification of Tertullian the jurist with Tertullian the Christian writer. McKechnie (1992: 
50) is particularly unconvinced. Barnes’s points about Eusebius, Tertullian’s education and 
the commonality of Tertullian’s cognomen are all valid, but none of them truly demolishes 
the idea of Tertullian as a jurist.
37
 Barnes makes his final point against the elision of the two 
Tertulliani thus: if Tertullian were such a great legal expert then surely he would have 
remarked that Christianity had not been outlawed by any specific legislation.
38
 Yet as 
McKechnie argues, Barnes’s argument here is weak. An advocate speaking before his 
governor was not obliged to cite specific laws, but rather precedents.
39
   
Rankin neatly summarises the problem of Tertullian’s status as a professional jurist. 
As he says in his 1997 article: 
Those who accept, without apparent question, the “given” of 
Tertullian’s professional status as a jurist do so on rather slight 
grounds, particularly so if they should cease to look for the evidence 
of this against an a priori assumption of such status. Yet those, too, 
who seek to throw over this traditional position with regard to 
Tertullian’s professional status—largely on the basis of the claim that 
the level of legal knowledge evident in Tertullian’s writings merely 
reflects the content of a normal “liberal arts” education—also operate 
on the basis of rather slim evidence.
40
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Rankin suggests that the question of whether Tertullian was a jurist is ‘at best, somewhat 
inconclusive.’ After all, Tertullian’s legal knowledge could have been gained in either a 
formal law school or through his private reading of the standard textbooks of rhetoric. In 
Rankin’s view, if Tertullian did have a background as a professional lawyer, then his writings 
demonstrate a level of proficiency in law best suited to a practising advocate, rather than a 
legal theorist.
41
 Ultimately, it is not impossible that Tertullian had some training or 
experience in the law-court. For the present discussion, it is best to leave the possibility that 
he was a jurist or a lawyer open but not dwell on it. 
Barnes has more thoroughly debunked the tradition, which began with Jerome (c. AD 
347-420), that Tertullian was a priest and that his treatises were his sermons.
42
 It is likely that 
Jerome’s description of Tertullian as a presbyter may have resulted from a misreading of 
Tertullian’s De Ieiunio, where he did indeed refer to himself as a presbyter.43 On the other 
hand, as Dunn points out, when this reference to priesthood in De Ieiunio is read in context, it 
is apparent that Tertullian was actually making a scriptural allusion to the first letter of Peter, 
whose author referred to all Christians as a royal priesthood.
44
 Jerome’s rendering of 
Tertullian as a presbyter was perhaps influenced by his intention to defend Christian 
scholarship through recognition of famous Christian writers.
45
 Making Tertullian a priest 
increased both Tertullian’s standing in the Church and the authoritativeness of his work. 
Jerome admired Tertullian, and it is possible that he felt Tertullian would have been a suitable 
member for the clergy.
46
 Yet as Barnes says, there is significant reason to doubt that 
Tertullian was ever a presbyter in reality.
47
 Surely if he were a presbyter, he would have used 
this in his polemical works to establish himself as a figure of authority in order to diminish 
the standing of the authors with whom he disagreed. Yet Tertullian more than once identified 
himself an ordinary member of the Christian congregation, and there is no reason to doubt 
him.
48
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It is questionable whether Tertullian normally delivered any of his treatises as 
speeches.
49
 Though the treatises clearly conformed to the standard format for a speech, this 
did not necessarily mean that they were delivered as such. The influence of rhetoric was 
pervasive in Roman literary culture. Even prose compositions meant for individual 
consumption contained elements of oratory. The earliest reference to Tertullian actually 
delivering any set speeches came from Eusebius’ Historia Ecclesiastica, from the fourth 
century AD.
50
 Eusebius’ suggestion that Tertullian delivered his Apologeticum before the 
Roman Senate was highly dubious, since Tertullian did not likely visit Rome.
51
 Nor is there 
any evidence from Tertullian himself to suggest that he actually declaimed before an 
audience. He made little effort to interact with his audience, and never actually referred to 
himself delivering speeches.  
In his lifetime, only a limited number of people probably received Tertullian’s words. 
During the persecutions of Septimius Severus, it would have perhaps been unsafe for North 
African Christians to declaim on Christian topics openly. Given Severus’ crackdown upon 
ecstatic cults (if not Christianity itself), it is probable that Montanists would have been 
particularly at risk.
52
 It is more than likely that Tertullian would have presented his treatises 
behind closed doors, to a select few. Yet there was nothing unusual about the narrow 
circulation of his works. Starr (1987) identifies that it was typical for Latin literary works to 
be distributed only among a handful of friends, from the evidence of Cicero and the Younger 
Pliny.
53
 While Tertullian probably did not deliver his treatises as public speeches, it is more 
than likely that he did recite them to a small group of familiars, or sent them copies produced 
at his own expense as Cicero did.
54
 Tertullian’s small circle of literary friends may have come 
from his local Christian congregation in Carthage. Alternatively, if he prepared his treatises 
for publication like Pliny did his speeches, then his associates would have made suggestions 
after attending a reading.
55
 From these emendations, Tertullian would have produced a 
second draft. The revised version would then have been sent to a slightly wider readership, 
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who could allow their own friends to make copies.
56
 From here, Tertullian would no longer 
have had control of the circulation of his work.  
There is evidence from Tertullian himself that he normally delivered his treatises in 
written form, rather than orally. Tertullian made it clear in the opening preamble of the 
Apologeticum that the treatise was meant to be read privately, since the Christians were 
unable to defend themselves publicly: ‘may it be that the truth reach your ears by the secret 
means of silent letters.’57 Adversus Marcionem sheds further light upon the usual medium in 
which Tertullian’s work was received. Tertullian mentioned that he intended the text to 
supersede an earlier, inferior draft, which a fellow Christian had stolen and plagiarised:  
I am attempting a brand new (treatise) out of an old one. I had 
withdrawn my first short, hastily written work, afterward substituting 
a more robust composition. I lost this also to the deceit of a man who 
was at that time a (Christian) brother, yet after that was an apostate, 
before there were yet sufficient copies. As fortune would have it, he 
transcribed some extracts very badly, and exhibited them to a crowd; 
(therefore), it is necessary to make emendations.
58
 
Perhaps Tertullian had given a draft copy to one of his trusted friends, hoping that he would 
provide suggestions for its revision. At this stage, Tertullian would have trusted implicitly 
that his friend would not show it to others, or publish it himself.
59
 This in itself suggests that 
Tertullian’s works were not initially received as spoken declamations. However, it is perhaps 
more telling that Tertullian was preparing additional copies of the final draft for circulation 
before his friend’s betrayal forced him to retract it and begin anew. This could have been 
intended as the final stage of publication, if he employed the method that Starr identifies. 
Whether he acquired his rhetorical expertise through formal legal training or through 
the liberal education customary for a rich Roman youth, Tertullian had no doubt been 
exposed to manuals of rhetorical technique and style such as those of Aristotle, Cicero and 
Quintilian by the commencement of his literary career. The methods of argument these 
authors prescribed are manifest throughout Tertullian’s corpus.60 Quintilian’s influence seems 
particularly strong. As discussed below, Tertullian appears to have followed the advice of 
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Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria when using the unborn child as evidence. For Latin rhetorical 
writers of the second century, Quintilian’s mammoth handbook was very influential. 
Numerous authors such Martial, Pliny, and Juvenal mentioned Quintilian as a master of 
letters.
61
 In many ways, Quintilian’s traditionalist conceptualisation of rhetoric provided an 
ideal model for Tertullian to emulate in his Christianisation of Latin rhetoric.
62
 Quintilian 
emphasised that an ideal orator ought not sacrifice substance for style. For Quintilian, the 
practice of showpiece oratory for its own sake corrupted both the art of public speaking and 
its practitioners.
63
 He urged his readers to embrace the study of rhetoric for their moral 
betterment, rather than use it dishonestly.
64
 Granted, misleading arguments were a 
cornerstone of successful rhetoric.
65
 Yet Quintilian’s emphasis upon the moralising 
dimensions of rhetorical technique would have resonated well with Tertullian’s construction 
of himself as a moral puritan.  
A Latin speech was divided into three parts, roughly analogous to the introduction, 
body, and conclusion of an essay.
66
 The introduction consisted of an exordium, a preamble 
where an orator was expected to set his audience in a sympathetic frame of mind.
67
 It often 
featured an emotive plea to listeners’ senses of justice or ethics.68 The next part of the 
introduction, the narratio, was crucial. It was in the narratio that the speaker narrated the 
circumstances from which their topic emerged, and gave some indication of their plans to 
deal with it.
69
 According to the anonymous rhetorical handbook Rhetorica Ad Herennium, 
and confirmed by Cicero, the narratio chiefly consisted of a partitio, which explicated the 
main point of contention. It was here that the speech-writer stated the central thesis that he 
was trying to prove.
70
 In the partitio, the speaker was also expected to demarcate the points 
on which he agreed with his opponent from those with which he disagreed, and then 
summarise the content of his speech.
71
 Quintilian relabelled the partitio as the propositio.
72
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The body of the speech was the area in which the speaker was expected to provide 
proof to support the thesis laid out in the introduction.
73
 The integrity of the oration’s body 
lay in the strength of two parts, the confirmatio and refutatio. However, they were often 
difficult to separate from one another: Ad Herrenium treated them as indivisible.
74
 The 
confirmatio consisted of an affirmation and exposition of the orator’s case. It was in this 
section that the orator provided positive arguments.
75
 The confirmatio was accompanied by 
the refutatio, where the speaker sought to demolish the views of his opponent by providing 
negative arguments.
76
 Quintilian summed up the role of the refutatio neatly, saying that it was 
necessary for the advocate to deal with each point avowed in his opponent’s confirmatio by 
rebuffing, rationalising, or belittling them.
77
 An orator could also, if he chose, refute his 
opponent’s arguments through a praemunitio, wherein he cleared a path for his own 
arguments by steam-rolling any possible counter-arguments.
78
 Finally, the orator would finish 
with a conclusio, offering one last dazzling display of rhetorical skill in order to ram his point 
home. The speech was expected to conclude with a passionate attempt to win the audience’s 
sympathies.
79
  
Tertullian only mentioned unborn children in his treatise bodies, whose main purpose 
was to furnish proof and support the central thesis outlined in the introduction. Therefore, the 
unborn child itself was not his main concern; instead, he only used it to back his central 
thesis. In each case, Tertullian mentioned the unborn child to aid his refutatio, wherein he 
presented evidence to refute his opponents’ arguments, or in his confirmatio, where he 
confirmed his own case. If the foetus were Tertullian’s main interest, he would have 
mentioned it in the partitio of his introduction. Tertullian employed unborn children as 
exempla to justify the central theses of his treatises. As Petré suggests, Tertullian frequently 
employed exempla to strengthen his arguments.
80
 Quintilian had defined an exemplum in 
speech as ‘a reference to actual or assumed past deeds which is useful for persuading 
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(listeners of the point) you intend.’81 Tertullian referred to narratives of procreation and the 
termination of pregnancy to serve this very purpose. 
Tertullian’s explanation of conception and foetal development featured a curious 
mixture of artificial and inartificial proofs. Embryology was by no means the strongest 
evidence for a rhetorician. Of the types of proof Quintilian specified, the strongest was that of 
‘inartificial’ evidence from ‘previous rulings, rumours, evidence derived from torture, 
records, an oath, and witnesses.’82 The validity of these proofs required little justification. But 
in an age before modern medical imaging technology, the evidence associated with the 
development of the child in utero should be considered ‘artificial’ evidence. Artificial proofs 
included those drawn from ‘indications, reasonings, or exempla.’83 Of course, as Quintilian 
pointed out, exempla did not necessarily have to be genuine. Exempla from fiction could be 
as compelling as those from history. Their efficacy lay in the conviction of the speaker.
84
 The 
main point of such technical proof was to ‘assist and decorate arguments,’ giving them the 
‘appearance’ of substance, even if they had no substance in reality.85 For a Christian, the 
strongest exempla came from Scripture.
86
  
The first of Tertullian’s treatises to touch upon the unborn was Ad Nationes. The text 
was written in AD 197.
87
 It was an anti-pagan polemic, probably written in response to an 
outbreak of persecution. The Apologeticum, written in the same year, provides a clue as to the 
specific circumstances which prompted Tertullian to write the two apologies. Following the 
emperor Septimius Severus’ victory in February 197 over Clodius Albinus in the battle of 
Lugdunum, riotous celebrations likely occurred in Severus’ home province of Africa. 
However, neither the Christians nor the Jews of Carthage participated in public merriment, 
believing that festivities in honour of the emperor were unseemly.
88
 If the Christians 
abstained from the public celebration of Severus’ victory, it was perhaps misinterpreted as a 
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sign of political disloyalty to the Severan regime, resulting in increased levels of suspicion 
and hostility levelled against them.
89
 Underlying anti-Christian sentiments in the community 
of Carthage were brought to boiling point.
90
 Both Ad Nationes and the Apologeticum tell of 
Christians having their meetings disrupted, falling prey to informers and extortionists.
91
 
The persecution which spurred Tertullian to write Ad Nationes and the Apologeticum 
occurred in the context of an environment generally unfriendly to Christians. It is not difficult 
to see why polytheistic Romans might have seen the Christians in their midst as politically 
subversive or anti-social. As far as outsiders were concerned, Christians refused to pay due 
homage to the leader of the state. Their decision not to participate in the imperial cult might 
have been construed as treason, but the implications were deeper. The emperor was the 
guarantor of the pax Romana. Observing his cult ensured security, stability, and prosperity in 
the provinces, besides demonstrating political loyalty to the rulers of the empire.
92
 Refusal to 
participate in the imperial cult would have seemed an open abrogation of civilised society. 
Moreover, some Christians’ ardour for martyrdom was likely a source of anxiety for many 
second-century pagans. Marcus Aurelius deplored the unruliness of Christian zealots in his 
Meditations.
93
 Likewise, Celsus remarked in his polemic against the Christians that the 
martyrs were simply mad in their desire for death.
94
  
Yet outright persecutions, such as that which inspired Tertullian’s early apologetics, 
were occasional. The imperial governors exercised extraordinary autonomy concerning the 
running of their provinces. Their approach was largely ad hoc, dealing with problems on a 
day-to-day basis. Their primary goal was to maintain civic peace and prosperity, dispensing 
rulings on cases with this goal in mind.
95
 However, this did not necessarily mean that it was 
safe for a Christian to declare his or her faith openly. The public spectacle of the martyr’s 
death likely deterred many. As Barnes says, ‘the most serious result of the persecutions was 
not so much the deaths of the Christians as an atmosphere of emotional tension.’96 It was in 
this uneasy and unpredictable climate that Tertullian wrote.
97
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Ad Nationes comprises two books. Each stands apart from the other in its structure, 
content, and aims. They are alike, however, in that Tertullian envisioned them being read by 
pagans. Book One reads as an entirely self-contained work, featuring an exordium (1.1.7-9), 
partitio (1.1.10-1.3.7), refutatio (1.3.8-1.7.29), confirmatio (1.7.30-1.19.7) and conclusio 
(1.20.1-15). As stated in both the partitio and the conclusio, Book One was intended to 
absolve Christians from various charges. Tertullian argued that pagans could not in good 
conscience accuse Christians of the charges, since they themselves were guilty.
98
 The second 
book of Ad Nationes, however, was of a character completely different to the first. It focused 
exclusively upon the pagan gods, dealing with topics that had not been mentioned in the 
propositio of Book One. His argument in this work was essentially that the Roman gods were 
invented by humans, and were thus unworthy of worship.
99
 It too has its own exordium 
(2.1.1-7), partitio (2.1.8-14), refutatio (2.2.1-2.8.10), confirmatio (2.9.1-2.16.7), and 
conclusio (2.17.1-19). Tertullian’s definition of topics in this work was rather haphazard. 
Barnes raises the possibility that the work as we have it is incomplete.
100
 After all, much of 
the material from Ad Nationes would shortly be reworked with far greater perspicacity and 
elegance in the Apologeticum. The fact that the extant text exists at all indicates that 
Tertullian considered the work sufficiently complete to reveal a draft to one of his literary 
friends, who perhaps arranged to have it copied for perusal. It is easy to imagine that one of 
Tertullian’s literary compatriots advised him to abandon Ad Nationes and start afresh with a 
new work, which would evolve into the Apologeticum. 
Book One of Ad Nationes opened with an exordium.
101
 Tertullian’s purpose here was 
to ensure that his reader was amicable to the Christian. He first assured his pagan reader that 
once they ceased their ignorance of Christian precepts, they would stop hating the Christians 
or even convert.
102
 Tertullian then offered general remarks contrasting good and evil things, 
arguing that while a guilty person would hide their crimes, Christians made no effort to 
conceal their faith. Thus, they were not guilty of the crimes of which they were accused.
103
 
Tertullian then suggested that pagans had perverted the course of justice by their refusal to 
examine the case of the Christians with due care.
104
 After that, Tertullian turned towards his 
propositio, in which he named the charges against the Christians, namely cannibalism, incest, 
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and infanticide.
105
 Tertullian argued that if these accusations were brought to light, they 
would be revealed as fictitious. Subsequently, Tertullian indicated that the moral integrity of 
his client, Christianity, was beyond criticism. Accusations against Christianity were based 
upon no more than presumptions about the name of Christianity, whose very spelling was 
confused in the Roman mind.
106
  
Once he had offered these preliminary remarks, Tertullian then engaged in a refutatio, 
producing negative arguments. He first indicated that Christianity should not be classed 
alongside philosophies named after their founders.
107
 The public suspicions about Christians 
were unfair, since Christians were actually vilified for their virtues rather than their faults.
108
 
Next, he declared that the misdeeds of individual Christians ought not to be held against the 
entire religion. After all, people of a bad character were not true Christians, regardless of their 
pretensions.
109
 Laws against Christians had not been carefully considered; any appeals 
towards the permanency of tradition were invalid, due to the mutability of law.
110
 Calumny 
was the root of the maltreatment of Christians. He picked up on the themes previously 
espoused, arguing that fama was no firm basis for accusation.
111
 ‘For the more prone you are 
to maliciousness, the more ready you are to believe malice. In short, people more easily 
believe in a false evil than true good.’112 Furthermore, any accusations regarding Christian 
conduct in clandestine ceremonies was clearly based upon lies, as the crimes supposedly 
occurred in the privacy of the home. The only possible witnesses to crimes were house-
slaves, whose testimony was unsound.
113
 No physical evidence could be produced to prove 
the accusations.
114
 Christianity certainly offered the prospect of eternal life and the 
resurrection of the dead; yet even this would be insufficient incentive to slay an infant or to 
drink human blood.
115
 Christians were not the cause of natural disasters, since catastrophes 
                                                          
105
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.2.9-1.3.1. 
106
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.3.1-10. 
107
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.4.1-4. 
108
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.4.8-15. 
109
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.5.1-10. 
110
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.6.1-7. 
111
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.7.1-10. 
112
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.7.11.  Quanto enim proni ad malitiam, tanto ad mali fidem oportuni estis; facilius denique 
falso malo quam uero bono creditur. 
113
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.7.12-18. 
114
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.7.19-21. 
115
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.7.23-34. 
51 
 
such as those of Atlantis and Corinth occurred prior to the coming of Christ. The pagan gods 
had failed here, not the God of the Christians.
116
  
Having offered refutations sufficient to undermine the case of his opponents, 
Tertullian then advanced his confirmatio.
117
 The opening sentences of chapter ten shows a 
clear turn from negative arguments towards positive ones, and gave an indication of his 
intended method of argumentation:  
Come now, pour out all your venom. Strike against our name with all 
your shafts of slander. I will not stay any longer to repel them, but in 
the end they will be blunted by my exposition of our whole 
discipline. Now indeed I’m going to pull the very same (shafts) out of 
our body and deflect them back upon you. I will show that the very 
same wounds which you have wrought upon on us by your charges 
are planted upon yourselves, so that you can fall upon your own 
swords and javelins.
118
 
Tertullian countered the argument that Christians corrupted the mores of the Romans by 
pointing out that the Romans themselves were apt to change their laws, customs, and 
religion.
119
 Indeed, the writings of Homer, which Tertullian seemed to treat as a kind of 
pagan equivalent to a sacred text, had portrayed the Olympic deities as susceptible to human 
foibles. Ergo, poets and dramatists who drew upon Homer were insulting the gods far more 
than Christians.
120
 
 The next three chapters (1.11.1-1.14.4) dealt with charges of religious sacrilege. After 
disposing of the story, found in Tacitus, that Christians worshipped the head of a donkey, 
Tertullian answered the rumour that they idolised the cross as an object of worship in itself.
121
 
In fact, pagans themselves might be said to worship crosses, such as those which upheld the 
legionary standards.
122
 Nor could the conceptualisation of Christians as sun-worshippers be 
taken seriously, as pagans too on occasion paid homage to the sun.
123
 Tertullian then returned 
to his point about the ass’s head, using the example of a Jewish apostate in Rome who 
mocked the Christians by donning an a donkey’s head and parading himself carrying a book; 
                                                          
116
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.9.1-11. 
117
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.10.1-1.19.6. 
118
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.10.1-2.  Effundite iam omnia uenena, omnia calumniae tela infligite huic nomini, non cessabo 
ultra repellere, at postmodum obtundentur expositione totius nostrae disciplinae. Nunc uero eadem ipsa de 
nostro corpore <re>uulsa in uos retorquebo, eadem uulnera criminum in uobis defossa monstrabo, quo 
machaeris uestris admentationibusque cadatis. 
119
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.10.3-5. 
120
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.10.36-40. 
121
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.11.1-1.12.4. Tertullian’s reference was to Tac. Hist. 5.3-5.4. 
122
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.12.5-15. 
123
 Tert. Ad nat. 1.13.1-15. 
52 
 
yet such slanders could not be held against Christians.
124
 In any case, the Romans themselves 
could not be too shocked about the spectacle of an animal-headed god, since such deities had 
been long been incorporated into the pantheon.
125
 
 Tertullian then turned in chapter fifteen to the themes of sacrifice and infanticide. 
Here, we at last find remarks relevant to the unborn child. First, he argued that the accusation 
of human sacrifice and cannibalism lacked merit, as the Romans themselves had once 
performed such rituals.
126
 Moreover, according to Tertullian, Roman parents regularly caused 
the deaths of their babies by exposing them.
127
 Yet Tertullian was here clearly relying upon 
artificial proof. Just as pagan accusers could not prove the rumours about what Christians got 
up to in the privacy of their homes, neither could Tertullian prove his point about pagans’ 
treatment of their children. It was not important for Tertullian whether the perception was 
accurate; it was sufficient for his case that it was believed. Tertullian employed his acid wit to 
counter the rumour that Christians routinely practised homicide. After an extended tirade 
concerning their supposedly routine practices of exposure and infanticide, Tertullian 
suggested that pagans were actually more morally depraved in their character compared to 
their Christian peers concerning their treatment of the unborn.
128
  
On this basis, he sarcastically argued that if anyone believed the false charges laid 
against Christians, they would have had to believe something even less credible of pagans. 
Tertullian suggested that if his reader were to believe that Christians ate their neonatal babies, 
then they should have believed that pagans ate their unborn children.
129
 Tertullian was not 
seriously suggesting that any pagan actually ate their children. It should be considered an 
example of reductio ad absurdum, in the sense that Aristotle discussed the technique in his 
Priori Analytica.
130
 He utilised the ridiculousness of the idea that pagans ate their unborn 
offspring to prove that the concept of Christians eating their young was similarly 
preposterous.  
For the final arguments of Book One, Tertullian first addressed accusations of things 
supposedly done under cover of night.
131
 Pagans openly committed the very crimes 
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Christians supposedly committed in secret.
132
 Licentiousness was not by any means exclusive 
to the Christians, and pagans were answerable for the incest of which they accused 
Christians.
133
 He then turned to the closely related themes of political loyalty and 
martyrdom.
134
 It was unfair to accuse Christians alone of being disloyal, since the emperor 
had enemies among pagans too.
135
 Christians indeed were loyal subjects, who happily prayed 
for the emperor’s wellbeing, and had never engaged in any assassination plot against him. 
The claim that Christians showed obstinacy in the face of death was also unfair; Christian 
martyrs’ acceptance of their execution was comparable to that of heroic figures of Rome’s 
early history. Where the Roman heroes were upheld for their bravery in the face of death, 
Christians were vilified.
136
 Christian refusal to waver in the face of death was not based upon 
arrogance, but upon the promise of eternal life. This was not so different from various 
philosophers’ arguments in favour of reincarnation.137 Nor were the Christian concepts of 
Heaven and Hell so far removed from the Pyriphlegethon and Elysium of the epic cycle.
138
 
Tertullian then rounded off his first book with a conclusio, recapitulating his arguments.
139
 
He closed the first book with words to the effect that pagans had to amend their own 
behaviour before they could justifiably condemn Christians. Yet by doing so, they would 
themselves become Christian.
140
 
Book Two turned to themes somewhat disconnected to the first book. After opening 
with his case that his reader ought to concede the falsehood of the pagan gods, Tertullian 
offered a brief exordium, in which he ruminated upon the distinction between truth and 
error.
141
 After that, he lay out the arguments he would employ to prove his hypothesis. 
Tertullian based the structure of the first half of Book Two upon Varro’s encyclopaedic work 
Rerum Divinarum.
142
 Varro had divided the Roman gods into three distinct classes. First, 
there were the gods who had physical existence in the elements, which were subject to 
philosophical conjecture. Next, there was the mythical class of gods, invented by the poets. 
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Finally, there were sundry ‘Gentile’ gods, which various peoples had created.143 In the 
ensuing chapters, Tertullian would disprove the divinity of each type of deity on the basis 
outlined in the final lines of chapter one:  
Among the philosophers all these things are uncertain, because they 
are varied. Among the poets they are all are useless, because they are 
scandalous. Among the nations all are unbalanced, because they are 
dependent on (human) will. Furthermore, if you are undertaking (to 
understand) true divinity, it is so definite that it is not to be gathered 
from uncertain disputations, nor polluted by useless fables, nor may it 
be judged by promiscuous conceits. It should indeed be regarded as it 
really is: as certain, whole, universal, because it can know of all 
things. What other deity will I believe? One that has been evaluated 
with suspicion? One that history has established? One that a 
community has wished for? It would be worthier by far to believe in 
no god than one who can be doubted, or who ought to be ashamed, or 
else one subject to arbitrary selection.
144
 
Here, Tertullian revealed his thesis. He argued that the one God was of firm nature, not 
subject to vagaries, immorality, or self-contradiction. Yet in the latter half of Book Two, 
Tertullian focused upon the Roman religion specifically, arguing that the Roman gods were 
mortals elevated to godhood.
145
 Once more, he had not mentioned these arguments in the 
propositio of the second book; it is possible that he added them during the drafting stage, 
intending to go back and revise the opening chapters to include the new ideas. If this was his 
intention, it would seem that Tertullian never completed the task, but moved on immediately 
to the Apologeticum. 
Following the order of arguments outlined in the propositio, Tertullian moved onto 
his refutation.
146
 Tertullian first addressed the natural philosophers’ traditions in chapters 2-7. 
The philosophers, including the Platonists, the Epicureans, and the Stoics, had rightly 
discovered the existence of a single deity. However, they did not fear God, and had strayed 
from this simple wisdom. Instead, the philosophers offered watered-down and confused 
interpolations.
147
 Many philosophers of Greece and Egypt believed the heavenly bodies to be 
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deities. Alternatively, some held that the elements themselves were divine, as some myths 
detailed the gods’ origins from the elements.148 However, the elements could not possibly be 
divinities in themselves. If the primordial elements were the progenitors of the gods as the 
philosophers alleged, where had the elements sprung from?
149
 Moreover, if the physical 
elements were to be conceptualised as animated, then it followed that each of the elements 
should have a mortal soul, rather than an eternal one.
150
 Varro apparently held that the 
elements were divine because they moved of their own accord. But, as Tertullian said, 
animals did too, and only the superstitious Egyptians considered beasts divine.
151
  
After a digression on the origin of the Greek word theos, Tertullian acknowledged the 
theory of Zeno, wherein God and matter were discrete from one another. Since the divine was 
not physical, or detectable by the senses, it followed that the physical gods were fictitious.
152
 
Moreover, as the exemplum of Thales the stargazer showed, the curiosity of the philosophers 
concerning nature was self-indulgent and vain.
153
 People might have suffered due to the 
vicissitudes of the elements, but it was foolish to designate them gods for this reason alone.
154
 
The elements, after all, were not responsible for their own conduct, but were under the 
control of a single divine power. The nature of God was thus not servile like that of the 
elements. Rather, He was immovable and eternal. He was not subject to change as the 
heavenly bodies were.
155
  
Once he had exhausted the topic of the physical gods, Tertullian turned very briefly to 
that of the mythic class.
156
 As the final section of Ad Nationes would deal heavily with myths, 
Tertullian perhaps did not feel that he needed to elucidate the subject in great depth here. 
Mythic deities could not be truly ascribed godhood. They were actually humans sometimes 
called ‘gods’ and at other times ‘heroes.’157 Perhaps Tertullian here was referring to the many 
hero-cults of the Roman pantheon. Many of the figures revered as gods were immoral in their 
character, reprehensible for adultery or parricide.
158
 Romans revealed the flimsiness of their 
belief system when they dismissed their own epic poems as fiction. Nor was poetic licence 
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any excuse for inconstancy in depicting the gods. Indeed, anybody who believed poets’ 
testimony was being duped.
159
 Some might have said that the poets merely honoured the 
dead; yet in doing so they would admit the human origin of the gods.
160
 
The mythic gods thus dismantled, Tertullian turned towards the Gentile class.
161
 
Tertullian aggressively headed this section by comparing the many various gods of the world 
to the constancy of the Christian God. Other gods had been adopted capriciously, and were 
interpreted according to the individual whims of the races to the point where they could not 
be easily reconciled.
162
 On the other hand, Tertullian said, the Christian God was ‘everywhere 
known, everywhere present, everywhere powerful-- an object that should be worshipped by 
all, and served by all.’163 He then listed a number of obscure regional deities, many of whose 
names would have meant little to the ancient reader in Carthage.
164
 Yet the mythology 
associated with many of the pagan gods was in fact a corruption of scriptural narrative. By 
way of example, Tertullian introduced the idea that Serapis was in fact a garbled version of 
Joseph.
165
 
The remainder of Ad Nationes focused exclusively upon the Roman religion.
166
 In this 
section, Tertullian compelled the reader with a confirmatio. His over-riding argument, 
affirmed throughout, was that the Roman gods were actually deceased humans, who were not 
worthy to be deified.
167
 In this part of the treatise, Tertullian made a further reference to the 
unborn child, as part of his disparagement of the Roman religion.
168
 Before he mentioned the 
unborn child, Tertullian iterated that Roman power had been the instrument which 
transmitted the errors concerning the three types of god.
169
 In answer to the threefold 
distinction between different types of deities, Tertullian devised his own means of classifying 
the gods upheld by the Romans. He made a distinction between the communes or ‘common’ 
gods and the proprii, or ‘particular’ ones.170 The Romans assimilated the gods of their fallen 
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enemies into their pantheon, and also worshipped deified mortals.
171
 Yet Tertullian argued 
that deifications were apportioned inconsistently, and that a system where fallible figures 
such as Aeneas or Romulus could become gods was not to be esteemed.
172
 Dubious figures 
from mythology and recent history could be assigned godhood.
173
 
In chapter eleven, Tertullian embarked upon a brief digression in which he made 
comments concerning the gods assigned to the protection of the unborn. Tertullian listed 
many pagan deities associated with the protection of children. His point was that the Roman 
system of appointing deities for specific tasks was haphazard, and the most abstract of 
concepts could be treated as deities.
174
 Moreover, he argued that the Roman religion was 
clearly false, since gods and goddesses could be created to suit devotees’ needs on an ad hoc 
basis. Unfortunately, this section of Ad Nationes has not survived in full. There is only one 
manuscript, held in the Codex Agobardinus. The pages discussing the gods of the unborn 
(folios 29r and 29v) have sustained heavy damage.
175
 The text remaining to us reads: 
People are not content merely to assert that these things are gods, 
which were seen, heard, and dealt with above, whose images have 
been painted and whose deeds have been chronicled, and whose 
memory is propagated. Rather, people insist upon making bodiless 
and inanimate shadows sacred, and even the mere names for things. 
They divide up a person’s entire condition between separate powers 
even from conception in the womb. Thus there is god named 
Consevius, who... presides over... from sexual intercourse, and 
Fluviona who (nourishes) the child in the womb. After this, there are 
Vitumnus and Sentinus, through whom the child begins to live and 
have its first sensations. There is moreover Diespiter, who leads the 
child to birth, with... And Candelifera, who bears the (child?) to the 
light of the candle, and who... it is said. Those born wrongly... Indeed 
is the duty of Prosa, one of the Carmentes...
176
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All of these entities served to safeguard the unborn child and supervised the baby’s 
development in utero in order to ensure safe delivery. Tertullian’s point here was not that the 
child did not deserve such protection, but that a religion in which abstract concepts could be 
deified on the spot was difficult to take seriously. For him, it was absurd that the Romans 
should devise a new deity for every stage of life.  
Tertullian then once again turned back to his arguments that the entities worshipped 
as gods were actually humans, and immoral ones at that.
177
 Saturn, the progenitor of Jupiter, 
was mortal.
178
 The inferior nature of the gods was demonstrated by the fact that some higher 
power had to elevate them to godhood.
179
 Moreover, the greatest of the gods did not merit the 
status of godhood. Jupiter was a scurrilous usurper, who willingly entered into an incestuous 
marriage, and practised other debaucheries as well. Anybody who upheld him as Jupiter 
Optimus clearly idolised such infamy.
180
 Hercules was a debased parricide, prone to fits of 
madness, yet he was revered with a cult.
181
 Aesculapius was no better.
182
 The constellations, 
if they were divine, did no more than spectate coldly over mortal affairs.
183
 If the genii 
locorum were to be esteemed as gods, then the heavens were very crowded indeed. These 
spirits served to aid devotees in specific tasks; yet foreigners who had no knowledge of the 
genii performed those tasks just as competently. They were therefore false.
184
 Artists were 
not to be regarded as divine either, as they owed their creative faculty to the original 
creator.
185
  
Tertullian then rounded off with a conclusio.
186
 He ended Ad Nationes by warning his 
imagined Roman reader that their piety towards the gods would not ensure the continued 
glory of the empire. After all, the gods had built up and subsequently abandoned empires of 
greater antiquity than that of Rome. Imperial power was not apportioned at the whim of the 
pagan gods, but by the supreme God of the Christians.
187
 In his words:  
Ask who has ordained these turning points in time. It is the same 
(God) who hands out kingdoms, and has now allotted authority over 
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them to the Romans, as though the wealth of many (lands) were 
collected in one chest, after it had been demanded. Those who are 
nearest to Him know what He has decided for it.
188
   
According to Barnes, Tertullian’s Apologeticum was also written in AD 197, shortly 
after Ad Nationes.
189
 The Apologeticum was considerably longer than Ad Nationes, 
comprising fifty chapters. It was far less imitative of the Greek apologists than its forerunner, 
and featured a much broader range of exempla drawn from pagan sources.
190
 Like Ad 
Nationes, the Apologeticum was a forensic treatise whose purpose was the exculpation of 
Christians from charges commonly levelled against them. Tertullian evoked the image of a 
court in which Christianity itself was on trial for treason against the Roman state; he adopted 
the role of defence advocate. Sider (2001) summarises the structure of the treatise as 
follows.
191
 First, Tertullian made introductory remarks in chapters 1.1-6.11. After that, 
Tertullian refuted the charges based upon fama.
192
 The rest of the body of the Apologeticum 
(10.1-45.7) consists of Tertullian’s handling of crimes which Christians were accused of 
committing openly. Tertullian devoted this section of the Apologeticum to answering two 
main allegations. First, he countered the claim that the Christians were atheists (10.1-28.3), 
and next that they were inimical to the state (28.4-45.7). Tertullian’s conclusio comprised 
chapters 46.1-50.16. Many of the arguments presented in the Apologeticum will be familiar to 
one who has read Ad Nationes. Yet, while the two books of Ad Nationes were disparate, 
Tertullian here achieved a unity of argument previously unheard of in Christian rhetoric.
193
 
Tertullian has been called ‘a pugilist with a pen.’194 Here, he certainly lived up to the 
metaphor, alternating skilfully between using refutation to block his opponent’s arguments, 
and delivering some devastating blows of his own through positive argument. 
For this dissertation, the chapters of greatest relevance are the opening statements and 
the section dealing with accusations concerning manifest crimes. The exordium and the 
narratio in the Apologeticum consisted of the first three chapters. Tertullian addressed the 
treatise specifically to the provincial governors, appealing to their sense of justice.
195
 First, he 
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pointed out the injustice of their tendency not to judge Christians according to the same 
standard as that applied to other criminals, due to prejudice and ignorance.
196
 Tertullian’s 
narratio was found in chapters two and three. In the second chapter, Tertullian iterated that 
the case against Christians was invalid because there was simply no story to tell.
197
 In his 
third chapter he traced the narrative of how even a good person could find their reputation 
destroyed by rumour.
198
 He said that he would demonstrate the Christians’ innocence by 
repudiating the misconception that they practised anti-social activities.
199
 Tertullian listed the 
charges falsely laid against Christianity. As with Ad Nationes, these were ‘murder, sacrilege, 
incest, and treason.’200 Tertullian declared his intention to disprove each of these claims in 
turn, on the basis that the charges were founded upon no evidence stronger than hearsay and 
rumour.
201
 Tertullian argued that these rumours had emerged due to the public’s lack of 
knowledge regarding Christian praxis.
202
 Tertullian then moved on to his propositio in 
chapter four. Here, he said that he would prove that those who falsely accused Christians of 
anti-social behaviour were in fact attempting to defer their own guilt hypocritically. As he 
said:  
I am undertaking these things for the purpose of subjecting the 
injustice of the public’s hateful deeds against us to scorn. I will now 
take a stand concerning the case of our innocence, and I will not 
merely refute the charges which are brought up against us, but I will 
even turn (the charges) which (our accusers) bring against them, so 
that from this people also know that those (crimes) are not present 
among the Christians which they do not realise actually exist among 
themselves, and simultaneously so that our accusers can be put to 
shame; not, I say, as the worst (people) accusing the best, but rather as 
their equals, as per their wish.
203
     
Tertullian also included a praemunitio in chapters four through to six, in which he pre-
empted the counter-arguments that being a Christian was illegal in itself, and that Christianity 
ought to be rejected as a strange and foreign religion. He retorted that laws could be changed 
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or repealed if they were found to be unjust or self-contradictory.
204
 Only cruel tyrants, such as 
Nero and Domitian, had gone out of their way to persecute the Christians.
205
 Furthermore, 
Christianity was no stranger than any of the many foreign cults already incorporated into the 
state religion.
206
 Nor was social conservatism an acceptable reason to denigrate Christians, as 
Romans embraced new customs readily.
207
  
 Tertullian next directed the reader’s attention towards infanticide and incest, the first 
two charges against the Christians.
208
 He said that he dealt with these clandestine crimes 
together, ‘in order that I might clear my way towards more open affairs.’209 It was in this 
section of the Apologeticum dealing with secret crimes that Tertullian mentioned abortion. 
chapter seven consisted of a refutatio, in which Tertullian provided negative arguments 
which undermined the validity of the charges. He asserted that there was no evidence; the 
crimes had supposedly occurred without witnesses, after all.
210
 In the absence of any actual 
proof, his imagined accuser was forced to admit that their case was based upon supposition 
and rumour. In chapter eight, Tertullian offered several further counter-arguments based upon 
artificial evidence. Neither pagan nor Christian would think that the prospect of eternal life 
was worth committing such heinous acts as those imputed to the Christians: 
Come then, plunge the sword into the baby, enemy of nobody, the 
accused of nobody, a child of all people! Or else, if that task belongs 
to somebody else, simply stand beside a human being dying before 
having really lived, await the flight of the new soul, take up the fresh 
blood, soak your bread with it, eat freely.
211
 
Tertullian built upon this point aggressively in the next chapter, a confirmatio in 
which he made positive arguments illustrating the actual nature of Christian praxis. He 
reaffirmed his intention, stated in chapter four, of proving that pagans actually were guilty of 
the very crimes of which they accused the Christians.
212
 Tertullian argued that Christians 
could not be guilty of homicide, since they were so zealous in their preservation of life that 
they refused to terminate even infants in utero. He enumerated many exempla of cannibalism 
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and human sacrifice drawn from Roman mythology and history, as well as local Punic 
customs, in order to demonstrate that pagans were actually guiltier of these crimes than 
Christians.
213
 Then Tertullian declared that by comparison, the Christian ethos was so 
exemplary that Christians abrogated even abortion:  
Indeed, because homicide has been prohibited for us at all times, we 
are not permitted to dissolve even the conceptus in utero, while as yet 
blood is drawn off into the person. It is quick homicide to prevent a 
birth, and it does not matter whether you snatch away a life that has 
come into existence, or one that is coming into existence. That is a 
human, even that which is yet to be; the whole fruit is already in the 
seed.
214
  
In this instance, Tertullian profited from explicating the contrasts between his pagan and 
Christian exempla. An orator could exploit dissimilarities between his exempla to great 
rhetorical effect. Quintilian demonstrated the use of ‘unlikeness’ in rhetoric by pointing out 
the difference between Marcellus’ legitimate seizure of Syracusian artworks as spoils of war, 
compared to the governor Verres’ illegal looting of Syracusian temples.215 Tertullian utilised 
bloodthirsty and perhaps fictitious exempla of non-Christians shedding blood, in order to 
make Christians appear more virtuous by comparison.   
Tertullian’s argument in his apologies that the Christians normally abstained from 
practising abortion owed a great deal to Greco-Roman rhetorical advice regarding the 
usefulness of ethos, ‘character,’ to legal rhetoric. In his Ars Rhetorica, Aristotle defined ethos 
as one of the three modes of persuasion an orator should adopt in order to win over a jury.
216
 
The other avenues of persuasion included pathos ‘passion,’ and logos ‘logic.’ 217 However, 
these would have been useless if listeners did not consider the speaker trustworthy. It was 
thus imperative for a speaker to impress their integrity and credibility upon the audience.
218
 
The speaker had to convince the audience that they were technically able, that they were 
morally virtuous, and that they were well disposed towards the audience.
219
 Roman 
rhetoricians incorporated the idea of ethos into their own rhetorical system, with one major 
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difference. The Roman legal system allowed lawyers to advocate for others in court, while 
orators represented themselves in the Athenian law-courts.
220
 Therefore, as Cicero explained 
through the mouthpiece of Antoninus in De Oratione, it was necessary for an advocate to 
construct both himself and his client carefully through speech.
221
 Orators could cultivate a 
persona of moderation and reservation, in order to win the sympathy of the jury.
222
 Quintilian 
generally concurred with Cicero.
223
 
By suggesting that Christians normally abstained from abortion, Tertullian rendered 
them as paragons of virtue. Moreover, Tertullian demonstrated that his client, Christianity, 
was well disposed towards his imagined jury of Roman governors. The Christian ethos 
concerning the value of human life was unimpeachable, according to Tertullian’s rhetoric, 
and indeed superior to that of the accusers. He had established in chapter eight that a pagan 
would recoil from the idea of slaying a baby and consuming the infant’s blood, even when 
offered the enticement of eternal life; the Christians were unusual in that they regarded child-
killing as abhorrent even before the offspring was fully acknowledged as a human being. If it 
was expected that one should not stand by a morienti homini antequam vixit, the Christians 
were even more astounding in that they viewed the destruction of the futurus homo as 
murder.  
In doing so, he also implied heavily (without directly stating it) that abortion was a 
regular practice among his Roman contemporaries. Their ethos was inferior. As with Ad 
Nationes, it was irrelevant whether the insinuation was fair. It was enough for him that his 
reader would readily believe it of the accuser, and thus view the defendant in a better light. 
Tertullian’s characterisation of Christian ethos concerning the termination of life in the womb 
also explains why he was inclined in the Apologeticum to present Christians as uniformly 
against abortion. The Apologeticum differed from his presentation of Christian views on 
abortion in the later De Anima. In his treatise on the soul, Tertullian presented contemporary 
Christian attitudes towards abortion as more morally grey, recognising that abortion could be 
medically necessary in certain circumstances.
224
 Adopting a similar stance for the 
Apologeticum would have weakened his efforts to portray Christians’ exemplary ethos 
concerning infancy, and by extension homicide. 
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As Dixon and Kapparis point out, it is not likely that induced abortion was a routine 
procedure in antiquity, due to the variety of medical hazards it presented.
225
 Termination was 
not a medically safe means of family planning, particularly in the later stages of pregnancy.
226
 
Moreover, it is questionable how many actual abortions Tertullian was privy to, since they 
would have occurred behind closed doors. It is likely that his arguments concerning the 
supposed normality of abortion as a means of family planning among pagans were based 
upon invention, rumour and supposition. Tertullian’s reference to abortion here should be 
considered an example of artificial evidence. However, by suggesting that pagans routinely 
ended their pregnancies, Tertullian characterised them as practitioners of homicide. In doing 
so, he made Christians appear gentler and more ethically beneficent by comparison. This 
aided his purpose of painting Christians as having a gentler ethos concerning the unborn 
child. 
On the other hand, it is worth noting that in the Apologeticum Tertullian did not 
appear to consider abortion a form of parricide, the legal category of murder considered most 
heinous in the eyes of Roman law. He was at pains to emphasise the difference between 
homicidium, the general term for murder, and parricidium, the term for the murder of one’s 
close relatives. Tertullian stressed the distinction between the terms twice.
227
 Here, 
Tertullian’s point was that while pagans accused Christians of committing homicide, they 
themselves were guilty of the much more serious crime of parricide. Since abortions were 
generally carried out with the consent of one or both parents, one might expect that Tertullian 
would have called the procedure parricide. However, it made sense for Tertullian to call 
abortion homicide rather than parricide in this context, since he was answering the accusation 
of homicide directly. Calling abortion parricide, as he would in the later Ad Uxorem, would 
have confused his distinction between the crimes of which the Christians were innocent from 
those of which the pagans were guilty.
228
 
The remainder of the Apologeticum contains nothing significant for investigating 
Tertullian’s attitude towards the unborn child, but it is worth outlining in brief.229 Doing so 
will demonstrate just how small a part the exemplum of the unborn played in the overall 
scheme of the treatise. In response to the charge of atheism, Tertullian gave a further 
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refutation. The Christians could not be rightly viewed as atheists, since the pagan gods were 
fictitious.
230
 Furthermore, the supposedly devout pagans hypocritically insulted their own 
gods.
231
 In turn, he rebuffed flawed conceptualisations of Christ.
232
 Tertullian gave a 
confirmatio, in which he explicated Christian monotheism.
233
 He had previously 
demonstrated that the pagan deities were not truly divine. Now, he showed their true nature 
as demons.
234
 Moreover, the Romans did not owe their empire to divine agency.
235
  
Having concluded his arguments on the pagan gods, Tertullian turned towards 
political themes.
236
 He continued his thread of positive argument, averring that Christians 
actually benefitted the empire because they prayed on behalf of its rulers.
237
 The Christian 
might not have participated in public festivals like their pagan neighbours, but this did not 
prove that they were disloyal.
238
 It was unfair to single out Christians as traitors. As 
demonstrated by the recent civil war, pagans were more apt to turn against the emperor than 
Christians were.
239
 Nor were Christians a subversive sect.
240
 Compared to pagans, they were 
model citizens, making productive contributions to their respective communities.
241
 
Tertullian finally summed up with his conclusio, in which he indicated that Christianity was 
no mere philosophy.
242
 It was the true faith, and even in the face of persecution Christ’s 
followers would not be deterred.
243
 
While Ad Nationes and the Apologeticum were forensic works, Tertullian’s address to 
his wife, Ad Uxorem, was deliberative.
244
 As such, the treatise was meant to exhort its reader 
to follow a specific course of action. In this case, Tertullian adopted the genre of the 
consolatio as a means by which to argue against Christian remarriage following 
bereavement.
245
 Traditionally, the consolatio served to comfort a reader who was already 
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grieving over a personal loss.
246
 However, Tertullian subverted the traditions of the genre 
ingeniously. He wrote this treatise for his wife, in anticipation of her mourning in the event 
that he should hypothetically die before her.
247
 It is questionable whether Tertullian actually 
intended for his wife to receive the work as a personal epistle, or whether his intentions were 
more rhetorical. The epistolary genre presented an expedient means by which he could 
present his arguments on remarriage to Christian peers. By rendering Ad Uxorem like a 
personal letter, Tertullian gave his words greater emotional impact, plucking at the 
heartstrings of his readers by using his own personal life to prove a moral point. 
Ad Uxorem was divided into two books, written between 198 and 203.
248
 As with Ad 
Nationes, the two books can be read as separate, self-contained works. Each dealt with the 
same theme of remarriage. Tertullian appears to have come back to write the second book of 
Ad Uxorem sometime later, in order to follow up on issues raised in the first part.
249
 The first 
book mostly consisted of arguments against remarriage. The second dealt more specifically 
with problems that could hypothetically arise if a Christian woman were to enter an 
exogamous marriage after her first had ended. The first book of Ad Uxorem is of greater 
importance for this dissertation, as it referred to the unborn child. Whether he intended the 
work to be received as a personal letter or as a rhetorical exercise, Tertullian stated in his 
propositio of Book One that he aimed to persuade his wife to remain celibate after death had 
separated them, on the basis of Paul’s advocacy of celibacy in 1 Corinthians.250 As Tertullian 
said: 
Therefore, I instruct you that you should reject marriage after our 
departure, with all the self-control you can. Not that by this there will 
be any advantage in my name, except that by which you will gain for 
yourself.
251
 
A second marriage, as he argued in the second chapter, would simply be a form of serial 
polygamy. In the days of the patriarchs, polygamy had been necessary, but by Tertullian’s 
time it was no longer an acceptable practice: ‘Materials for subsequent emendations were 
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organised in advance, from which the Lord by His gospel, and then the apostle in the last 
days of the (Jewish) age, either cut off the redundancies or arranged the disorders.’252 
In order to demonstrate that his wife should remain celibate, Tertullian focused in the 
third, fourth and fifth chapters upon themes common to deliberative oratory.
253
 Sider 
identifies the main themes of deliberative oratory as ‘advantage, honour and necessity,’ and 
suggests that Tertullian explored them especially in relation to motive and cause.
254
 In 
focusing upon these themes, Tertullian was perhaps building upon Cicero and Quintilian’s 
advice concerning deliberative oratory. In De Inventione Rhetorica, Cicero defined 
‘advantage,’ as something from which one derived personal benefit, such as wealth.255 On the 
other hand, honourable themes existed purely for their own sake. Cicero listed ‘wisdom, 
justice, courage and temperance’ as honourable themes for a speaker to pursue.256 Honour 
and advantage were not mutually exclusive concepts.
257
 Necessity, however, was a 
rhetorically weak cause or motivation, which in the view of both Cicero and Quintilian paled 
in significance next to honour.
258
 However, Quintilian also made it clear that other rhetors 
frequently explained motivation and cause in terms of necessity successfully.
259
 
While it was permissible for Christians to marry, Tertullian argued that it was a mere 
necessity in instances where a Christian might succumb to temptation. Marriage was an 
acceptable choice for a Christian, but celibacy was preferable due to its inherent virtue. ‘It is 
easily discerned that the ground on which the power of marrying is conceded is necessity; but 
whatever necessity grants, she by her very nature depreciates,’ he wrote.260 Tertullian 
compared the issue of marriage to the dilemma of a prospective martyr. It was acceptable to 
flee persecution rather than deny Christ under torture. Yet it was more honourable for a 
Christian to endure torture and profess the name of Christ.
261
 Likewise, it was a more 
honourable course for a Christian to choose celibacy on a voluntary basis, rather than be 
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impelled towards marriage by the necessity of avoiding sexual immorality. In this case, the 
honourable course would yield greater advantages. In his words:  
Therefore there are certain things which should not be desired simply 
because they are not forbidden; yet in a way they are forbidden, since 
other things are preferred to them. For the preference given to the 
superior things is dissuasion from the inferior. A thing is not good 
simply because it is not evil, though it is not evil because it does no 
harm. That which is fully ‘good’ is further superior, however, because 
it does not just do no harm, but is above all profitable. For you should 
prefer things that are profitable over those which are (merely) not 
harmful. For the former is what every battle strives for. The latter has 
consolation, but does not have victory.
262
 
Tertullian then further elaborated upon the division between the necessity of marriage 
and the honour of celibacy. Marriage, he argued, was only necessary in cases where a 
Christian was subject to concupiscentia. There were two varieties of concupiscence: that of 
fleshly desire, and that of worldly desire. The ephemeral advantages offered by either choice 
paled in comparison to the eternal advantages of celibacy. He said:  
Concupiscence of the flesh lays claim to the business of adulthood. It 
seeks after the harvest of beauty, rejoices in its own shame, and says 
that a husband is necessary for the (female) sex, either as a source of 
authority and comfort, or so that she may be safe from evil 
rumours.
263
 
On the other hand, women who remained celibate after marriage enjoyed God’s approval, a 
closer relationship with their Lord, and the eternal gift of His blessing.
264
  
Working yourself towards the emulation of (their) self-control by the 
examples of such women, you will through spiritual affection lay that 
fleshly concupiscence to rest, in abolishing the temporary and flighty 
desires of beauty or youth, while attaining the compensating 
achievement of immortal blessings.
265
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Worldly concupiscence, conversely, had its roots in a person’s ‘hunger for glory, 
greed, ambition, and inadequacy.’266 A Christian contemplating a second marriage for these 
reasons would reap the futile reward of money appropriated from another family.
267
 A 
celibate Christian, on the other hand, had no need for such things, as God provided all of their 
needs. Christians, living for the next world, had no need for riches or ostentatious displays of 
wealth.  
I implore you to take for granted that you need for nothing, so long as 
you can attend upon the Lord; indeed, (accept) that you have all 
things, if you have the Lord, whose are all things. Reflect on heavenly 
things, and you will despise earthly things. In the case of the widow 
sworn to God, nothing is necessary but perseverance.
268
  
Once he had established that the motivations for second marriage were deficient, Tertullian 
then had to pre-empt the counter-argument that procreation was an important justification for 
marriage. 
Tertullian’s discussion of abortion and the unborn child in Ad Uxorem should be 
considered part of this cross-examination of the worldly reasons for marriage. Tertullian 
argued that the necessity of childrearing did not correlate with his conceptualisation of 
Christian honour or advantage, as they were based purely upon parents’ self-interest in their 
own legacy. In his words: 
Indeed, people build their cases for marriage from concerns for their 
posterity, and the extremely caustic delight of children. This is a moot 
point for us. For why should we have a passionate desire to raise 
children, whom we wish to send forth, once we have them, in 
consideration, of course, of the imminent difficulties, even as we 
ourselves long also to be lifted from this most unjust and secular 
world, and restored to the Lord, which was the pledge even of an 
apostle? Forsooth, progeny are necessary for the servant of God! For 
we are secure enough regarding our own salvation, (so) that we have 
free time for children. Our own burdens must be sought after, which 
are evaded even by most Gentiles, who are forced (to reproduce) by 
legislation, who are devastated by abortions; (burdens) which, if 
nothing else, are to us most of all unnatural, insofar as they are 
hazards to faith! For why did the Lord foretell: “Alas for the pregnant 
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women, and those suckling,” if not because he bears witness that 
upon that day of reckoning the inconveniences of children are going 
to be hindrances? Naturally, marriage is what these things denote. 
However, it will not pertain to widows. They will rush forward 
unencumbered at the angel’s first trumpet-call. They will endure to 
the end whatever oppression and persecution freely, with nothing 
boiling in the womb, no hefty burden of marriage upon the breast.
269 
 
In this passage, Tertullian first attempted to prove that it was not necessary for Christians to 
have children, in light of his belief in the looming apocalypse. As a motivation, necessity was 
therefore an insufficient motive for Christians to beget children, since the benefits of celibacy 
far outweighed those of procreating. Tertullian suggested that Christians should avoid having 
babies, since it would be easier to endure martyrdom without the anxieties of parenthood.
270
 
By abstaining from having children, Tertullian suggested that Christians could avail 
themselves of the honour and advantage of the divine grace in which God held martyrs.  
In this particular passage, Tertullian was discussing the apparently common desire 
among non-Christians to avoid having children. He considered it alongside Roman laws 
which compelled citizens to reproduce. Again, it is worth emphasising that Tertullian’s 
presentation of abortion as a regular practice among pagans should not be treated as 
reportage. His description of pagan mores concerning abortion should be viewed as 
subordinate to his overall aim in this section of proving that it was not ideal for Christians to 
reproduce. Admittedly, Tertullian may here have meant parricidium in its normal sense of 
‘parricide,’ rather than as a synonym for the more common abortio. If this were the case, then 
Tertullian could have meant the term ‘parricide’ to refer to the killing of newborn rather than 
unborn children. Yet Tertullian’s use of the term here is ambiguous, likely on purpose. He 
made it clear that he was referring to both the offspring in utero and the newborn child in his 
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quotation of Luke and Matthew: Vae praegnantibus et nutricantibus.
271 Tertullian’s 
discussion of the sarcina aestuans in utero also shows that his discussion of parricide applied 
also to women who had not yet given birth.
272
 It is also worth considering that Tertullian’s 
fellow African Christian, Minucius Felix, unambiguously applied the term parricidium to 
abortion in the Octavius.
273
 It is probable that Tertullian used the term in the same way. In 
this passage, Tertullian has elided the concepts of infanticide and abortion, denigrating each 
under the harshest possible term for murder.  
Overall, Tertullian’s argument seemed to be that if even the worldly pagans avoided 
the onerous task of rearing children, then ideally Christians, living for the next world and 
mindful of the looming apocalypse, should too. However, he did not go so far as to condemn 
Christians who already had children. Nor did he strongly disparage Christians who sought to 
become parents. He qualified his argument through the words: Nimirum necessaria suboles 
seruo Dei. Satis enim de salute nostra securi sumus, ut liberis uacemus.
274
 For a married 
Christian, children were a permitted necessity, and those whose salvation was already 
prepared could have children. Though reproduction was allowable, the choice to become a 
parent was still inferior to that of childlessness. Childless widows were better positioned for 
the honour of responding to the angel’s calling than those who had the responsibility of 
carrying or rearing a child.   
In the following chapter, Tertullian continued to compare Christian practices to those 
of pagans. He argued that pagan widows found it easier to be celibate after their first 
marriage. Surely if they could manage to remain single in widowhood, then his wife could?
275
 
God would have willed that her husband should be taken from this world.
276
 She (or indeed 
any widow) thus had an opportunity to embrace celibacy, the superior choice: ‘The occasion 
must be embraced which puts an end to what necessity commanded.’277 Priesthood, after all, 
was barred to men who had remarried.
278
 Tertullian’s subsequent conclusio ended the book 
with a series of appeals. Tertullian urged his wife to consider Isaiah 1.1.17.18. She would 
have the honour of God’s benefaction, a gift greater even than that allotted to virgins.279 
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Finally, he suggested that she ought to avoid the company of those who might dissuade her 
from the course he recommended.
280
  
My dearest fellow-servant, I commend these things to you 
now, following the apostle. These things have been undertaken 
profusely indeed, but even so they are likely to be a source of 
consolation to you some day, for you will cherish my memory by 
returning to (my words) if it turns out thus.
281
 
The second book of Ad Uxorem did not mention the unborn, and will thus be 
summarised only in brief. For the second book of Ad Uxorem, Tertullian argued that his wife, 
if she had to remarry, should at least marry a Christian.
282
 In his narratio, Tertullian said that 
the case of a local woman who had married outside the faith had given him pause to consider 
the problems she might face.
283
 Tertullian built his case upon Paul’s First Letter to the 
Corinthians, where Paul said that people ought to marry ‘in the Lord.’284 One might argue 
that it was permitted for Christians to marry pagans, for Paul had said that one should not 
dissolve their marriage to a non-believer after conversion.
285
 However, Tertullian retorted, 
Paul clearly referred to people who became Christian after marriage, not before.
286
 Marriage 
with a Gentile was a form of infidelity, defiling the Church.
287
 A Christian woman married to 
a pagan would have her loyalty divided between two masters.
288
 Even a husband tolerant of 
his wife’s beliefs would generate strife, as he would have access to the mysteries of Christ.289 
Even worse, a Christian woman in an exogamous marriage might be expected to partake in 
pagan rituals.
290
 A pagan man who had willingly entered a marriage with a Christian would 
be less likely to convert than one whose spouse became a Christian after marriage.
291
 After 
further comparison between pagan and Christian marital practices, Tertullian finished with an 
extended encomium praising the beauty of Christian marriage, illustrating that a Christian 
would a better choice of husband for his wife.
292
 It also perhaps diverted attention from the 
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fact that many of his arguments against remarriage in the first book could apply just as easily 
to his current marriage.
293
 
De Exhortatione Castitatis was somewhat similar to Ad Uxorem, in that it was 
constructed as a deliberative speech framed as a personal address. While Ad Uxorem dealt 
with widows, Tertullian here beseeched a widower, an un-named Christian ‘brother’ who was 
contemplating marriage.
294
 It is open for speculation whether Tertullian had a specific man in 
mind when he wrote the treatise, or whether he meant it as an open letter to Christian 
husbands. Regardless, the treatise exhorted an argument similar to that of Ad Uxorem. Like 
Ad Uxorem, Tertullian here sought to argue based upon Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians 
that it was less than ideal for a Christian widower to remarry.
295
 Yet Tertullian adopted a less 
compromising perspective on the issue generally, dismissing any motivation for remarriage 
as an excuse for the satiation of sexual lust. Indeed, Tertullian set himself against the 
necessities of the flesh ‘as an advocate.’296 His thesis was that God wished for men to remain 
celibate, although He would indulge their weaknesses of the flesh by allowing them to 
marry.
297
 The only truly acceptable course for a Christian widower, therefore, was that of 
discipline and self-restraint. 
It is not surprising that Tertullian approached the issue from a more puritanical 
perspective. Barnes suggests that Tertullian wrote De Exhortatione Castitatis in AD 208, 
after he had joined the Montanist Christian sect.
298
 The Montanists’ moral standards were 
unusually strict.
299
 If Tertullian intended this treatise for a Montanist reader, he might have 
left himself open to criticism by his fellow Montanists for taking a softer approach. This 
treatise was somewhat harsher in its premise than Ad Uxorem, in that Tertullian made no 
allowance even for endogamous remarriage. He argued that remarriage was wrong in every 
instance, even to a fellow Christian.
300
   
In the opening lines of De Exhortatione Castitatis, Tertullian identified three species 
of virginity: that from birth, that from baptism, and that which issued from the renunciation 
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of sex following the severance of marriage.
301
 Of these, the third species was the most 
virtuous and praiseworthy, as it reflected the moderation of the widower.
302
 Tertullian then 
offered an exordium, in which he ruminated upon the question of free will in relation to the 
topic at hand. God had ended the widower’s first marriage; thus remarrying would a rebellion 
against the will of God. Men were responsible for their own desires, and could not blame 
either the Lord or the devil for things born of human volition.
303
 By careful deliberation, the 
reader could discern things genuinely pleasing to God from that which He simply indulged.
304
 
Those forged from human discipline more reflected God’s will. If God preferred one course 
of action but would allow another, then the former was the best. The latter was a partial sin, 
not so much good but a lesser evil.
305
 
Tertullian then began his confirmatio in earnest, citing scriptural evidence. There was 
nothing specific in the Apostle’s writings which prescribed a second marriage; anything not 
specifically allowed by God was forbidden.
306
 By urging sexual self-restraint, Paul had 
implicitly argued that people ought not to lack restraint. Remarriage might have brought the 
Christian widower greater levels of worldly happiness, but celibacy would bring him closer to 
the Holy Spirit.
307
 Tertullian then addressed the issue of polygamy. As with Ad Uxorem, 
Tertullian construed serial monogamy as a kind of polygamy. God had established 
monogamy as the ideal course by creating one wife for Adam, not many.
308
 In the days of the 
patriarchs, polygamy had been necessary to fulfil God’s commandment to ‘be fruitful and 
multiply,’ but now that was superseded by Paul’s encouragement of celibacy.309 Yet even the 
Old Testament had laid down precedents for monogamy. According to Tertullian’s 
interpretation of Leviticus, men could not be admitted to the priesthood if they had been 
married more than once.
310
 Since even members of the laity could be seen as members of a 
priesthood, the widower would be shirking his duties if he took another wife.
311
 Marriage 
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might have been lawful in the eyes of God, but it was not necessarily expedient; after all, the 
apostles could have married if they chose, but they did not.
312
  
In chapter nine, Tertullian argued that remarriage was a form of fornication.
313
 This 
chapter would set up his later points regarding the unborn, and thus it is important to analyse 
it closely. Here, Tertullian made some comments which could be viewed (perhaps fairly) as 
derogatory of marriage as an institution. He himself acknowledged that his words might be 
interpreted this way.
314
 The means of becoming a husband (looking upon a woman with 
desire) were the same as those which led to sexual promiscuity.
315
 The distinction, for 
Tertullian, was one of legality: ‘It is laws which seem to make the difference between 
marriage and fornication, through diversity of illicitness, not through the nature of the thing 
itself.’316 It was best, therefore, to eschew contact with women altogether.317 As always, 
though, it is important not to take Tertullian’s words out of context. Tertullian was a married 
man, as anybody who knew him would have realised. He could not have challenged the 
institution of marriage without seriously undermining his own credibility. His points against 
marriage should be considered in light of the following lines: 
Be grateful, if God indulged you to marry once. In fact, you will be 
grateful if you don’t realise that He has indulged you (to marry) once 
again. But you will abuse His indulgence if you make use of it of it 
without modesty. Modesty is understood from the term modus, 
‘limit.’318   
Tertullian’s point was not that marriage was wrong, per se, but that it was not the optimal 
course for a Christian.
319
 The end result of all this marrying was that Christians would be 
burdened with children, and thus ill-prepared to face the trials of the apocalypse. Tertullian’s 
point was very similar to that of Ad Uxorem 1.5. In his words:  
And marrying, let us be overrun by the final day, just like Sodom and 
Gomorrah. It will be on that day when the "woe" pronounced over 
"such as are pregnant and breastfeeding" shall be fulfilled; that is, 
over the married and those who lack self-control. For from marriage 
there come (full) wombs, (lactating) breasts, and infants. And when 
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will there be an end of marrying? I believe it will be after the end of 
living.
320
 
Tertullian would build upon this point in chapter twelve, where he would strip away the 
reasons for which men sought to be married to reveal the true purpose, procreation. In the 
intervening chapters (10.1-11.2), Tertullian argued that widowhood would bring greater 
spiritual advantages than remarrying. Abstinence would render prayer more effective, and 
enhance the Christian’s ability to contemplate Scripture, sing psalms, and perform 
exorcisms.
321
 If humanity’s carnal nature was sinful in first marriage, it was a great deal more 
so in second.
322
 Moreover, a Christian husband would remain tied to the spirit of his deceased 
wife even as he was bound to that of his second. He would be a spiritual bigamist, ashamed 
before his fellow Christians who had been married only once.
323
 
In chapter twelve, Tertullian picked up his previous point about the burden of 
children. He offered a list of the traditional justifications for (re)marriage, saying: 
I know the excuses by which we could gloss over the insatiable desire 
of the flesh. We allege: the home needs to be administered, the 
household needs governing; money-boxes and keys have to be 
watched over; the weaving needs to be dispensed; our food needs to 
be prepared and our anxieties need to be decreased.
324
 
Yet these motives were moot. The household of a bachelor could prosper as well as that of 
the married man. A Christian could serve better as a Christian soldier if he were not 
encumbered by a wife.
325
 If he wanted to share his household, he could always enter a 
‘spiritual marriage’ with a widow: ‘It is pleasing to God to have many such wives.’326 
Therefore, these alleged reasons for remarriage served no purpose but to cover the real 
motive. Men, Tertullian said, wanted progeny, to ensure their posterity. Children would 
ensure the safe distribution of his property, and make sure their father was properly buried.
327
 
Yet Tertullian argued again that desire for family was a hollow reason for bereaved 
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Christians to seek a new spouse. Propagation would serve nobody’s interest except that of the 
Roman state by providing new spectators for the games in which Christians were killed.
328
  
Tertullian once more used abortion as evidence to support his case. However, he 
adopted a completely different tactic, bringing abortion into the discussion via a rather 
convoluted argument. At first, the mention of abortion seems completely out of place. As he 
said:  
Ergo, what will you do if you fill your new wife with your moral 
principles? Should you dissolve the conceptus by means of 
medication? I think it is no more permitted for us to harm (offspring) 
coming into existence, than one which has already come into 
existence. But perhaps at that time of your wife's pregnancy you will 
be bold enough to beg from God a remedy for such a (serious) 
concern, which you refused when it lay in your own power?
329
  
The Christian widower who simultaneously wanted freedom to be ready for apocalypse and 
to become a father sought two irreconcilable goals. By the time he had impregnated his wife, 
it would be too late to expedite the first goal by ending the pregnancy or by praying for a 
natural miscarriage. Far from dismissing contraceptive abortion as a pagan phenomenon, 
Tertullian here urged his Christian reader to consider that remarriage would likely result in 
undesired pregnancy. Since the pressures of parenthood would make it harder for Christians 
to serve God according to his interpretation of Paul, Tertullian argued that his reader might be 
tempted to abort. The simplest way to avoid this temptation to kill was simply to remain 
celibate.  
 It is also worth considering that Tertullian here again compared dishonourable 
motivations for remarriage against honourable motives for celibacy, as he did in Ad Uxorem. 
Tertullian construed all motives for remarriage as pretexts for lust. His entire argument rested 
upon the idea that lust was an insufficient motive for remarriage. Tertullian presented sexual 
desire as a kind of self-indulgence unsuited to a Christian.
330
 Sexual desire and the wish for 
children were not ‘necessary’ in the sense that Cicero or Quintilian discussed motive. 
Therefore, any pretention towards remarriage paled in its moral value compared to the 
honourable motivation of observing Scripture. In this instance, he upheld celibacy as the sole 
honourable life choice for Christians following the death of a spouse, with the motive of 
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observing Paul. Moreover, Tertullian construed (perhaps fallaciously) that Christians who 
abstained from sex were motivated by the scriptural commandment not to murder. 
The peroration of De Exhortatione Castitatis was very similar to Ad Uxorem 1.6. 
Tertullian iterated numerous exempla of pagan religious institutions whose priests and 
priestesses were expected to be either celibate or to have married only once. Legendary 
examples, such as Dido and Lucretia, had committed suicide in order to remain faithful to 
their first husbands.
331
 If such servants of the devil went to such lengths to avoid remarriage, 
then they put Christians to shame.
332
 Christians, who sought Paradise, should have 
scrupulously avoided that from which Paradise was intact.
333
 
De Virginibus Velandis was also constructed as a deliberative treatise, since it 
advocated a specific course of action.
334
 The dating of this work is somewhat less than 
certain; Barnes places it in AD 208 or 209, but in the afterword of the second edition of his 
book admits that it could have been written later.
335
 Whatever its exact year of composition, 
Tertullian’s work concerning the veiling of virgins clearly shows the influence of his 
Montanist background.
336
 The text was likely a redrafted version of one of his early works, 
because he declared that he had previously expounded upon the topic in Greek.
337
 Tertullian 
opened with his propositio, which succinctly stated his thesis. He sought to prove that ‘it is 
fitting for our virgins to be veiled from the point when they will have passed their age of 
transition.’338 Tertullian was dealing with a controversy that had arisen in his local 
congregation: much to his chagrin, some younger females had begun attending Church 
gatherings unveiled, and were encouraging others to do the same.
339
 In his exordium he 
argued that the local practice of allowing virgins to go unveiled in public, although it had a 
long history, had its origins in mere custom rather than truth.
340
 In his narratio, he then traced 
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the practice of veiling virgins to the very earliest days of the Pauline Church, in order to 
demonstrate that veiling was based upon scriptural precepts rather than custom.
341
  
Tertullian then proceeded onto the main body of his treatise, alternating between 
positive and negative arguments to succour his thesis.
342
 Dunn argues that Tertullian used 
‘the threefold pattern of argumentation.’343 Tertullian explicitly referred to this structure in 
his concluding remarks, where he recapitulated his main points.
344
 First, Tertullian offered 
arguments based upon Scripture, particularly 1 Corinthians.
345
 For the second segment of his 
treatise, Tertullian turned to arguments based upon nature and reason.
346
 Finally, Tertullian 
supported his thesis on the lines of ecclesiastical teaching.
347
 It was in this section that 
Tertullian remarked upon the unborn child. 
Tertullian first addressed the case, from 1 Corinthians, that women should not speak 
in an ecclesiastical gathering.
348
 Tertullian then offered a series of refutationes. He countered 
the proposal that virgins could distinguish themselves from married women by leaving their 
heads bare.
349
 He then discussed the question of whether male virgins should be honoured in 
chapter ten. According to Tertullian, sexual self-restraint was more difficult for young men 
than for women, yet virgin males were not distinguished from their peers in the congregation. 
Therefore, he argued, girls should not distinguish themselves by attending church services 
unveiled either.
350
 In chapters eleven to twelve, Tertullian quashed the argument that if 
unwed women were meant to be veiled, then so too should prepubescent girls. He qualified 
that his arguments did not pertain to a child but only applied ‘from the time when she begins 
to understand herself, and to enter into the sensation of her nature, to leave behind the (sense) 
of the virgin, and to suffer the new (sensation), which is of another age-group.’351 Tertullian 
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then advanced the argument that a virgin who went unveiled in the Church but went veiled in 
public was living a life of self-contradiction.
352
    
In the next chapter, Tertullian mentioned the unborn and perhaps alluded to the 
practice of abortion in order to refute the argument that unwed women bared their heads in 
order to glorify God.
353
 Tertullian countered this argument by questioning the motives of 
unveiled women. Tertullian opined that the only possible motive for a girl to attend services 
unveiled was to tempt the male members of the congregation towards sexual sin, which 
would inevitably lead to pregnancy out of wedlock. Far from glorifying God, these young 
women showed that their commitment to chastity was less than total by going unveiled in 
mixed company. Women of this character would then face the awkward situation of being 
pregnant while keeping their heads uncovered as though they were virgins.
354
 They would 
then be compelled to hide the evidence of their illicit intercourse. ‘For they will not confess, 
unless they are betrayed by the cries of their babies themselves.’355 Though Tertullian did not 
explicitly mention abortion, his next remarks may be read as an allusion to the procedure. As 
Tertullian wrote: 
I must say, although I do not wish it, that a woman who fears to 
become one always develops with difficulty, and now anybody can 
pretend that she is a virgin under God. Likewise, how much will she 
risk in the vicinity of her uterus, in case she is also exposed as a 
mother? God knows how many babies [He] has now guided to be 
formed and carried intact through to birth, after the conclusion of a 
long battle from their mothers. Always virgins of this type fall 
pregnant with the greatest ease, carry very fruitfully, and (their 
young) are actually very like their fathers.
356
 
The most effective means by which a pregnant woman could prevent her child’s cries from 
revealing that she was no longer a virgin would have been to terminate the pregnancy before 
the child had the capacity to cry: Quanta item circa uterum suum audebit, ne etiam mater 
detegatur? Yet the means of abortion in antiquity were not always reliable and sometimes 
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failed to have the desired effect.
357
 Despite a long struggle from the mother, Tertullian said, 
the child would still be brought to term.  
Yet again it should be considered that Tertullian’s target in De Virginibus Velandis 
was not the practice of abortion. Rather, he sought to highlight the theme of self-contradiction 
he had mentioned in the previous chapter.
358
 There was a clear paradox in the idea of a 
pregnant woman wearing the veil as though she were a virgin. The simplest way to avoid this 
self-contradiction (and its consequences) was simply for the virgin to attend church with her 
head covered, thus avoiding the male gaze and the risk of an unwanted pregnancy. Tertullian 
here used abortion to show that a maiden who did not call attention to herself by going 
publicly unveiled had piety as her motivation.
359
 He then followed this up by contrasting the 
scandalous character of these girls against the honourable repute of the devout woman. 
According to Tertullian, a veiled woman’s motives were honourable. By concealing her face, 
she kept herself aloof of satanic influence.
360
 Finally, Tertullian devoted the last two chapters 
of De Virginibus Velandis to a rousing conclusio.
361
  
Tertullian’s De Anima was an invective treatise aimed against the heretic, 
Hermogenes, who had incorporated pagan philosophies of ensoulment into Christian 
theology. This work was written around the same time as De Carne Christi. Barnes dates it to 
sometime between AD 206 and 207.
362
 In order to prove that Hermogenes’ ideas had sprung 
from falsehood, Tertullian’s partitio outlined his intention to refute the pagan philosophers’ 
arguments regarding the timing of animation upon scriptural, metaphysical and physiological 
lines.
363
 He said: 
Having already clashed with Hermogenes regarding the soul’s single 
point of origin, insofar as he presumed that it was widely agreed to be 
arise from matter rather than from the breath of God, I shall be seen 
                                                          
357
 Prioreschi 1995: 78; Ov. Her. 11.33-42. 
358
 Dunn 2004: 139. Dunn does not read chapter fourteen as containing anything relevant to the subject of 
abortion. His translation of Virg. Vel. 14.4 (p. 158) also makes it clear that he believes the passage referred to 
the contradiction between so-called virgins pretending not to be pregnant when clearly they were. I do not 
dispute Dunn’s interpretation. However, it is also possible to read the passage as an implicit reference to 
abortion for the reasons outlined above. Dunn’s interpretation and my own are not by any means incompatible; 
the most expedient means for an unveiled woman to maintain the pretence of her virginity was to eliminate the 
evidence of her pregnancy before it became visible.  
359
 Tert. Virg. Vel. 14.5. 
360
 Tert. Virg. Vel. 15.1-3. 
361
 Tert. Virg. Vel. 16.1-17.5. 
362
 Barnes 1985: 55. 
363
 Tert. An. 1.1-3.4. 
82 
 
conversing with the philosophers even as I’m now turning to deal 
with the many remaining questions.
364
 
Hermogenes had adopted the Platonic theory of the soul, based upon Plato’s Timaeus: he 
held that the soul was incorporeal, and that God did not create the soul of each individual out 
of nothingness, but shaped it from primordial substance.
365
 Conversely, Tertullian responded 
with an elaborate treatise designed to confound Hermogenes’ views on the soul and promote 
traducianism. He espoused the idea that the embryo received its soul directly from its father 
upon conception.
366
 Though denigrating Hermogenes and his pagan sources was Tertullian’s 
ostensible purpose, it is also worth considering that De Anima had much in common with an 
epideictic speech, which frequently dealt with conjectural issues of origin and cause.
367
 This 
is not surprising, as there was considerable crossover between an epideictic speech of blame 
and invective oratory.
368
 Invectives and speeches of blame both served to pour scorn on the 
subject. It is possible that Tertullian simply used Hermogenes as a convenient platform 
against which he could explore general conjectural questions of ensoulment.  
In this sense, Tertullian was perhaps borrowing from Cicero’s ideas regarding 
conjectural questions and their relationship with issues of origin. In his Topica, Cicero 
suggested that there were four main areas to be addressed in dealing with a conjectural issue. 
In his words:  
The rule of conjecture is distributed into four segments, of which the 
first is asking whether something exists. Next, where did it arise 
from? Thirdly, what cause made it come about? In the fourth part, 
(the question) of what alters the subject is asked.
369
  
Cicero’s methodology explains the complex structure of De Anima, whose topic could only 
be the subject of conjecture. After his customary exordium and narratio, Tertullian dedicated 
the first part of his treatise to defining the existence of the soul by explaining its nature.
370
 He 
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offered a refutatio of the Platonist arguments concerning the incorporeality of the soul.
371
 In 
Tertullian’s view, the soul was corporeal.372 It was of one substance but divided into many 
parts.
373
 The soul’s shape was complete from its creation at conception.374 Next, Tertullian 
addressed the second and third topics for conjecture, explicating the origin of the soul and the 
circumstances of its creation. After refuting the Platonic ideation of the soul’s origin, 
Tertullian argued that the soul came into being immediately upon conception.
375
 After 
refuting the Pythagorean theory of transmigration, he gave a confirmatio, re-affirming his 
case that ensoulment occurred at conception.
376
 Finally, he dealt with the fourth topic, 
changes in the condition of the soul. This section predominantly consisted of positive 
arguments.
377
 He argued that the soul did not change in its nature along with the growth of 
the body, but developed in its faculties.
378
 Sin corrupted the soul from its inception, but the 
anima could be purified by baptism.
379
 Nor did sleep affect its nature.
380
 However, in dreams 
the soul had dominance over the body.
381
 He argued that death did not affect the soul, which 
was immortal, but merely separated it from the body.
382
 All souls then entered Hades, there 
held in suspended animation to await the return of Christ.
383
 Only the souls of the martyrs 
were worthy to enter heaven immediately upon death.
384
 Tertullian then rounded off with his 
conclusio.
385
  
Since Tertullian’s exempla based upon prenatal biology in De Anima owed as much to 
pagan literary sources as to Scripture, they were clearly not intended as his strongest 
arguments.
386
 When referring to the unseen processes of human development, Tertullian 
relied upon non-Christian literary authorities such as Soranus and Aristotle, rather than 
common knowledge.
387
 As Riddle, Kapparis, and Congourdeau thoroughly explore, there was 
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no strong consensus in antiquity regarding the physical or metaphysical nature of the 
unborn.
388
 Foetal development was the subject of speculation based upon signs visible to the 
external viewer. When he was describing the physical process of gestation, Tertullian was 
perhaps knowingly using weak evidence. However, readers of Tertullian schooled in Latin 
rhetoric would have expected him to present positive arguments in his confirmatio. It was 
better to present weak evidence than to be caught with no evidence at all. Tertullian would 
have appeared feeble as a polemicist if he could only attack the opinions of others without 
presenting any of his own. 
On the other hand, Tertullian’s presentation of the processes of pregnancy visible to 
the naked eye could be considered inartificial evidence. Tertullian employed the experiences 
of mothers to refute the Platonic ideation of the soul as incorporeal. He argued against the 
following Platonist syllogism, as rendered in Waszink’s words: ‘The soul is in the body; in 
one and the same place there cannot possibly be two bodies, so that the soul is not a body.’389 
The Platonists had probably arrived at this conclusion from Plato’s discussion of the dualist 
relationship between body and soul in the Phaedo.
390
 As evidence, Tertullian retorted that 
women could obviously carry more than one soul in their bodies while they were pregnant. 
Indeed, he pointed out a famous case of a woman who carried quintuplets, arguing that there 
were no less than six souls in her body.
391
 In chapter twenty-five, Tertullian also drew upon 
the experiences of mothers and midwives to prove that the infant acquired a soul prior to 
birth, contrary to Hermogenes’ adaptation of the Stoic and Platonic theory that a child inhaled 
his or her soul upon their first breath.
392
 Tertullian presented the views of women as 
incontrovertible proof, since female testimony could be easily verified by asking women for 
their experiences. As he argued: 
I suppose that it shamed these men to consider that which women 
(have always) understood! And how much more do they blush, when 
there is a solution from the women to disprove them, rather than 
affirm them! In fact, there is no tutor, arbiter, or witness as fitting as 
the very sex in this type of matter. Answer, mothers, you who are 
pregnant and you who have already given birth! Sterile women and 
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men ought to keep quiet, (for) the truth of your own nature is being 
asked about, and the truth of your suffering is being asserted.
393
  
Tertullian held that women would support his argument concerning animation in the womb, 
because pregnant women could feel their foetuses moving in response to external stimuli. A 
mother’s ability to bond emotionally with her foetus was a clear sign that the child lived prior 
to birth, and that it was not physically part of her body. Knowing that it was a separate entity, 
a mother could bond with her prenatal infant, sympathising with the unborn child to the point 
where pregnancy would cause cravings and fluctuations in her emotional state.
394
 Perhaps 
Tertullian used the testimony of women to compensate for the weaknesses in his evidence 
concerning the physiological processes of reproduction. By using a combination of inartificial 
and artificial evidence, Tertullian made his arguments concerning the point of ensoulment 
appear stronger.
395
  
It is possible that Tertullian genuinely consulted women concerning pregnancy, but 
this did not necessarily mean that he himself trusted their testimony. As a Montanist, 
Tertullian was unusually well positioned to consult women concerning the mysteries of 
childbirth. As De Virginibus Velandis makes clear, Montanists were unusual among early 
Christian communities in that Montanist females seem to have exercised more privileges than 
those of other sects.
396
 Tertullian’s consternation over the immodesty of young women 
attending church attests to their presence alongside men.
397
 Women clearly spoke at 
meetings, as Tertullian made clear in his description of a woman’s testimony concerning her 
ecstatic vision of the soul’s shape in De Anima.398 The unique status of Montanist women 
perhaps emerged because two of the three founders of the Montanist movement, Prisca and 
Maximilla, were women.
399
 Of course, the fact that Tertullian used the evidence of women 
concerning childbirth in De Anima should not necessarily indicate that he held women in any 
particular esteem. After all, his rhetoric was often unsympathetic towards women, even if he 
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cannot be called overtly misogynistic.
400
 He frequently construed women as a corrupting 
influence upon men, once going so far as to call women ‘the gateway of the devil.’401 
Tertullian cited the testimony of women concerning pregnancy because he needed proof to 
support his idea that the embryo gained a soul upon conception. 
In De Anima, Tertullian again examined the issue of abortion in relation to the motive 
of necessity. Tertullian made an oblique reference to the idea that abortion was medically 
necessary in instances where pregnancy threatened the life of a mother. As he said: 
Sometimes, an infant is killed in the womb by cruel necessity, 
because the oblique presentation makes delivery impossible and so 
kills his mother unless he dies. So among physicians’ tools there is 
first an instrument of a well-proportioned twisting frame for forcing 
open the secreta; next an anulcultro for cutting up the limbs inside 
with careful mastery; next a blunt hook for pulling out the entire 
violated thing with a violent delivery. There is also a copper spike for 
the dark killing, it is called  for its infanticidal 
function, because of course the infant was alive.
402
  
It is tempting to follow Dölger’s interpretation that this passage condoned therapeutic 
abortion.
403
 After all, in De Anima Tertullian described abortion as necessaria crudelitatas, or 
‘cruel necessity’ even in cases where it would save the mother’s life.404 Yet the fact that 
Tertullian might have grudgingly recognised instances where abortion was medically 
justifiable should not suggest in any way that Tertullian expressed sympathy for those who 
practised abortion.
405
 The procedure of late-term abortion and subsequent embryotomy 
provided a vivid, visceral illustration that the foetus had been animated before its first breath. 
It is thus likely that he described therapeutic abortion as a necessity simply to justify his use 
of it as proof.    
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According to the rhetoric of De Anima, abortion may have been a necessary evil 
under certain circumstances, but it was an evil nonetheless. As a motivation, necessity was 
insufficient for abortion. Even when Tertullian insinuated that abortion was necessaria, he 
continually condemned the procedure by his use of pejorative terms.
406
 Noonan points out 
that Tertullian’s use of the verb caeduntur to describe the actual destruction of the foetus 
carried connotations of unmitigated slaughter.
407
 Tertullian further condemned abortion as a 
form of infanticidium or ‘infanticide,’ and called it a scelus, or ‘crime.’408 Noonan also points 
out that Tertullian here described the foetus as a facinus, or ‘victim of a crime.’409 Noonan 
further proposes that Tertullian was actually being sarcastic in his juxtaposition of the words 
iugulatio, ‘throat-cutting,’ and anxio arbitrio, ‘careful mastery.’410 Tertullian also condemned 
those who ended the lives of foetuses at any point prior to birth as murderers.
411
 The use of 
such pejorative and emotive language to describe abortion outweighed his passing insinuation 
that it could be medically necessary. Tertullian later described adherence to the medical 
necessity of abortion as less honourable as a motive than obedience to the condemnation of 
induced miscarriage in the Law of Moses.
412
 
Probably written in 206, De Carne Christi was an invective directed against the 
Docetist principles espoused by the heretic, Marcion.
413
 Tertullian also targeted Marcion’s 
followers, including Apelles, Valentinus, and Alexander. As Docetists, the first three heretics 
argued that Christ had no physical body. Rather, Marcion argued that Jesus was a kind of 
phantom who lacked human flesh. He denied that Jesus had a human birth.
414
 Apelles, on the 
other hand, denied the nativity of Christ but believed that Jesus did possess a human body. 
Valentinus admitted both Christ’s birth and His flesh, but argued that they were of a different 
character to that of humankind.
415
 Alexander differed from the other heretics, in that he 
mistakenly believed that those who acknowledged Christ’s flesh conceded that Christ’s body 
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was of a sinful nature. In Alexander’s view, non-Docetists believed that in the crucifixion 
Jesus had forever redeemed the flesh of humankind.
416
 Though he was dealing with four 
separate heretics, Tertullian disproved each of them by utilising a single argument. 
Tertullian’s thesis was that Christ had to have had a normal human form, and that He was 
born of a virgin.
417
 In his closing remarks, Tertullian said that De Carne Christi formed a 
preamble to his later work, De Resurrectione Mortuorum.
418
 The point that Jesus was 
physically human in both birth and flesh was subordinate to Tertullian's greater purpose of 
proving that the Passion of Christ enabled the resurrection and redemption of humankind in 
body and soul. Therefore, the entire work should be viewed in light of Tertullian’s 
soteriological conceptualisation of Christ.
419
 If Jesus were of some species other than human, 
then Christ’s own death and resurrection would have had no significance for those of the 
human race. 
 The structure of De Carne Christi has been interpreted in numerous ways. Most 
controversially, Otten has divided the treatise into two broad segments. She argues that the 
first section (comprising chapters 2.1-16.5) dealt with the truth of Christ’s nature, while the 
second portion (17.23-23.6) focused upon the quality of Christ’s being.420 Yet Otten perhaps 
oversimplifies the structure of the treatise by not considering the precepts of classical 
rhetoric, as previously discussed in the introductory chapter of this dissertation. The 
contributions of Sider and Dunn (2007) on the structure of De Carne Christi are of greater 
value here, and will provide the basis for the discussion below. Broadly, the structure may be 
divided into a partitio (1.1-3), refutatio (2.1-16.5), confirmatio (17.23-23.6), and conclusio 
(24.1-25.2). 
 First, Tertullian offered a highly compact introduction. His first chapter contained 
both his propositio and the narratio.
421
 He launched straight into his propositio, demarcating 
the purpose of the treatise.
422
 He then provided a narration of the circumstances which had 
led to the present controversy, describing each of the heretics in turn.
423
 Tertullian then turned 
towards the body of his treatise, offering negative arguments against each of the heretics in 
                                                          
416
 Tert. Carn. 16.1-2. 
417
 Tert. Carn. 25.1. 
418
 Tert. Carn. 25.2. 
419
 Dunn 2007: 468. 
420
 Otten 1997: 248-254. 
421
 Sider 1971: 27-28; Dunn 2007: 471. 
422
 Tert. Carn. 1.1-2. 
423
 Tert. Carn. 1.2-3. 
89 
 
turn. The first subject of his ire was, of course, Marcion. After discussing the significance of 
Isaiah and drawing upon exempla from Luke, Tertullian indicated that Marcion did not have 
the authority to make his outlandish claims, since he was not a true Christian.
424
 Tertullian 
then turned to the themes of advantage, honour and necessity, which were normally reserved 
for deliberative treatises.
425
 Tertullian first argued that God had the power to assume human 
form without any change to His essential nature. Thus He did not demean himself by His 
incarnation.
426
 Subsequently, Tertullian turned to the theme of honour, dealing with 
Marcion’s view that it would have been dishonourable for Jesus to have had an ordinary 
gestation and birth.
427
  
Here, Tertullian made several remarks which are relevant to discerning his attitude 
towards the unborn child. In his words: 
If, therefore, you do not repudiate the assumption of a body as 
unfeasible or perilous for God, it is left for you to scorn and reproach 
it as worthless. Beginning from the hated childbirth itself, come now 
and make a case against the filth of the generative elements within the 
uterus, the condensed curdling of fluids and blood, (and against) the 
nine-month development of the flesh out of that same muck. Describe 
the uterus as it enlarges daily: (it is) insolent, weighty, troubled, 
insecure even in slumber, uncertain in its feelings of squeamishness, 
desire, and gluttony. And inveigh now against the very shame of the 
woman giving birth. Yet this should instead be honoured due to (her) 
peril, or be revered due to nature. No doubt you recoil from the baby 
too, when it is poured out into life along with the slurry and detrius 
(from the womb). You consider (the infant) unworthy even after it has 
been washed, dressed in swaddling-clothes, anointed, and smiled 
upon charmingly. Marcion, you spit upon this venerated course of 
nature. And how exactly were you born? You detest a nascent human 
being, so how do you love anybody? You obviously had no love for 
yourself when you withdrew from the Church and the faith of Christ. 
But never mind, if you are displeased with yourself, or if you were 
born in a way different from other people. Christ, certainly, has loved 
even that person who was condensed in the uterus amidst all its 
foulness, even one who was brought (into life) through the shameful 
(process), and even one among the fawning of the nurses.
428
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Tertullian here relied upon his reader’s general awareness of the alenda per novem menses 
and subsequent nativitas as a source for inartificial evidence. He described the distension of 
the uterus during pregnancy, and perhaps showed his knowledge of the movement of the 
foetus within the womb. He demonstrated an appreciation of the dangers of childbirth, calling 
the process periculum. Indeed, he argued that the process of this ordeal ought to be honoured. 
Evoking vivid imagery, Tertullian also discussed the profusion of blood and amniotic fluids 
that accompanied the delivery of a baby. None of these things would have been particularly 
difficult for his reader to grasp; even if his male readers had not witnessed the birth of a baby 
with their own eyes, it would not have been difficult to imagine. Anybody could see the 
swelling of a woman’s belly and feel the movement of the child within. Families would have 
been all too aware of the perils which the arrival of a new child brought. Tertullian did not 
here rest his case upon particularly technical or contrived arguments drawn from his learning 
in embryology, as he would later in the confirmatio of the treatise.  
Instead, he painted an image of childbirth in broad strokes to show that Christ’s 
nativity was as normal as that of anyone else. He also demonstrated that Marcion was a self-
loathing misanthrope by suggesting that childbirth would have been in some sense unworthy 
of God.
429
 In doing so, Tertullian undermined Marcion’s ethos considerably. Marcion had 
alienated himself from the rest of humanity in his repudiation of Christ’s birth, according to 
Tertullian’s rhetoric. As a consequence, Tertullian implied that the Pontic heretic had also 
alienated himself from the reader. 
Tertullian then built upon his description of the gestation and birthing process as a 
humble one for his next point about the necessity of foolishness for Jesus.
430
 He quoted 1 
Corinthians 27: ‘God has chosen the foolish things of the world, in order to confound the 
wise.’431 It was thus necessary for God to partake in something as foolish as the assumption 
of human flesh. ‘Will anything be more "foolish" than believing that God was born, and of a 
virgin for that matter! And (who was) moreover of a fleshly (nature), who wallowed in all 
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those embarrassments of nature?’432 The foundation of Christian faith, he argued, was false if 
Christ were not born, since if that were true then He could not redeem humankind by His 
resurrection.
433
 In response, he asserted that Jesus had dual natures. One of these was of God, 
and the other of man.
434
   
Having thus dealt with Marcion, Tertullian moved on to give Apelles a similar 
treatment in the second section (6.1-9.8) of the refutatio. Apelles contended that Christ’s 
body was composed of sidereal substance, more akin to that of an angel than of a human.
435
 
Tertullian swiftly demolished the claim that God granted Jesus a body like that of the angels. 
After all, such a claim was based upon the Old Testament, the veracity of which Marcion and 
his followers repudiated.
436
 In chapter seven, Tertullian turned towards scriptural exegesis of 
Matthew 12.48, in which Jesus inquired: ‘Who is my mother and who are my brothers?’437 
Apelles interpreted the passage as a denial of their existence. Tertullian retorted that Jesus 
was simply denying his mother and his brothers in the sense that: ‘while strangers were 
fixated on Him, His closest relatives were absent... they wish to call Him away from such 
great work.’438 Tertullian then proceeded to argue on a conjectural basis that the human side 
of Christ’s being was not celestial in its essence. Rather, His divine nature was.439 
For the third part of his refutation (10.1-15.6), Tertullian targeted Valentinus. It 
should be noted that Tertullian’s understanding of Valentinus’ ideas was perhaps not based 
on reading any of Valentinus’ works directly. Rather, he seems to have read a text by one of 
the heretic’s students.440 Valentinus claimed that Christ’s flesh was actually animalis, or 
composed of His soul. Therefore, Jesus’ soul was indistinguishable from His body.441 
Tertullian replied that since humankind was of a dual nature with the corpus separate from 
the anima, and Christ was sent to redeem the soul and not the flesh, there would have been no 
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purpose in transforming His soul into flesh.
442
 God’s intent was not to show humankind the 
soul by revealing it in fleshly form. This would have been redundant, since the soul was self-
aware.
443
 Moreover, Christ Himself spoke of the body and soul as two distinct entities.
444
 
According to the interpretation of Valentinus, Jesus’ nature had to have been angelic, for if 
He had possessed a human body, then Christ would have been subject to corruption.
445
 
Tertullian counter-argued that if Christ were an angel, then He could not have saved 
humankind through the Passion, since He would have been a completely different species.
446
 
Finally, he argued that if the Valentinians were to acknowledge Christ’s death, then it 
followed that they should also acknowledge His mortal flesh.
447
 
The fourth and briefest section of the refutatio (16.1-5) dealt with Alexander. 
Tertullian’s arguments here were somewhat tangential to his main purpose of arguing for the 
existence of Christ’s flesh, for Tertullian here needed to demolish Alexander’s accusation 
that Christians who acknowledged the existence of Jesus’ human flesh rejected Original Sin. 
Alexander, apparently, would say that non-Docetists contrived Christ’s flesh as sinful in its 
nature, and that he had redeemed the flesh of all humankind from Original Sin. As Tertullian 
put it:  
Furthermore, that Alexander, with his desire for argumentation and 
his ingenious heresy, carved out a niche for himself by having us 
affirm a consensus that Christ put on an earthly flesh, so that He 
could in His own person nullify the sinful flesh.
448
  
It is optimal to view this chapter as a praemunitio. Tertullian had to quash Alexander’s 
protest before he could move on to advance positive arguments in subsequent chapters. In 
response, Tertullian carefully made the distinction between the carnem peccati, the ‘sinful 
flesh,’ and the peccatum carnis, the ‘sin of the flesh.’ Christ had done away with the latter 
rather than the former, ‘not the material (of the flesh), but its (sinful) nature; not its substance, 
but its error.’449  
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Having concluded his refutatio, Tertullian turned towards his confirmatio, which 
comprised chapters 17.1-23.6. Tertullian had two main positive arguments here, which were 
very closely linked. First, he argued that Christ’s flesh had its origin in His mother, Mary. 
Secondly, Jesus’ flesh was human because it was derived from that of a human.450 
Tertullian’s focus upon questions of origin and cause here are not surprising, in light of the 
themes of conjecture.
451
 The quality of Christ’s flesh was the subject of conjecture rather than 
hard evidence. Tertullian actually admitted that Scripture had nothing to say about the 
substance from which the Word was made flesh.
452
 He was therefore pressed to come up with 
novel ways in which to interpret Scripture so that it would prove his thesis. Tertullian first 
considered the origin of Christ’s flesh, which had its roots in the Creation narrative. He 
compared Jesus to Adam; just as Adam came from the virgin earth, so too must Jesus have 
come from a virgin.
453
 Since Mary was a descendent of Adam and Eve, her form too 
originated from the earth. Through her, Christ’s flesh therefore had its origin in the earth as 
well. On the other hand, Tertullian also contrasted Mary and Eve. While Eve was tempted by 
the words of Satan, Mary was filled with the spirit of God. Eve thus gave birth to the first 
murderer, Cain, while the birth of Jesus inaugurated the new life for the human race.
454
 God’s 
motive, therefore, in clothing Jesus in a human flesh, was to redeem the human race. 
Tertullian’s next arguments leaned heavily upon ancient understandings of 
embryogenesis. His points about pregnancy here were far more obscure and theoretical than 
those advanced in chapter four. In chapter eighteen, Tertullian re-affirmed his point about the 
dual nature of Christ.
455
 Essentially, he explained this in terms of the origin of Christ, His 
conception. Tertullian was adamant that no human sperm was involved in the process of 
Christ’s conception. Rather, the spiritus of God filled the role normally carried out by the 
father’s sperm.456 The spirit impregnated Mary, endowing Christ with the divine aspect of 
His being. Yet Christ’s flesh came from Mary, who provided His humanity.457 Tertullian had 
to nullify the objection that John 1.13 said Christ would be born ‘not of blood, nor of the will 
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of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.’458 As discussed in the third chapter of this 
dissertation, Tertullian’s arguments here were underpinned by Aristotle’s understanding of 
reproduction. For the present, it is important to the manner in which he presented the 
evidence.  
Tertullian was affirming arguments for which there was no inartificial proof, since 
none of the Gospels offered a physiological description of the Incarnation of Christ.
459
 
Tertullian was perhaps aware of the shortcomings of his proof, and attempted to disguise it as 
inartificial evidence. Tertullian based his understanding of Christ’s conception upon a 
relatively obscure tradition drawn from Aristotle’s theory of spermatogenesis. Moreover, 
many other authors had contradicted Aristotle’s conception theory. To cover up the 
slenderness of his evidence, Tertullian resolved the discrepancy between John 1.13 and the 
concept of the virgin birth by his insistence that John actually was referring to male seed in 
his discussion of blood. Tertullian asserted that the sperm ‘is well known (emphasis added) to 
be warm blood, changed by ejaculation
 
into the coagulum of the woman's blood.’460 Yet, as 
he repeated several times, there was no human seed involved in the conception of Christ.
461
 
Tertullian clearly hoped that his reader would consider this exemplum drawn from Aristotle 
as common knowledge, when in fact it was easily challenged by reference to alternative 
traditions.   
Having discussed the particulars of Christ’s conception, Tertullian then turned 
towards His development in utero. He drew upon a rich array of exempla drawn from 
Scripture as inartificial evidence to prove that Christ was born ‘of’ Mary, and was not simply 
‘in’ her, and that Jesus’ body was generated out of Mary’s. He particularly relied upon 
Matthew 1.16 and 1.20, Galatians 4.4, John 1.14, and Psalm 21.9.
462
 Tertullian’s 
interpretation of the psalm was Christological. However, Tertullian again turned to artificial 
evidence to underscore the inartificial. Tertullian discussed the biology of lactation once 
again in Aristotelian terms in order to elaborate upon his interpretation of Psalm 22.9: ‘Thou 
art my hope from my mother's breasts; upon Thee have I been cast from the womb.’463 
Tertullian’s point was Mary would only have been lactating if she was pregnant, and thus she 
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did carry Him. The umbilical cord ‘communicated growth to Him from the uterus.’464 He 
invoked the witness of ‘doctors, midwives, and natural philosophers.’465 As discussed in 
Chapter Three of this dissertation, his understanding was based primarily upon his reading of 
Soranus and Aristotle.  
Tertullian surely did not mean for the biological arguments of chapters 18.3-19.5 to 
be his strongest. He placed them in the middle of his confirmatio, sandwiched in between his 
comparison of Adam and Christ (17.4), and his discussion of Isaiah (21.1-23.6). For the 
remainder of De Carne Christi, Tertullian was on much firmer ground. Chapters 21.1-23.6 
presented inartificial evidence drawn from Scripture. Tertullian advanced the argument that 
Christ was the fulfilment of messianic prophecy in Isaiah 7.14, which predicted that the 
messiah would be conceived of a virgin. He then produced a series of passages which 
confirmed the Christological reading of Isaiah.
466
 Finally, in chapters 24.1-25.2, Tertullian 
wrapped with his conclusio. Tertullian was likely bearing in mind the advice of Rhetorica ad 
Herrenium:  
In the confirmatio and refutation of arguments it is appropriate to 
have a regular disposition of this kind. The firmest arguments ought 
to be positioned at the beginning and at the end of the speech. The 
mediocre ones, and also those that are neither useless to the speech 
nor (strictly) necessary for the discussion, should be placed in the 
middle. These would be weak if presented separately or singularly, 
but become firm and credible when presented in conjunction with the 
others. For immediately after the facts have been stated, the hearer 
waits to see whether the case can by some means be proven. That is 
why we should immediately present a firm argument. For the 
remainder, since the final statements are easily committed to memory, 
it is useful, when finishing up speaking, to leave a very firm argument 
well in the hearer's mind. This disposition of topics in speech, just 
like the arrangement of soldiers in battle, will make victory 
possible.
467
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It is not surprising that Tertullian would finish his treatise with inartificial proofs from holy 
text, rather than the artificial ones based upon biology. His argument would have appeared 
rather feeble if he had closed with such shaky evidence. 
For Adversus Marcionem, Tertullian adopted an invective stance that was rather more 
ad hominem than that of De Carne Christi. Tertullian devoted much of his exordium to 
slandering Marcion as the product of a backward province.
468
 It was probably written around 
the same time as De Anima. Barnes suggests that it was written between April AD 207 and 
April 208.
469
 As mentioned previously, the surviving text was the third revision of a small, 
inferior invective.
470
 In this treatise, Tertullian sought to discredit the Marcionites’ dualist 
ideation of God. In the narratio of Book One, Tertullian iterated that Marcion, the founder of 
the heresy, had argued that the wrathful God of the Old Testament was a completely different 
being from the merciful God of the New Testament. Marcion believed that Christ was a new 
deity suddenly revealed to the world, totally unconnected to anything that had come 
before.
471
 Marcion therefore rejected the Old Testament entirely, and upheld only an 
amended version of Luke’s Gospel and a handful of Paul’s letters as canonical.472 Marcion 
had also taken snippets of Luke and paired them with passages from the Old Testament 
which supposedly contradicted the gospel.
473
 He called this work the Antitheses. In the 
partitio, Tertullian declared that he would disprove all Marcionite dogma once and for all, 
wiping out all memory of his previous, lesser invectives against Marcion.
474
  
Adversus Marcionem was a massive work which comprised five books. Although the 
text was very long, its overall structure was relatively simple.
475
 Here, it is helpful to consult 
Evans’s summary of the content. In Evans’s view, the first three books served to explicate 
Tertullian’s theology.476 Book One dealt with the philosophical underpinnings of Marcionite 
dualism.
477
 The Old Testament was the main focus of Book Two. Here, Tertullian argued for 
the continuity of the Old Testament and the New.
478
 The third book attacked Marcion’s 
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Christology, arguing that Jesus was both God and man.
479
 The next two books cross-
examined Marcion’s evidence. Book Four was a kind of hostile commentary on Marcion’s 
version of Luke’s gospel, analysing the text chapter-by-chapter to prove Marcion’s heresy.480 
Book Five did likewise with Paul’s letters.481  
In Book Four, Tertullian made a comment about the nature of the unborn child that 
was as brief as it was illuminating. It is thus worthwhile to examine Tertullian’s stated aims 
and methods as outlined in the partitio of Book Four. The introduction of Book Four 
comprises its first six chapters. First, Tertullian briefly delineated his plan to base the 
majority of his arguments upon Marcion’s mutilated text of Luke, humiliating Marcion by 
using his own sacred text to prove him wrong.
482
 As he said: ‘I now defy every sentence, and 
indeed the entire arrangement, which arose from Marcion's impiety and sacrilege, in terms of 
that gospel which he has by interpolation made his own.’483 Tertullian declared that his plan 
of attack was not to contend with Marcion directly, but to flatten his interpolation of Luke by 
demonstrating a more accurate interpretation. In fact, Marcion’s own evidence actually 
discredited him: 
Ah, but I could have destroyed those (Antitheses) by using a carefully 
arranged attack, addressing each of the Pontic man’s interjections 
singularly. I might have failed, if it were not more convenient by far 
to neutralise them all together both in and along with that gospel 
which they administer. Though it is quite easy to rebuff them by 
(offering up my own) precepts, (it would be even easier) if I were to 
make them acceptable, and if I were to consider them authoritative, 
and if I were to say that they (actually) build up my argument, so that 
(the Antitheses) could be shamed for the blindness of their author, (for 
they would) now become my own antitheses against Marcion.
484
  
In this passage Tertullian also revealed the structure of this book would mirror that of Luke 
directly. As was customary for the partitio, Tertullian outlined the extent to which he agreed 
with his opponent. There was no denying the differences between the Old and New 
Testaments, as Tertullian recognised. Yet this did not indicate that the texts were the products 
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of two different deities. Rather, the new Law inaugurated by Christ was the fulfilment of 
messianic expectation; it was impossible to separate the gospels from the Old Testament.
485
 
The next four chapters (4.2.1-4.5.7) continued Tertullian’s attack upon Marcion and 
discredited his evidence. The other three gospels were genuine, and were the product of the 
ancient Jewish tradition. Marcion’s version of the gospel, on the other hand, was a radical 
new invention from the barbaric province of Pontus.
486
 The authorship of Marcion’s gospel 
was not even properly ascribed.
487
 Tertullian could have made a stand on this point alone. 
Instead, he said: ‘I prefer to contend all points, and I do not leave aside anything that can be 
understood (as being) in my favour.’488 Indeed, Luke was not by any means the strongest of 
the sources from which Marcion could have chosen. Perhaps Marcion had singled out Luke 
on the basis that the other apostles were false. If this were true, then Marcion was discrediting 
Jesus Himself. If the apostles’ testimony was false, then surely Luke’s was too.489 Both 
Marcion and Tertullian believed their version of Luke was the true one. The veracity of 
Tertullian’s text was born out by its antiquity, whilst Marcion’s gospel was the result of his 
recent meddling.
490
  
In chapter six, Tertullian reaffirmed his intention to prove that Marcion’s text was 
corrupt, and that his dualist heresy was blind, by carefully proving that Jesus belonged to the 
Creator. He ended the introduction thus: ‘I ask you, reader, to recall this statement and this 
prescript at all times, and begin to recognise that Christ is either of Marcion or of the 
Creator.’491 Tertullian sought to disprove the Marcionite interpretation of Luke by means of 
positive argument. Tertullian’s confirmatio was thus not easily distinguishable from his 
refutatio.
492
 Having brought the preamble to a close, Tertullian embarked upon his 
commentary in earnest. Since Marcion had apparently deleted the first three chapters of Luke, 
Tertullian began his commentary in chapter seven at Luke 4.31. Tertullian diligently grappled 
with Marcion’s interpretation of Luke 4.31-8.48 in chapters 7.1-20.14 of Adversus 
Marcionem. 
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Tertullian’s comment about the unborn child may be found in chapter twenty-one, 
which dealt with Luke 9.1-9.26.
493
 Here, Tertullian once again assailed Marcion’s docetist 
understanding of Christ, with effects similar to those witnessed in De Carne Christi. 
Tertullian presented the crowd’s identification of Jesus as Elijah or as a Prophet of the Old 
Testament (Luke 9.19) as proof of the relationship between Jesus and the Creator.
494
 
Tertullian viewed Peter’s identification of Jesus as Christ (Luke 9.20) as confirmation that 
Peter had recognised Jesus due to his learning of the sacred Scriptures.
495
 Yet Jesus also said, 
‘Whoever is ashamed of me and my words, the Son of Man will be ashamed of them when he 
comes in his glory and in the glory of the Father and of the holy angels.’496 The remainder of 
Tertullian’s chapter focused upon these words.  
According to Tertullian, one could only be ashamed of the true Christ, for He had 
taken upon Himself all the indignities of human flesh. Marcion’s sidereal Christ, on the other 
hand, was supposedly composed of some higher substance, and thus His form was not the 
object of shame: 
He can’t have been curdled in a virgin’s womb, let alone that of a 
grown woman. Yet even though there were no seed, by the law of 
corporeal substance (he must have been conceived) from the blood of 
a woman. (Your Christ) was never considered to be flesh before he 
was formed, and was not called a foetus after His figuration. He was 
not delivered after ten months of anguish, nor was He spilled out 
upon the ground through the body’s sewer, with sudden trembling 
pains along with the filth of all that time, and He did not at once 
favourably meet the light with tears, or experience His first wound at 
the cutting of the cord. He was not cleansed with balm, and was 
treated with neither salt nor honey, and His swaddling was not His 
first winding sheet. From that point on, there was no question of His 
wallowing in the foulness of its folds, of Him troubling her breasts, of 
Him having a long infancy, a difficult boyhood, slowly (becoming) a 
man. Rather, He was left exposed out of heaven. He was at once 
grown-up, at once complete, Christ straight away: spirit, and virtus, 
and also God—and that only. So then, as He was not a genuine man, 
for (His humanity) could not be seen. Likewise, there was nothing to 
be ashamed of in the curse of the cross, for He lacked its truth, since 
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He lacked a body. And thus it could not have been (a phantom Christ) 
that said, “Whoever will be ashamed of me.”497   
Tertullian here employed embryological theory as a form of artificial evidence. As explored 
in the third chapter of this dissertation, Tertullian here presented the process of hominisation 
in utero as a gradual one, echoing Aristotle. Using such obscure scientific theories reinforced 
the purpose of Adversus Marcionem in two ways. First, Tertullian here depicted the humble 
origins of a baby to illustrate the mystery of the divine humiliation.
498
 By lowering Himself to 
the human level, God showed compassion for the human race.
499
 Jesus assured humanity’s 
salvation by assuming human form, including the more primal or visceral aspects of fleshly 
existence, such as the process of being conceived and born. He was not perfect from 
inception, but mere caro ante formam. The point in this passage is very similar to that of De 
Carne Christi 4.1-4.3. Next, it is probable that Tertullian aimed to ridicule the lack of 
embryological learning in Marcion and his followers.
500
 Portraying Marcion and the 
Marcionite heretics as scientifically uneducated would have aided Tertullian’s 
characterisation of Marcion as an uncultured barbarian, as he portrayed him in the 
exordium.
501
 By contrast, Tertullian implicitly characterised himself as a master of 
embryology. By constructing himself as an authority on the subject, Tertullian made it clear 
to his reader that his views were more reliable. 
For the remainder of the treatise body, Tertullian continued his commentary on Luke 
9.28-24.53. His conclusio for the fourth book was extremely compact. Indeed, the 
commentary continued right into the final chapter.
502
 Tertullian finished with the following 
lines, in which he restated his intentions for Book Four: 
I have kept my solemn promise, I believe. I have shown that Jesus 
was the Christ of the Prophets in His doctrines, His judgements, His 
affections, His sensations, His virtues, His sufferings, and also in His 
                                                          
497
 Tert. Marc. 4.21.11-12. non vulva licet virginis, tamen feminae, coagulatus, et si non semine, tamen ex lege 
substantiae corporalis, ex feminae humore, non caro habitus ante formam, non pecus dictus post figuram, non 
decem mensium cruciatu deliberatus, non subita dolorum concussione cum tanti temporis coeno per corporis 
cloacam effusus ad terram, nec statim lucem lacrimis auspicatus et primo retinaculi sui vulnere, nec mulso 
ablutus, nec sale ac melle medicatus, nec pannis iam sepulturae involucrum initiatus, nec exinde per 
immunditias inter sinus volutatus, molestus uberibus, diu infans, vix puer, tarde homo, sed de caelo expositus, 
semel grandis, semel totus, statim Christus, spiritus et virtus et deus tantum. Ceterum ut non verus, qui non 
videbatur, ita nec de crucis maledicto erubescendus, cuius carebat veritate, carens corpore.  Non poterat itaque 
dixisse, Qui mei confusus fuerit. 
498
 Osborn 1997: 112. 
499
 Tert. Marc. 4.21.12. 
500
 Heyne 2011: 152. 
501
 Tert. Marc. 1.1.1-2. 
502
 Tert. Marc. 4.43.1-8. 
101 
 
resurrection, (and was) none other than the Creator’s (offspring). And 
so again, He fulfilled the psalm by sending his apostles for the 
purpose of preaching to all the peoples, and ordering that their sound 
must go out into the entire world and that their voices (must go) to the 
ends of the earth. I pity you, Marcion; you have laboured in vain. For 
even in your gospel Christ Jesus is mine.
503
 
This chapter has contextualised the place of the unborn child in Tertullian’s rhetoric. 
Tertullian did occasionally turn towards abortion and the unborn as exempla. However, he 
mentioned them only to prove points laid out in the introductions to his treatises. Tertullian 
employed the unborn child in a number of ways. For his forensic treatises, he referred to 
abortion to prove that Christian ethics were superior to those of pagans concerning the 
valuation of human life. On the other hand, Tertullian often examined the issue of abortion in 
terms of necessity as a motive in his deliberative works. According to Tertullian, necessity 
was not a sufficient motive to end a pregnancy. To succour his invectives against heretics, 
Tertullian cited numerous theories of embryology, treating them as artificial evidence. When 
necessary, he compensated for the weakness of his evidence by employing the testimony of 
mothers as inartificial proof. The next chapter will turn from Tertullian’s rhetorical aims and 
methods towards his employment of scriptural evidence and Christian tradition concerning 
abortion and the nature of the foetus and embryo. 
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Chapter II: The Christian Context 
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to refute Dunstan’s view that Tertullian was a 
dissident from previous Christian tradition due to his identification of the unborn child as a 
human being and his arguments against abortion. The chapter builds upon the work of Jones 
(2004, 2005) by providing a deeper analysis of Tertullian’s treatises and considering the 
extent of his contribution to Christian thought on these matters. First, the chapter argues that 
the rejection of abortion was a well-established trope of Judaeo-Christian literature long 
before Tertullian. Many earlier Christian texts, such as the Didache, the Epistle of Barnabas, 
and the Apocalypse of Peter had reviled abortion as murder on the basis that the unborn child 
held a human identity. The later authors Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, and Minucius 
Felix also gave no allowance for abortion. Indeed, it is argued that Tertullian borrowed his 
denigration of abortion in the Apologeticum from Athenagoras, and that Minucius Felix’s 
arguments on the unborn were directly related to those of Tertullian. Next, it is argued that 
Tertullian’s approach was only unusual in three respects. He gave the first lengthy discourse 
upon the unborn child in Christian literature. Tertullian was also the first to provide specific 
Scriptural exempla to support his views. His other major contribution was his argument that 
abortion was immoral from conception, which no prior author had articulated. All of these 
contributions are best understood in light of Tertullian’s utilisation of the precepts of rhetoric. 
Before discussing the relevant Christian sources on abortion, it is important to 
establish the centrality of Scripture to the authors’ discussions, the form of Scripture they 
used, and the manner in which they approached it. The second-century Christian authors’ 
metaphysical conceptualisation of prenatal offspring was intimately linked to traditions found 
in the Old and New Testaments. The early Christians, as well as the Jews, were unlike most 
other religious sects in the Greco-Roman world in that they based their ethical perspectives 
upon the authority of Scripture. Kapparis points out that pagan religions of antiquity tended 
to promote a humanist ethical basis, rather than a strictly theistic one. As he says, ‘there was 
no supernatural authority outside this world holding the absolute truth and transmitting it to 
humans by means of a holy book or the teachings of a holy man.’1 Within this framework, 
pagans were to some extent able to adjust their views of the unborn child according to their 
individual practical and emotional needs, as well as the expectations of their socio-cultural 
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contexts. The reverse situation applied to the Christians and the Jews, who based their moral 
decisions upon the precepts found in sacred text.
2
 In particular, the Christian moralists 
utilised the New Testament as the highest authority by which to make and justify their moral 
choices.
3
 They also backed it with Old Testament. For the Christians and the Jews, there was 
thus considerably less flexibility in their understanding of antenatal life and its significance.
4
 
Though they lacked a direct condemnation of abortion, the Scriptures presented essentially 
fixed values concerning the unborn child.
5
  
The Old Testament provided the strongest authority on which the Christians based 
their opposition to abortion. Normally, the New Testament would have held equal authority 
for the Christians. However, there was remarkably little discussion of procreation in the New 
Testament, which did not contain any comment on the issue of abortion.
6
 There was no 
specific commandment against the termination of the foetus or embryo in the New 
Testament. Nor was there a discussion of the discrete point in development in utero the 
human soul came into being. Even the Gospel narratives of Jesus’ conception and birth 
contained very little comment regarding His being in utero.
7
 Noonan suggests that the 
warnings about drugs and sorcery in Galatians and Revelation referred to abortifacients.
8
 
However, Noonan’s interpretation of the relevant passages is difficult to support, since there 
is no strong evidence that this was the intended sense. Given the crossover between magic 
and healing in antiquity, there is a strong possibility that the words pharmakeia or pharmakon 
were used in these texts to censure witchcraft rather than abortion. In Revelation particularly, 
the words pharmakon and pharmakos were employed in the context of demon-worship and 
idolatry.
9
 Even if the terms were meant to refer to medicine, there is no indication at all that it 
denoted abortifacients specifically. 
However, the overall silence of the New Testament on procreation and abortion 
would not have posed a problem, as the Old Testament remained an important authority for 
the majority of Christian readers.
10
 In particular, it is difficult to overstate the theological 
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status of the Pentateuch, the first five books of the Old Testament, in Judaeo-Christian 
culture. According to Jewish and Christian tradition, these first five books were handed down 
directly from God through the agency of Moses.
11
 The Septuagint, the third-century BC 
Alexandrian Greek translation of the Hebrew texts which comprised the Old Testament, was 
the sacred text employed by the authors of the New Testament, as evident in numerous 
quotations and the New Testament authors’ emulation of Septuagint syntax.12 The Christians’ 
continued employment of the Old Testament is not surprising, since Christianity began as a 
Jewish sect. 
By the time the Apostolic Fathers and patristic authors were reading the various 
disparate texts of the Old Testament in the second century, they had been codified into a 
single work, the most common version of which was the Septuagint. Marcos points out that 
the patristic authors who approached the Bible in Greek utilised the Septuagint as ‘an 
autonomous literary work,’ effectively treating it as a single coherent text rather than an 
omnibus of many scattered texts.
13
 Historical details about the composition of each individual 
work of Scripture do not appear to have had a significant bearing on the early Christian 
writers’ interpretation of the texts, and will not be considered at length in this chapter. 
However, it is important to recognise that the early Christian writers of the second 
century continually interpreted the Old Testament through the lens of Christian theology. One 
of the cornerstones of Christian theology was that Jesus was the Messiah foretold in the Old 
Testament; thus, according to the interpretation of many Christians, ‘all of the texts of the 
Old Testament spoke of Christ and of Christian mysteries.’14 Christian hermeneutic 
sometimes resulted in interpretations of the text different from those of the Jews. For 
instance, although the Old Testament’s record of God’s summoning the Prophets in the 
womb was initially intended specifically for important figures of Israelite history, Tertullian 
interpreted such references as applying to all humankind.
15
 The Christians regarded Jesus as 
the fulfilment of Israel’s messianic prophecies. As Jones argues, the idea of humans being 
called to God’s service was therefore ‘universalised.’16 While certain Christians were still 
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called to special positions, one of the central tenets of Christianity was that all people were 
called to serve God, rather than a select few. Under the principles of this New Covenant, the 
inclusion of Gentiles within God’s promise for the salvation of Israel democratised the 
human relationship with God, allowing each individual to participate in a special relationship 
with their creator regardless of their status in life. For Tertullian, all people were thus called 
in utero as the Prophets were.
17 
By the time Tertullian and the patristic scholars were writing in the late second 
century, the New Testament was still in the process of formation. Ante-Nicene Christians did 
not yet have a set canon of works.
18
 A multitude of Christian works were produced in the 
same generation as the twenty-seven New Testament works currently considered canonical, 
or shortly after. Not all would continue to be regarded as canon. However, until the 
establishment of a canon, there was nothing to stop early Christians from employing 
theological texts of the apostolic period (AD 50-150) as Scripture. For instance, the Didache, 
the Letter of Barnabas and the Apocalypse of Peter were all cited as having the authority of 
Scripture at one time or another, as discussed below. These works were all composed in 
koine, or common Greek, and do not appear to be intended as elite works of literature.
19
 
However, they are very important to the history of Christianity, since they emerged from the 
same social milieu as that of Jesus and the earliest Christian followers.  
For Latinate Christians of the late second century, there were also unauthorised Latin 
translations of the Septuagint and New Testament. These translations, which were completed 
long before Jerome’s production of the Vulgate, are collectively known as the Vetus Latina, 
or ‘Old Latin.’ The origins of the Vetus Latina are not known, but the earliest witness comes 
from Tertullian’s home province of Africa.20 In AD 180 Speratus, one of the Scillitan 
Martyrs, was caught carrying ‘the books and letters of Paul.’21 They were most likely written 
in Latin, as Speratus quoted an Old Latin version of 1 Timothy 6.16 in his trial.
22
 The 
example of Speratus reveals two things. First, there was an established pattern in North 
Africa of using the Bible in Latin well in advance of Tertullian’s period.23 Next, it showed 
that Scriptures were published in individual volumes, and were not always bundled together 
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as a single, unified text. The process of translating the Bible into Latin was gradual, and it is 
probable that not all books were translated at once.
24
  
It is also important to recall that in antiquity, as today, Christianity was an incredibly 
diverse religion, especially before the creation of the Nicene Creed.
25
 There were many 
competing doctrines and interpretations of Scripture, influenced by ethnic, cultural, linguistic, 
and geographic variances. What was Scripture to one group might be heretical to another. 
Bearing this diversity in mind, it is worth questioning whether early Christian texts that 
mention the unborn are actually a representative sample of ancient Christian thought on the 
matter. Jones perhaps goes too far to suggest a widespread ‘consensus’ in thought on abortion 
in early Christianity from this limited range of literary references.
26
 There is insufficient 
evidence for scholars to draw definitive conclusions regarding the extent to which Christians 
actually lived according to the ideal of total abstention from abortion in their daily lives. The 
most that can be said from the existing evidence is that a handful of Christian preachers and 
writers denounced abortion in their written works, and that their words no doubt influenced 
those who received them. After all, Hippolytus (c. AD 170–235) did make reference to 
Christians practising abortion in Rome shortly after Tertullian’s period, though this may 
simply have been an attempt to discredit the Bishop of Rome.
27
 Likewise, Tertullian 
expressed anxieties about Christians in Carthage ending their pregnancies, as iterated in the 
previous chapter. It would also be impossible to track all the many different interpretations of 
the Scriptures, since their reception was not always recorded. Instead, this study will restrict 
itself to examining written interpretations of the relevant passages as recorded by the authors 
mentioned in the introduction. 
Before Christian views are discussed, it is important to iterate Jewish thought on 
abortion in brief.
28
 As was the case with many ethical issues, early Christian perspectives had 
their antecedents in Jewish interpretations of Scripture. In particular, the biblical 
conceptualisation of the human race as imago Dei, coupled with the prohibition of murder, 
had a profound impact upon Jewish and Christian valuations of human life.
29
 In the Old 
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Testament tradition, God did not assume material form, as discussed in Deuteronomy.
30
 
According to the Creation story in Genesis, God moulded Adam and Eve, the progenitors of 
humanity, in His own image.
31
 Thus, God may not have been physically present on Earth, but 
those who upheld Genesis as a sacred text saw His image in humanity. The doctrine of imago 
Dei rendered the act of killing a fellow human immoral; as discussed below, this could 
include those not yet born. Part of God’s Covenant with Noah was that the deliberate taking 
of human life would be punished as a desecration of God’s likeness.32 Murder was again 
condemned in the Decalogue, the Ten Commandments which Moses handed down directly 
from God. It was iterated in both Exodus and Deuteronomy.
33
 For Christians and Jews alike, 
the theological authority of the commandment against killing was paramount. The 
commandment in the Pentateuch against unlawful killing had a particularly strong bearing 
upon the Judaeo-Christian tendency not to practise abortion.
34
 No Jewish writer of antiquity 
expressed a permissive attitude towards abortion. Indeed, numerous sources including Philo 
(c. 20 BC-AD 50), Josephus (AD 37-c. 100), and the Sententiae of Pseudo-Phocylides all 
stringently condemned the wanton destruction of the foetus or embryo on the basis that it was 
comparable to infanticide.
35
  
Both Jewish and Christian discussions about the value placed upon the unborn were 
also heavily informed by the respective authors’ readings of Exodus 21.22-23. Strictly 
speaking, Exodus did not deal with abortion at all.
36
 Rather, the text gave legal advice for 
retributive justice in cases when a man inadvertently caused miscarriage.
37
 The discussion 
may be found in the context of property law, particularly the appropriate penalties for specific 
types of damage to a man’s household contents. Wives and offspring were included among 
the property under discussion.
38
 As Freund (1983) establishes, there was a strong difference 
between the Hebrew and Septuagint versions of Exodus 21.22-23. The difference mostly 
referred to the value placed upon life in the womb.
39
 The Hebrew version of the text 
translates as follows: 
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When men strive together, and hurt a woman with child, so that there 
is a miscarriage, and yet no harm (ason) follows, the one who 
performed the hurt will be fined according as the woman’s husband 
shall lay upon him, and he shall pay as the judges determine. If any 
harm follows, then you shall give life for life.
40
 
The fact that the errant striker could have been punished with financial penalty in instances of 
miscarriage indicates that the foetus held at least a material value in the Hebrew textual 
tradition.
41
 However, causing the death of a foetus was clearly not considered homicide. If it 
were, then the charge of ‘life for life’ would have applied. As it was, the charge only applied 
in the instance of ‘harm’ to the child’s mother.42 
The Hebrew version of Exodus 21.22-23 influenced many Jewish commentators, as 
evident in the cases of Josephus and the Talmudic Sanhedrin. Josephus clearly followed the 
Hebrew version in his Antiquitates Judaicae. As he said: 
(Concerning) a man who kicks a woman who has conceived and it 
comes to pass that the woman miscarries: let him pay a financial 
penalty as determined by the judges. For by destroying that which lay 
in her womb he has lessened the whole host; and let money also be 
given the woman's husband by the man (who kicked her); but if she 
should die from the blow, let him also be killed, for the Law judged it 
right that life should (be paid) for life.
43
 
Josephus acknowledged that inducing a miscarriage would cause harm to the child’s mother 
and father, and would have diminished the population. Yet according to his interpretation, a 
man could be held responsible for murder only in cases where miscarriage resulted in the 
mother’s death.44 Nor was Josephus alone in this interpretation, as several Rabbis viewed 
Exodus in similar terms. The Babylonian Talmud was published in the late fifth century, but 
it collected rabbinic opinions on the application of sacred Law dating back to the third. In it, 
the tractate Sanhedrin shows that the Hebrew text of Exodus 21.22-23 was consulted for 
determining the circumstances in which a man could justifiably kill a rival suitor, or the 
punishment to follow if a man accidentally killed a bystander while assaulting another.
45
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However, this should not suggest that followers of the Hebrew version condoned 
abortion or considered it a legitimate means of regulating family size.
46
 It is noteworthy that 
the Hebrew tradition of Exodus did not make a distinction between the formed and unformed 
offspring. This suggests that penalties would be applied regardless of the stage of gestation at 
which induced miscarriage occurred. Causing even accidental miscarriage at any stage of 
development would have brought consequences according to this tradition, the gravity of 
which was at the discretion of the judge. However, only harm to the mother incurred the 
harshest penalty. There was thus no contradiction between reliance upon the Hebrew Exodus 
and denunciation of abortion. For instance, in his polemic Contra Apionem, Josephus argued 
that the Jews were so pious concerning their marital customs that the Law made no allowance 
for a woman to practise abortion:  
(The Law) orders all children to be brought up, and prohibits women 
either to induce miscarriage or to destroy that which is sown; a 
woman found guilty of this is considered child-killer, because she 
obliterates a soul and lessens the race.
47
  
Regardless of the legal technicalities of whether or not the foetus was a human being, 
Josephus clearly conceptualised the termination of foetal life as murder. The ‘Law’ referred 
to in this passage was most likely the prohibition of murder in the Decalogue. For Josephus, 
the immorality of abortion was obvious, even if the Hebrew Bible did not make any definite 
statement on the matter.
48
  
It is important to note that some rabbinic authors considered embryotomy necessary in 
cases where bringing the child forth would have endangered the life of the mother. The tract 
Oholot, preserved in the Mishnah, dealt with the procedures to correct the ritual impurity 
which followed handling deceased bodies. The text indicated that the full-term foetus was 
normally dismembered in cases of difficult birth:  
If a woman suffers a hard labour, the fetus is cut up in her womb, and 
taken out limb by limb, for her life comes before comes before its life; 
if the majority of it has already come out, it may not be touched, for 
the (claim of one) life cannot supersede (that of another) life.
49
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It is probable that the ‘majority’ of the child referred to the head of the baby. The Talmudic 
Sanhedrin indicated that it was at this point that the child made the transition from being 
considered unborn to born.
50
 From here on, the child was deemed to have a life of his or her 
own, equal in value to that of the mother. Beforehand, it was clear that the wellbeing of the 
child came secondary to the mother’s. It was expected that her life should take precedence 
before the emergence of the baby.
51
 
Readers of the Septuagint made it much clearer that the taking of foetal life 
constituted murder, since the Greek version of Exodus ascribed full human status to the 
unborn child.
52
 The Greek translation would prove to be the strongest scriptural basis for the 
early Judaeo-Christian writers’ opposition to abortion.53 Though the Old Testament did not 
mention abortion specifically, the Septuagint version of Exodus laid down the tradition that 
the child in the womb had the full status of a human being once it was formed. According to 
this tradition, causing the demise of a child in the womb was homicide after formation. The 
text translates as: 
Whenever two men fight and they should hit a woman carrying (a 
child) in the belly, and the child should come out of her unformed (me 
exeikonismenon), he shall repay the damages with honour in whatever 
manner the woman’s husband imposes. But if the child was formed, 
he shall give life for life.
54
 
The contrast between the Greek and the Hebrew is remarkable. In this section, the Septuagint 
did not actually mention accountability for harm to the pregnant woman. Rather, the penalty 
was invoked only in the event of an unborn child’s death. Unlike the Hebrew tradition, the 
Greek made a clear distinction between the ‘formed’ and ‘unformed’ child, suggesting that a 
foetus’ worth increased cumulatively through gestation. However, the child only achieved 
full personhood once he or she had assumed a recognisable human form, and killing the 
offspring henceforth attracted a homicide charge. As discussed in the next chapter, this 
ideation of embryogenesis bore a strong resemblance to that of Aristotle. 
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 Freund believes that the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of imago Dei influenced the 
divergence between the Greek and Hebrew renditions of Exodus 21.22-3. He links the perfect 
participle passive exeikonismenon to its root verb, eiko, ‘form, image, portrait,’ and suggests 
that a better translation might be ‘made in the image.’55 If this was the intended sense of the 
word, it is possible that the Septuagint translator was applying his knowledge of Genesis 9.6, 
where God instructed Noah that homicide should be punished as a desecration of God’s 
image. Freund suggests that the translator arrived at the participle by transliterating the 
Hebrew ason, ‘harm,’ as the homophonic Greek term asoma, ‘unbodied.’ When translating 
the transliterated Hebrew, the translator corrupted the meaning of the original text by 
translating asoma literally. Then the translator, grounded in Creation theology, might have 
decided to apply exeikonismenai in the process of polishing his translation, in order to 
indicate that the body of the developed foetus was the fulfilled Image of God.
56
  
If this was the case, the logic that underpinned the Septuagint distinction between the 
formed and unformed embryo is clear. Once a child was sufficiently developed in the womb, 
it took on a more human appearance, and therefore a divine likeness. Beforehand, it simply 
represented the potential for achieving divine endowment. To cut off this potential was 
considered reprehensible by financial penalty, but was not a capital offence. Once sufficiently 
grown, destruction of the foetus was considered a desecration of God’s sacred image. 
However, it should be noted that Freund’s discussion is very speculative. There is not enough 
evidence to draw a definite conclusion that the translator had the concept of imago dei in 
mind, or the exact process that led him to his finished translation. It is quite possible that the 
translator was working from an alternate Hebrew tradition which has not survived.
57
 
Before moving on to examine individual authors’ use of the Septuagint in relation to 
abortion, it is important to note that the Vetus Latina version of Exodus 21.22-21.23 probably 
followed the Septuagint version closely. As of writing, the Institut Vetus Latina has not yet 
produced a critical edition of the Old Latin Exodus. It is thus necessary to consult Sabatier’s 
edition of the Vetus Latina Old Testament, published in 1743. The passage translates as 
follows:  
However, if two men quarrel, and they should strike a woman 
carrying (a child) in her uterus, and her child should come out not yet 
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formed, then he shall acquiesce (to pay for) the damage, as much as 
the woman’s husband shall have demanded. If, however, (the child) 
was formed, then he shall give life for life.
58
 
Sabatier’s text is probably a fair approximation of the Old Latin translation, as there were 
witnesses in the early medieval period to this translation. For example, Augustine saw a 
distinction between the undeveloped foetus and the articulated embryo in his sermon on 
Exodus, Quaestiones Exodi. On the basis of Exodus, Augustine argued that it was not 
homicide to terminate a pregnancy before the foetus was capable of thought or sensation; it 
was homicide to kill the foetus only after formation.
59
 Since Augustine said in his 
Confessiones that he was far less confident in his ability to read Greek than he was in Latin, it 
is plausible to suggest that he was commenting on the Vetus Latina rather than the 
Septuagint.
60
 Elsakkers (2005) has also demonstrated that the Gothic Bible’s version of 
Exodus was based upon the Vetus Latina, rather than the Vulgate of Jerome. The Gothic 
Bible was consulted for the Visigoths’ secular laws on abortion. It is unsurprising, therefore, 
that the Visigoths’ laws on abortion also reflected the Septuagint’s distinction between the 
formed and unformed child in utero.
61
 It is thus probable that readers of the Old Latin, such 
as Tertullian, were working from a textual tradition similar to that of the Septuagint. 
Philo of Alexandria’s thought on abortion was particularly influenced by the 
Septuagint’s translation of Exodus, as demonstrated by his references to it in his treatise De 
Specialibus Legibus. This work was an exegesis on the Decalogue and its ramifications for 
everyday living. In the chapters where he discussed the commandment against murder, Philo 
made it clear that an attack upon an expectant mother resulting in the demise of the child 
within her belly was considered a capital crime. In Philo’s words: 
But if anyone grapples with a woman who is pregnant, and brings 
about a blow on her belly, and she miscarries, if the miscarried child 
is still unmoulded and unformed, he shall be fined, both for the 
assault and also because he has become an impediment to nature, who 
was producing and working to bring forth that most beautiful of all 
creatures, a human. But if the child had already assumed a shape in all 
its parts, after receiving the arrangement of its qualities, then he will 
die. For that sort of creature is a human whom he has killed while it 
was still in the workshop of nature, whom (nature) had not thought it 
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proper to produce into the light, but had kept like a statue lying in a 
sculptor's workshop, complete, and requiring nothing more than to be 
carried outside and released.
62
  
It is worth noting that Philo framed his discussion around a deliberate attack upon a pregnant 
woman, rather than an accidental blow as in the Septuagint. He seems to have followed the 
Greek Exodus, however, in that he assigned value to the unborn according to the child’s stage 
of development. The destruction of the recognisably human foetus was viewed as 
interference in God’s work of crafting a human being. Philo similarly expressed his learning 
in the Septuagint in his discussion of infanticide and exposure: 
Therefore, (Moses) has renounced the exposure of children, by an 
unspoken (prohibition), when he condemns to death, as I have said, 
those who are the guilty of causing a miscarriage to a woman whose 
child within her is already formed.
63
  
Though the reference did not pertain to abortion directly, it is clear that Philo considered 
causing the death of an unborn child the equivalent of killing a newborn infant. Once more, 
however, only the man who had brought about the death of a formed foetus was liable to 
capital punishment in his view.  
Philo indicated further scriptural reasons for the Jews to avoid abortion. As part of his 
discussion of the Decalogue’s prohibition of adultery in De Specialibus Legibus, Philo argued 
that it was sinful for a man to engage in sex with a woman during her menstrual cycle. Men 
who thus engaged in intercourse without any intention to conceive a child did nothing more 
indulge carnal lust, sowing their seed in vain.
64
 Worse still, a child could be conceived in the 
process, and be flushed from the womb along with the menstrual blood: ‘These people craft 
(living beings) in the womb, nature’s workshop, and skilfully bring each part of the body and 
soul to perfection.’65 Only after the woman’s menstrual period had passed, and she could be 
safely impregnated once more, was it permitted for a man to have sexual relations with his 
wife. Here, Philo seemed to draw a connection between the biblical injunction against having 
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sex during the monthly cycle in Leviticus (20.18) and the story of Anan. According to 
Genesis, Anan (transliterated in Greek as Aunan) was ordered to impregnate his sister-in-law. 
However, Anan violated God’s command, and instead practised coitus interruptus:   
Judas said to Anan, “Enter the wife of your brother, and form a 
connection with her by marriage, and raise the seed for your brother.” 
But when Anan had come to realise that the seed would not be his, it 
happened that whenever he entered the wife of his brother, he 
ejaculated on the ground, and did not give the seed to his brother’s 
wife. Because he did this, he appeared grievous before God; and He 
also put him to death.
66
 
In itself, the story of Anan had nothing to do with abortion. However, Philo’s emphasis upon 
the sin of ‘spilling seed’ indicates that he interpreted this story as a sign that God intended 
sexual intercourse primarily to serve the function of begetting offspring. For Philo, God’s 
punishment of Anan for practising coitus interruptus probably demonstrated that the evasion 
of God’s commandment towards fertility was sinful. His point in this passage was not so 
much that the destruction of the embryo was murder, but that it resulted from immoderate, 
non-procreative sex. 
Several Christian texts prior to Tertullian argued against abortion, the earliest of 
which was the Didache.
67
 While the Old and New Testaments as they survive today do not 
contain any reference to abortion, it is worth considering texts that would later be dismissed 
as apocryphal, since they too influenced the ante-Nicene Christians.
68
 The earliest of these 
were the second-generation works of the Apostolic Fathers, including the Didache. 
Niederwimmer dates the Didache to sometime in the early second century due to the 
similarity of the text’s syntax and vocabulary to the koine of the New Testament.69 
Conversely, Milavec dates the text to the mid-first century.
70
 Some Christian writers cited it 
as canon in antiquity, though never in relation to the issue of abortion.
71
 However, the text’s 
exact temporal and geographic provenance is unknown.
72
 The Didache was essentially a 
didactic exegesis on the ethical code of the Two Ways. The concept of the Two Ways was 
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underpinned by a conceptualisation of morality as a continual choice between the binary of 
good and evil.
73
 Good choices led Christians down the path of light to eternal life. 
Conversely, evil choices led down the path of darkness towards eternal damnation. The 
Didache made no allowance for a middle path.  
Though the New Testament itself as it stands today did not link the concept of agape 
with the foetus, the author of the Didache interpreted Jesus’ emphasis upon compassion as an 
exhortation to protect the child in the womb. As Ferngren points out, the New Testament was 
unusual in its employment of the term agape to denote love. Agape differed from other Greek 
terms for love, in that agape was ‘unlimited, freely given, sacrificial, and not dependent on 
the nature of its subject.’74 The New Testament texts constructed agape as a divine gift, a 
reflection of God’s love for the human race. According to the first Epistle of John, ‘God is 
love.’75 The incarnation of Christ was the embodiment of this love.76 Therefore, the Christian 
authors would have viewed prayer and enactment of divine commandments as a reflection of 
God’s love.77 Christians themselves were called upon to act with agape, as manifested by 
calls to assist the downtrodden.
78
 It was the driving force behind the Christian concept of 
compassion and charity.  
Once more, the compulsion towards agape resulted from the doctrine of imago Dei. 
‘Just as God loved humans, so they were expected to respond to divine love by extending 
love to a brother, who bore the Image of God.’79 The idea of the human race as imago Dei 
continued to feature prominently in the New Testament, though the canonical New Testament 
never linked it to abortion as such.
80
 As might be expected, the New Testament’s presentation 
of the Image of God was somewhat different from that of the Old Testament, as Christians 
held that God had indeed materialised in the form of Christ. Three books of the New 
Testament identified Jesus as the literal Image of God.
81
 Yet the Old Testament’s tradition of 
the human race as the Image of God also persisted to some extent. For instance, 1 Corinthians 
said that male devotees need not cover their heads in worship, for they reflected the Image of 
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God.
82
 The author of James remarked that when the tongue was employed to curse others, it 
effectively cursed the Image of God.
83
 Given the New Testament’s continued formulation of 
humanity as imago Dei, it is not surprising that the Pentateuch’s prohibition of murder also 
continued to be an important aspect of Christian theology. It carried through into the New 
Testament, and was mentioned repeatedly. Three of the four Gospels depicted Jesus Himself 
listing homicide among the gravest of sins.
84
 The fact that the Christians’ Messiah directly 
and explicitly condemned the act of taking human life provided early Christians with a clear 
authority on which to base their rejection of killing. 
The Didache prohibited the practice of abortion twice. The first half of the text 
illustrated the principles of the path of light, which was reachable by practising philanthropy 
born of universal love.
85
 Included in this section was a list of prohibitions whose language 
was heavily reminiscent of the Decalogue. The anonymous author listed abortion and 
infanticide among the prohibitions: ‘you will not slay a child in an abortion nor destroy that 
which has been born.’86 Milavec reads Didache 2.2 as a direct adaptation of the Decalogue 
for Christians living among Gentiles. In his view, the prohibition of abortion and infanticide 
was intended to warn the reader against adopting the Gentile tendency to abort or expose 
babies.
87
 The fact that the Didache author listed abortion and infanticide together suggests 
that he considered the acts similar, if not identical.
88
 The Didache did not attempt to 
distinguish between different stages of pregnancy, but never definitively stated that human 
existence began at conception.  
The second half of the Didache dealt with the path of darkness. Unsurprisingly, the 
text taught that the path towards eternal darkness was the rejection of philanthropy and 
love.
89
 Those who embraced darkness showed no compassion towards the poor or 
downtrodden, but rather advocated the interests of the wealthy. The author censured child-
killers while reproving those who did not practise charity. According to Lindemann’s 
interpretation, this applied to those who practised abortion, since the author seemed to deal 
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with the ideas of child-killing and abortion interchangeably.
90
 As Williams (1998) and Bakke 
suggest, the Didache thus equated infants in the uterus with adults in need of care.
91
 The 
Didache was the earliest Christian endeavour to rebuke abortion on a theological basis.
92
 The 
text specified takers of human life sin as ‘corrupters of God’s creation.’93 According to 
Bakke’s interpretation, the author reasoned that since humans were the product of divine 
design and made in the divine image, their lives were automatically sacrosanct.
94
 However, 
the author did not elaborate upon his theological stance against abortion. It is likely that he 
felt he could safely assume that his contemporary readers were familiar with the Scripture 
that underpinned it. Moreover, an esoteric theological excursus would perhaps have been 
outside the scope of the Didache as a practical guide to Christian morality. 
The Letter of Barnabas was closely connected to the Didache, echoing its 
proscription of abortion. The exact date and provenance of the epistle are imprecise, but it 
most likely originated some time during the early second century.
95
 If the letter was intended 
for a particular Christian group, it is unclear which it was. The letter was widely read in 
antiquity, and even appears in the biblical Sinaitic Codex, dated to the early fourth century.
96
 
Moreover, Clement of Alexandria cited it as Scripture, though again not in relation to 
abortion.
97
 The fact that Clement read it could perhaps be an indication that the epistle was of 
Egyptian origin.
98
 The majority of the text laid out Christian doctrine concerning Christ’s 
resurrection and the salvation of sinners. Principally, the text argued on the basis of Scripture 
that Jesus was the fulfilment of messianic prophecies in the Old Testament.
99
 However, the 
last three chapters comprised practical knowledge and teaching in Christian morality, whose 
implementation would lead the reader towards the salvation it had previously expounded 
upon. Like the Didache, the author explicated Christian morality via the doctrine of the Two 
Ways.
100
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The Letter of Barnabas followed almost exactly the same argument as the Didache 
concerning abortion.
101
 The author urged his readers to eschew abortion on the basis of the 
scriptural commandment: ‘love thy neighbour.’102 The author classed abortion and infanticide 
alongside the oppression of the poor and needy. Thus, like the author of the Didache, the 
writer of the Letter constructed unborn children as neighbours, as much in need of Christian 
charity as any other member of the community.
103
 Also, like the Didache, the author linked 
the ideas of infanticide and abortion, but never actually argued that they were synonymous. 
The Didache and the Letter of Barnabas were also alike in that they linked heavily to the 
Decalogue. As mentioned above, they specifically banned abortion in terms very similar to 
the Ten Commandments. Each of them interspersed their admonitions with direct quotations 
of the Decalogue. It is clear that the author meant the texts to be in the same tradition as 
Exodus. To this extent, the prohibition against abortion may have been an elaboration upon 
the Decalogue’s commandment against murder, while bearing Exodus’ discussion of 
miscarriage in mind.
104
 
If Tertullian was aware of the prohibition of abortion in the Didache and the Letter of 
Barnabas, he gave no indication of it in his writings. He did not phrase his arguments against 
the termination of pregnancy in terms of the Two Ways. Nor did he conceptualise abortion as 
an abrogation of charity. If Tertullian read the Didache as Scripture, one might have expected 
him to appeal to its commandment against abortion. The only such legal precedent Tertullian 
cited was Mosaic Law in De Anima.
105
  
The pseudepigraphic Apocalypse of Peter also censured both the practice and 
practitioners of abortion quite severely. The Apocalypse described a vision of hell and the 
torments that awaited sinners. Among the sinners were parents who aborted their 
pregnancies. Amidst certain Christian sects of antiquity, the Apocalypse held authority equal 
to that of other New Testament books. The strongest evidence for the inclusion of the 
Apocalypse in early canon is its place in the Muratorian list, the earliest Western enumeration 
of canonical works. The Muratorian canon categorised the Apocalypse as a work of contested 
status: ‘we receive only the apocalypses of John and Peter, though some of us are not willing 
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that the latter be read in the Ecclesia.’106 The provenance and exact dating of the Apocalypse 
are unclear. However, the fact that one of Tertullian’s near-contemporaries, Clement of 
Alexandria (c. AD 150-c.215), cited it as canon provides a broad terminus ante quem.
107
 A 
large portion of the Apocalypse survives in two manuscripts, the earlier of which was written 
in Greek, and a much later version in Ge’ez.108  
The Greek version of the Apocalypse of Peter described how women who caused their 
offspring to be expelled from the womb before reaching full gestation faced eternal 
punishment by the shades of their children. The author discussed abortion directly after 
describing the similarly grizzly fate that awaited murderers:   
And I saw the killers and those who shared knowledge with them, 
thrown into a certain narrow place, (which was) filled with dreadful 
creeping things, and struck by those creatures, and in this manner 
writhing in that punishment; and worms lay upon them like clouds of 
shadow. And the souls of the slain were standing and watched the 
punishment of those killers and they said: “God, your condemnation 
is fair.” But adjacent to that place I saw another narrow place into 
which the fluid and the foul smell of those who were being castigated 
flowed downward and there became like a lake: and in that place 
women were set down, having the fluid right up to their necks, and 
many children sat against them who were born before their appointed 
hour, continuously weeping; and out of them came blazes of flame 
and struck the women in the eyes: and these were those who 
conceived unmarried and aborted their babies.
109
  
Gorman and Bakke suggest that this context indicates that the author saw abortion as 
homicide.
110
 This is not strictly true, since the women in this instance were not described as 
as murderers. They were punished in a separate category. However, their close proximity to 
murderers, and the similarity of the punishment, indicates that the author conceptualised 
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abortion as being analogous to the taking of human life.
111
 In any case, the author clearly 
considered abortion spiritual anathema.  
Moreover, the fact that the souls of the aborted foetuses stood over their parents in the 
afterlife indicates that the author believed that progeny achieved full-fledged ensoulment in 
the womb.
112
 Clement, apparently quoting the Apocalypse, went so far as to say that the souls 
of aborted infants were passed into the care of an angel, ‘by whom they are educated and so 
grow up, and they will be, it says, as the faithful of a hundred years old are here.’113 It is 
probable that Clement was quoting some portion of the text that has not survived in Greek. 
The Ethiopic version, which was composed substantially later, did mention the souls of 
children being placed in the protection of an angel by the name of Temlakos.
114
 
It is not clear whether the author of the Apocalypse meant that abortion was homicide 
from conception. Like certain of Tertullian’s later treatises, the author of the Apocalypse did 
not distinguish between different stages of pregnancy. However, it would be an overstatement 
to suggest the author meant that people enjoyed God’s protection in the early, embryonic 
stages of development. The author did not argue thus explicitly. The fact that the spirits of the 
children seem to have possessed some kind of physical body could indicate that they 
represented later-term foetuses. However, it should be considered that the author hardly 
intended to demonstrate knowledge of theories concerning reproduction. He sought to record 
his impressions of hell. To him, it was perhaps irrelevant to differentiate between an 
unformed embryo and a formed foetus. 
As with the Didache and Letter of Barnabas, there is also no demonstrable link 
between the Apocalypse of Peter and Tertullian’s thought on the unborn child. Tertullian did 
not mention the Apocalypse of Peter in any of his written works, nor did he give a clear 
indication of whether the deceased foetus would receive God’s grace in the afterlife.115 
Balfour (1985) attempts to reconstruct what Tertullian’s view might have been, based upon 
De Anima and certain other tracts including Adversus Marcionem. In Balfour’s view, ‘he has 
left some data on which his mind can be read.’116 Balfour argues that according to 
Tertullian’s theology, the souls of the unborn would have entered the afterlife upon 
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separation from the body.
117
 Ostensibly, Balfour’s argument appears quite logical. Tertullian 
did indeed argue that every foetus possessed a soul from the moment of conception, which 
survived physical death.
118
 According to De Anima, all departed souls entered Hades, a realm 
Tertullian described as one of either reward or punishment.
119
 Tertullian gave no indication 
that the unborn child was exempt. Next, while Tertullian suggested in De Anima that the soul 
was marred by Original Sin, he also held that God determined each individual soul’s place in 
Hades according to the morality of its deeds in adulthood.
120
 Since an unborn child never had 
the opportunity to sin, Balfour suggests they could not have been judged guilty.
121
 According 
to Balfour’s interpretation, these unborn souls would have been held in suspended animation 
until Christ’s return, when they would be reunited with their bodies.122 In Balfour’s view, 
Tertullian would have argued that the souls of early-term embryos whose lives were 
terminated prior to the formation of the body would have been allocated new bodies of 
angelic substance.
123
  
However, Balfour’s analysis has certain problems. He does not consider that 
Tertullian was writing polemic, and never sought consistency in the theological views he 
presented. Balfour cross-references his interpretation of De Anima with that in Adversus 
Marcionem, De Baptismo, De Paenitentia, De Praescriptione Haereticorum, and De 
Resurrectione Mortuorum.
124
 In doing so, he seems to overlook the fact that in his treatise 
against Marcion, Tertullian actually described the undeveloped embryo as simple, 
unanimated flesh.
125
 Since Tertullian was (perhaps knowingly) inconsistent in his arguments 
on the human embryo, it is perilous to speculate about his personal views on the question of 
the embryo’s eternal soul. While Balfour’s speculation is plausible, there is insufficient 
evidence from which to draw a definitive conclusion. If Tertullian knew that the Apocalypse 
discussed the souls of the unborn, he did not explicitly reference it in his work.  
Athenagoras (c. AD 133-190) was the first Christian apologist to employ abortion as a 
rhetorical exemplum to refute homicide accusations often levelled against the Christians. 
Athenagoras is commonly assigned the honorific ‘of Athens,’ though his exact origins are 
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unclear.
126
 Philip of Side, an early fifth-century chronicler, said that Athenagoras was the 
head of the Catechetical school at Alexandria.
127
 Though Philip is not always a reliable 
witness, there is no real proof to discount the idea that Athenagoras worked in Alexandria at 
some stage of his life.
128
 Athenagoras’ work does display awareness of Egyptian religious 
praxis, which lends the placement of him in Alexandria some degree of credibility.
129
 His 
manuscripts often described him as a Christian philosopher.
130
 Addressed to the emperors 
Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, his Legatio Pro Christianis was a general defence of 
Christianity’s place in the Roman Empire.131 Athenagoras adopted the genre of forensic 
oratory, evoking the imagery of a law-court to disprove the charge that Christianity was an 
anti-social cult.
132
 Moreover, he argued that Christians were loyal to the imperial family, 
using what Grant calls a ‘conciliatory loyalist approach.’133 Barnes has argued on the basis of 
the titles by which Athenagoras addressed the emperor in his exordium that Athenagoras 
intended the Legatio to be delivered before Marcus Aurelius in person during the latter’s visit 
to Athens in 176.
134
 
It is worth considering the similarity between Tertullian’s arguments against abortion 
in the Apologeticum and those of Athenagoras’ Legatio. Since Tertullian did not openly 
mention Athenagoras, it is not possible to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the former had 
read the latter’s work. However, their arguments against the unseen crimes of murder and 
incest were close enough to raise the possibility. If he did, then Tertullian likely got the idea 
of using abortion as an exemplum for apologetic purposes from Athenagoras. Since 
Athenagoras is to be compared closely to Tertullian, it is important to contextualise the 
reference to abortion by identifying its place in the overall structure of the Legatio.
135
 
Athenagoras opened with an exordium which comprised the proem and the first chapter. He 
addressed the emperor, flattering Marcus Aurelius in order to secure his goodwill.
136
 Here, he 
also gave the first hint of a narratio, saying that the Christians were being unjustly 
maltreated. Christians were being harassed due to slanders attached to the name of 
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Christianity. Athenagoras asked the emperor to make it illegal for others to single out the 
Christians for persecution. Christians hoped to be subject to the same quality of justice as 
their peers were. The odium heaped upon Christians, after all, was similar to that against the 
philosophers with whom Marcus Aurelius sympathised.
137
 Athenagoras then gave a partitio, 
in which he outlined the crimes against the Christians. The trumped-up charges, like those in 
Tertullian’s Apologeticum, included atheism, cannibalism, and incest.138 Athenagoras 
beseeched the wise philosopher-emperors to peruse the facts as he would present them before 
offering judgement.
139
  
The body of the Legatio was mostly dedicated to refuting the charge of atheism. He 
argued that the Christians were not atheists at all, but monotheists.
140
 Nor were the Christians 
alone in believing in one God, as the poets and philosophers had described the unity of the 
Godhead.
141
 Moreover, Christians committed no crime in rejecting a belief system as flimsy 
as that of Hellenistic polytheism.
142
 Athenagoras then gave positive arguments as to Christian 
beliefs.
143
 Chapters thirteen to sixteen refuted misconceptions about Christian abstention 
from sacrifice, and summarised the Christians’ metaphysical conceptualisation of God. 
Athenagoras then returned to a stinging attack upon the pagan gods. He argued that they were 
fictitious, as both the poets and the philosophers would agree. Pagan deities could assume all 
manner of foolish shapes, and were immoral.
144
 Some figures of mythology were in fact 
demons, while others were simply men who were granted divine status.
145
 Having dealt with 
the charge of atheism, Athenagoras then spent the remainder of the treatise body (31-36) 
refuting the charges of atheism, incest, and infant cannibalism, before he wrapped with a 
peroration in the final chapter.
146
 
In the final section of the treatise body, dealing with unnatural intercourse and 
Thyestian banquets, Athenagoras made arguments which bore more than a passing 
resemblance to those of the Apologeticum 7.1-9.20. Like Tertullian, he argued that pagans 
perpetuated rumours of such misdemeanours among the Christians simply in order to better 
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their own reputations. Yet public opinion was not necessarily an accurate measure of truth.
147
 
Because Christians lived for the prospect of reward in the afterlife, it was improbable that 
they would undermine their standing in the eyes of God by such illicit practices.
148
 Nor could 
pagans condemn Christians for incest, when the chief of their gods was himself guilty of the 
crime.
149
 Incest was forbidden for Christians, who abstained from all lust. Christians idealised 
the concept of celibacy, and it was thus unlikely that they would engage in sexual relations 
with their family members. Indeed, Christians were so chaste that second marriage was to be 
regarded as a type of adultery.
150
 Those who practised incest themselves could not justifiably 
accuse Christians of sexual immorality.
151
 Athenagoras then moved on to deal with the 
accusations of infanticide and cannibalism, again in a manner very like that of Tertullian. 
Pagans were the true cannibals, not the Christians.
152
 Christians could not consume the flesh 
of an infant unless they had first killed it, a concept abhorrent to Christian and pagan alike.
153
 
Christian moral standards were so high that they did not even kill their young, either born or 
unborn.
154
 Finally, anybody who believed in the resurrection of the flesh after Christ’s return 
would not kill and eat people.
155
 
Athenagoras mentioned abortion as evidence to dispel the contemporary 
misconception that Christian rituals involved human sacrifice and infant cannibalism.
156
 He 
suggested that Christians could not be guilty of homicide, since they were so zealous in their 
preservation of life that they refused to terminate even unborn infants: 
For that matter, how... can we put people to death? And when we 
declare that women who resort to abortifacients are killers of people, 
and will have to provide a testimony to God
 
for the abortion, by what 
rule should we commit murder? For it is not (in the nature) of the 
same person to consider by tradition that which lies in the womb as a 
living creature, and therefore subject to care from God, and to kill (the 
child) as soon as it has come into life.
157
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Athenagoras explicitly based the reasons for rejecting abortion on the Christian association 
between human identity and the divine, but this did not necessarily imply that he viewed 
foetal life as possessing full human status from the point of conception. He clearly argued 
that Christians eschewed taking life from the antenatal stage on the basis that human life was 
the product of God and thus inherently under God’s protection. However, it is worth 
considering that Athenagoras did not explicitly argue that Christians rejected abortion from 
conception onwards, unlike Tertullian’s De Anima. Athenagoras did not specify the stage of 
foetal development to which God’s protection applied. Perhaps he did imply that God’s 
protection applied from the earliest stages onward, but did not explicate this precisely. 
The similarity between Tertullian and Athenagoras here is not surprising. Tertullian 
wrote in imitation of the Greek apologists, transmuting the second century’s literary wave of 
Hellenistic Christian thought into Latin for the first time.
158
 He also supplemented 
Athenagoras’ arguments with a variety of exempla which would have held meaning for his 
African readership. It is perhaps to be expected that early in his career, he adopted an 
established writer of Christian rhetoric as his model. Though Tertullian may well have 
borrowed Athenagoras’ argument, he tweaked it so that it applied throughout pregnancy. In 
this manner, he removed any ambiguity concerning Christian views on abortion, and made a 
clearer case that Christians went to extraordinary lengths to avoid homicide and were thus 
undeserving of persecution.       
Clement of Alexandria (c. AD 150-215) was a contemporary of Athenagoras and 
Tertullian. Like them, he condemned abortion as a sin. Very little is known about his life. 
Highly educated in Greek philosophy and Christian literature, Clement dwelled and wrote in 
Alexandria for most of his life, though he was likely born in Athens.
159
 Though his approach 
to the interpretation of Scripture often showed a Platonist leaning, Clement also borrowed 
from the Stoics and Aristotle.
160
 Clement dealt with abortion in two works, the Paedagogus 
and the now fragmentary Eclogae Propheticae. His Paedagogus was intended as a didactic 
work on Christian moral custom for the education of a fresh convert. The text’s focus 
particularly emphasised the human race’s reciprocal relationship with the logos of God. The 
basis for Christian ethics, as outlined in the opening chapters of the text, was the imitation of 
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God.
161
 By avoiding over-indulgence of the passions, a Christian student could achieve the 
inner tranquillity necessary for maintaining the health of the soul.
162
 The Eclogae, on the 
other hand, appear to be mere ‘notebooks,’ a miscellaneous collection of scriptural quotations 
with occasion elucidations from the author. Clement probably did not intend them for 
publication.
163
 The Eclogae contain little other comment on the topic, other than to quote the 
Apocalypse section mentioned above.  
The discussion of abortion in the Paedagogus was in Book Two, which encapsulated 
Clement’s views on bodily pleasures, and the need for moderation. Besides advocating 
temperance regarding food, alcohol and self-adornment, Clement also urged his reader to 
avoid sexual excess. In Clement’s view, it was ideal to avoid non-procreative sex:  
Marriage is the yearning to raise children, not the wanton ejaculation 
of seed (which is) unlawful and irrational. All our lives would be 
according to nature, if from above we could withdraw our lusts and if 
we did not by means of ill-devised instruments slay humankind 
(which) develops according to divine foresight. For those prostitutes 
who in secret resort to abortion by means of deadly medications cause 
the miscarriage of all love for humanity, along with the foetus.
164
 
It would seem that Clement associated the ideas of contraception and abortion. This is not 
entirely surprising, as the line between early-term abortifacients and contraceptives was 
considerably more blurred in Clement’s period than it is today; Soranus’ Gynaecologia 
allowed the prescription of early-term abortifacients as a form of contraception.
165
 Therefore, 
it is possible that he even opposed early-term abortion, since the drugs whose use he 
condemned were most commonly taken in the first trimester of pregnancy.
166
 However, 
Clement did not make an explicit argument for the humanity of the undeveloped embryo. His 
use of the term embryon does not necessarily denote an ‘embryo’ in the sense of the modern 
medical term. In Greek, embryon was a generic term for a young creature. The word was 
used for the developed foetus with equal frequency.
167
 Interestingly, Clement did not oppose 
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abortion here due to the Christian rejection of killing per se, but used abortion to support his 
proposal that the pursuit of sexual pleasure as an end in itself was sinful.
168
  Clement also 
conceptualised reproduction as an integral aspect of human imitation of God. Humans, 
created in the divine image, had a moral and ethical obligation to imitate Him by all means. 
Only by the imitating God could people assimilate themselves with his divine majesty. The 
imitation of God included exercising the human faculty for the generation of new life. ‘And 
by this a man becomes the Image of God, insofar as he works together (with his wife) in the 
generation of another person.’169 Acting contrary to this purpose, in Clement’s view, would 
be a rejection of human love, here rendered as philanthropia.  
 Perhaps under the influence of the Apocalypse of Peter, Clement described abortion 
as a female sin, carried out only by prostitutes. By using the value-laden term porne 
‘prostitute’ to describe women who practised abortion, Clement expressed a severe moral 
judgement. He demeaned women who practised contraception even within the confines of 
marriage as prostitutes. By using such pejorative language, Clement placed non-procreative 
sex outside the boundaries of acceptable sexual behaviour. For Clement, women who ended 
their pregnancies were guilty not of murder so much as fornication.   
Bakke suggests that Clement did not base his opposition to abortion in the 
Paedagogus on a scriptural basis.
170
 When read in context, however, it is clear that Clement 
based his opposition to contraception and abortion upon scriptural principles, especially 
Genesis. Clement’s entire thesis concerning sexuality, as iterated in his opening lines of the 
chapter, was underpinned by God’s commandment in Genesis to ‘increase and multiply.’171 
His description of non-procreative sex as a matter of ‘spilling seed’ clearly alluded to the 
story of Anan in Genesis, and also echoed the views professed earlier by his fellow 
Alexandrian, Philo. Clement fiercely argued that any attempt to remove the procreative 
aspect from the sexual act constituted sin. As he said:  
The seed must not be sown on rocky ground nor treated with 
disrespect, for it is the beginning of one’s own birth and holds the 
organising rule of nature bound altogether within its essence. It is 
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precisely godless, to debase the laws of nature by expending them 
without count on porous (stones).
172
  
For Clement, abortion was a sin not only because it involved the destruction of human life, 
but because it was unnatural. It is thus unlikely that Clement strongly influenced Tertullian. 
Unlike Clement, Tertullian made it clear that he held both men and women responsible for 
abortion. It was not a crime carried out by prostitutes, but one which occurred within the 
family. Tertullian also did not argue against abortion on the basis that it artificially interfered 
with the reproductive process, as Clement did. In relation to abortion, Tertullian made no 
comment about the futility of spilling seed. In short, Tertullian opposed abortion on a 
scriptural basis completely different from that of Clement. 
Though it was perhaps written after Tertullian, the Octavius of Minucius Felix 
presented ideas on the unborn child that were striking in their similarity to those presented in 
the Apologeticum. Virtually nothing is known of Minucius Felix. The dating of the work is 
uncertain; the earliest reference to it came from Lactantius in the fourth century.
173
 It is often 
assumed that Felix lived sometime from the mid-second century to the early third. Although 
Lactantius and Jerome both said that he practised law in Rome, Clarke argues that he was 
most likely a North African by birth.
174
 In its vocabulary and its content, the Octavius bore 
more than a passing similarity to Tertullian’s Apologeticum, suggesting at least that the two 
writers had a similar education. Moreover, Felix referred to local exempla not mentioned 
outside the African canon, such as the deification of Juba II.
175
 The text of the Octavius was 
framed as a dialogue between two Roman interlocutors, the Christian Octavius Januarius and 
his friend Caecilius Natalis, a devotee of Serapis. Felix wrote that he himself served as the 
arbiter of discussion.
176
 Gradually, Octavius managed to persuade Caecilius and Felix that the 
pagan gods were false, and of the truth of the Christian faith.
177
 It is open to question whether 
the dialogue should be taken as reportage of an actual conversation, or as a platform for Felix 
to present his case on behalf of the Christians. 
Considering the parallels between the arguments of Tertullian and Minucius Felix, it 
is clear that there was some relationship between them. As Clarke says, ‘direct 
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interdependence between these works is on any reasonable account, certain.’178 The exact 
nature of their relationship has been a cause for some debate. Some, such as Price (1999), 
assert that Minucius Felix was the earlier author, implying that Tertullian emulated him 
closely.
179
 However, Becker (1967) has made a convincing case for the reverse. Becker 
argues that it is not possible to identify which author wrote first based purely upon a 
comparison of their works; internal evidence alone is insufficient without external 
comparanda.
180
 He compares Felix to other authors, pointing out that he primarily wrote in 
imitation of pagan sources, including Plato’s Socratic dialogues and Cicero’s De Natura 
Deorum. Since Felix was more interested in clever intertextual references than originality, 
Becker believes that he borrowed from Tertullian in exactly the same way.
181
 Yet this 
argument is perhaps tenuous in itself. Tertullian too was heavy on intertextual references, and 
did not always name the Christian authors from whom he borrowed. The debate over which 
author came first is circular, and it is doubtful that any conjectures provided will be 
acceptable to all scholars. 
As with Athenagoras, it is worth outlining the Octavius in full. The structure was as 
follows. Felix opened with a prologue in which he set the scene for the dialogue, and 
introduced the interlocutors, Octavius and Caecilius.
182
 From here, the debate ensued. 
Caecilius spoke first in defence of Roman polytheism. His main argument was that the 
Christians were unqualified to offer definite opinions about the divine, the nature of which 
was mysterious.
183
 The Romans, on the other hand, had achieved dominion on Earth due to 
their pious devotion to the gods, and the veracity of the Roman religion was borne out by the 
accuracy of its systems of divination.
184
 Moreover, the Christians were even worse than 
atheist philosophers in their obstinate attitude towards death.
185
 Felix had Caecilius argue that 
Christianity was an illicit cult, whose secret rituals involved killing an infant and feasting on 
its flesh, before carrying out acts of incest.
186
 Christians further demonstrated their depravity 
in that they worshipped a dead criminal who had been justly crucified.
187
 The Christians were 
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strange and foreign to the Romans in that they did not set up altars or shrines.
188
 Moreover, 
the apocalypse prophesied by the Christians was impossible, for celestial matter would exist 
eternally.
189
 The Christians could not expect God to provide them paradise in the next world 
when He gave no help in the world of the living.
190
 Caecilius then finished with a conclusio, 
wrapping with words to the effect that Christianity should be spurned as a superstition which 
claimed a predestined certainty about matters where none existed.
191
 
Much Caecilius’ chagrin, Felix reproached him for appearing overly smug about his 
eloquence.
192
 Octavius was then given the opportunity to present a contra, or rebuttal. In 
placatory tones, Octavius said that Caecilius had made several errors in his speech. In a 
partitio, he outlined his intent to disprove Caecilius point by point.
193
 There was no need for 
him to provide a narratio explaining the circumstances which had led him to defend 
Christianity, as Felix had just heard Caecilius’ speech. He then initiated an exordium, 
indicating that Felix should not accept his views due to his own authority in speaking, but 
because of their inherent truth.
194
 Anybody with the capacity for reason could attain the truth; 
the glory of God became clearest when people did not over-complicate His nature with 
decorous titles.
195
  
Octavius directed the first of his arguments against the poets and philosophers, whom 
Caecilius regarded as authorities on the nature of the gods. The highest claim either could 
make was that they acknowledged the unity of the one God. Yet they were distinct from the 
Christians in that they nevertheless worshipped a multitude of deities.
196
 Pagan gods were 
nothing more than men, whose legends were enhanced by the poets.
197
 True divinity had 
neither an end nor a beginning, but was eternal.
198
  
Octavius’ next points related to pagan praxis, comparing it negatively to that of the 
Christians. He argued that pagan rituals were more gory and horrendous than those of the 
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Christians.
199
 Such sacrileges had bought the Romans their empire, not their religious 
devotion.
200
 Reliance upon divination, the accuracy of which Caecilius praised, was wont to 
result in disaster.
201
 This was not surprising, as the process of augury was influenced by 
demonic powers.
202
 These demons spread misleading rumours about the innocent, both 
Christian and otherwise.
203
 Jesus was no criminal, and the idea that Christians idolised the 
cross was misconceived. Moreover, those who worshipped cult images could not fairly mock 
the Christians for allegedly doing the same.
204
 Octavius then gave his refutatio of Caecilius’ 
notions about Christian initiation rituals involving infanticide and incest. Christians did 
neither of these things, but pagans did.
205
 The Christians had no need for shrines, for it was 
impossible to render a graven image of the invisible God.
206
 God had forsaken the Jews, not 
the Christians, for had strayed from His path.
207
  
Octavius’ final arguments dealt with the themes of death and resurrection. The belief 
in the looming apocalypse was no laughing matter, for all material substances were finite. Yet 
God promised the regeneration of all things.
208
 When the end came, Christians would be 
rewarded for their faith, while the wicked would be punished.
209
 The Christians, said 
Octavius, did not believe in predestination as Caecilius claimed. Their moral choices were the 
keys to salvation, which was not pre-ordained.
210
 Physical sufferings in this world did not 
indicate abandonment by God, but served to test and train Christians in their faith. It was an 
honour for a Christian to be martyred, for in doing so he or she could provide a public 
demonstration of faith.
211
 The Christians’ choice not to participate in public sacrifices 
indicated their moral courage, in that they refused to submit to demons. The true religion, 
therefore, outdid the corrupt superstition of the pagans in every regard.
212
 When Octavius had 
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concluded thus, Caecilius admitted defeat. He and Felix were amazed, and both promptly 
converted.
213
 
Though the Apologeticum and the Octavius were rather different structurally, their 
respective authors would have agreed in their arguments against the rumours of baby-eating 
and incest. It is all but certain that one author utilised the other, as there was a great deal of 
overlap in their choices of exempla. Both authors argued that a horrible crime like killing an 
infant and drinking its blood could only be contemplated by one capable of actually acting on 
the thought. Pagans thus demonstrated their own perversity simply by accusing the 
Christians.
214
 Pagans could not reasonably accuse the Christians of infanticide, since they 
readily exposed their own offspring or committed parricide by preventing birth.
215
  
As Tertullian and Athenagoras did in their apologies, Felix here used abortion as a 
rhetorical exemplum to overturn the common Roman misconception that Christian initiates 
practised human sacrifice and drank the blood of infants. Through his mouthpiece of 
Octavius, Felix retorted that not only was this untrue, but pagans actually committed a crime 
just a heinous by exposing their unwanted babies and terminating their unborn progeny: 
Now, I would like to meet the man who says or thinks that we are 
initiated by the murder and bloodshed of a baby. Do you really 
believe that such a gentle and young body can possibly take those 
fated wounds? (Do you really believe) that anyone could carve up (a 
child), scarcely yet a human being, and pour out that fresh blood of 
new life and drink it? Nobody is able to credit this, except 
(somebody) who can actually intend (to do) it. For I see that now you 
expose your children, just brought forth, (leaving them) for wild 
creatures and the birds. And now (I see) that you destroy (your own) 
race after strangling the children in a wretched death. There are 
women who in their very wombs wipe out the foundation of the 
person yet to be by imbibing medications, and they commit parricide 
before they give birth. And these surely trace their descent from your 
gods’ instructions.216 
Like numerous other Christian authors including Tertullian, Felix linked the concepts of 
infanticide and abortion. Thus it is clear that born and unborn children were of equal value to 
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him. Since medications designed to expel the foetus or embryo from the uterus were most 
commonly taken during the earliest stages of pregnancy, Felix may have intended this 
passage as a censure of abortion from conception onwards, albeit recognising the 
Septuagint’s distinction between the unformed embryo and the more mature foetus. It also 
seems that Felix and Tertullian were alike their terminology for the unborn and for the 
abortion procedure, as Clarke points out.
217
 Just as Tertullian did in the Apologeticum, Felix 
described the unborn child as a futurus homo.
218
 The two texts were dissimilar, however, in 
that Felix was somewhat more direct than Tertullian in his argument that pagans regularly 
aborted their pregnancies. Tertullian said that Christians were ethically superior to pagans 
because they did not terminate their offspring, thus implying that it was an acceptable 
practice among pagans. Felix, on the other hand, was very explicit in arguing that this was the 
case. Felix derogated abortion by using the harshest possible term for homicide, parricidium, 
while Tertullian did not in the Apologeticum.
219
 
Felix’s other arguments against the charge of infanticide and cannibalism were all but 
identical to those of Tertullian. Saturn, progenitor of the gods, laid the foundation for both 
parricide and cannibalism by devouring his own children.
220
 In Africa, babies were once 
openly sacrificed to Saturn.
221
 The parents were callous enough to console their children as 
they led them to the altars, lest their tears be an ill omen.
222
 Barbarians such as the Pontic 
Taurians and the Gauls sacrificed adults to their gods. The brutal games held in honour of 
Jupiter Latiaris were a form of human sacrifice.
223
 The Catilinarian conspirators sealed their 
pact by drinking blood.
224
 Devotees of Bellona likewise drank human blood. Some pagans 
even imagined that drinking the blood of fallen beast-fighters would cure epilepsy.
225
 They 
committed a kind of cannibalism by eating animals which had sustained themselves on 
human flesh.
226
 The Christians, on the other hand, would not taste the blood of animals, let 
alone humans.
227
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Felix’s refutation of the accusation of incest also bore a distinct resemblance to that of 
Tertullian. Pagans were hypocritical in accusing Christian men of having sex with their 
mothers or sisters. After all, it was normal and expected for a Persian boy to have relations 
with his mother. Pagans enjoyed tragedies whose plots featured incest, such as Oedipus Rex. 
Indeed, Jupiter himself was incestuous.
228
 Exposed children could be adopted by pimps and 
trained as sex slaves. The pagan man who frequented the brothel thus ran the risk of having 
sex with his own child without knowing it.
229
 Christians had no need to worry about getting 
entangled in such sordid matters, for their men were so chaste that widowers abstained from 
remarriage. Moreover, each author upheld Christian veneration of virginity and celibacy as 
proof of their sexual continence.
230
   
Minucius Felix’s arguments against the accusations of cannibalism and incest are so 
close to the Apologeticum 7.1-9.20 that they read like a condensed version of Tertullian’s 
work. The problem is that this view rests upon the a priori assumption that Tertullian was the 
earlier author. One could just as easily argue that Tertullian took Minucius Felix’s work and 
expanded upon his arguments. Alternatively, both authors might have been working from the 
same, unknown source. It is even possible, though very unlikely, that the authors came to the 
same conclusions independently of one another. Clarke neatly summarises the problem. ‘In 
many passages it is proper to admit—though many scholars are reluctant to appear to be so 
uncommitted—that either author might have phrased the prior version.’231 For the purposes 
of this dissertation, it will suffice to say that Tertullian was not the only North African 
Christian who used abortion as an exemplum in his apologetic writings, and that one author 
likely used the other. Either Tertullian was directly employing a literary trope as his 
forerunner Felix did, or his fellow Christian Felix accepted Tertullian’s idea of the foetus as 
futurus homo and re-inscribed it. In either case, it is unfair to call Tertullian a lone dissident 
as Dunstan does. In light of the previous and contemporary Judaeo-Christian arguments 
against abortion, it is difficult to accept the idea that Tertullian dissented from prior tradition 
in arguing against the practice or identifying the unborn child as a human.  
It is important, however, to consider his unique employment of Scriptures and the 
novelties in his construction of the unborn. Before embarking upon an exploration of 
Tertullian’s use of Scriptures concerning the unborn, his motives and method for using them 
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should be noted. It worth re-emphasising the importance of rhetoric to Tertullian’s use of 
scriptural evidence. As a Christian, Tertullian was certainly influenced by Scripture. 
However, he was also using it as a source of exempla to boost the authority of his rhetoric. As 
Sider and Dunn indicate, exempla drawn from Scripture were by far the most powerful for 
Tertullian.
232
 He was primarily concerned with the controversies he addressed.
233
 Tertullian 
was hardly unusual in this. Although individual authors occasionally carried out exegeses, 
there were no set guidelines for the interpretation of the Bible in the ante-Nicene period. 
Origen (AD 184/5-253/4), Hilary (c. AD 300-368) and Jerome (c. AD 347-420) were the 
earliest Fathers to attempt rigorous exegeses.
234
 While perspicuous interpretation and citation 
of Scripture were necessary for the ante-Nicene Fathers, it mostly took place in the context of 
polemic. This was particularly true for Tertullian, who cited Scripture as a reliable 
testimonium to support his claims.
235
 Biblical exegesis served his refutationes of opponents’ 
arguments, particularly those of fellow Christians. In citing sacred texts, Tertullian aspired to 
demonstrate his familiarity with Scripture.
236
 By doing so, he gave himself a greater degree of 
credibility as a contender in the competitive world of Christian writing.  
Tertullian himself provided some indication as to his method of interpreting the Bible 
in Adversus Marcionem and De Resurrectione Mortuorum.
237
 Here, he displayed an 
inclination to favour literal interpretation wherever possible. Nevertheless, there were times 
when reading the Bible literally would result in nonsensical interpretations. In these 
instances, it was necessary to provide an allegorical reading of sacred text: ‘Facts (res) are 
held in the writings, and the writings are read in the facts. Therefore the form of prophetic 
eloquence is not allegorical either always or in all (writings), but sometimes and in some 
places.’238 Dunn (2006) does not believe that Tertullian’s statements of his methods in these 
works represented an ‘absolute principle,’ but rather ‘a more relative one, applicable to the 
needs of a particular treatise.’239 Rather than sticking too closely to a particular method of 
exegesis, Tertullian generally employed the opposite method to that of his opponent.
240
 
Tertullian would have made life difficult for himself as a polemicist if he had adhered to a 
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single principle of exegesis too rigidly, depriving himself of tools for effective argument. 
When it suited his arguments concerning the unborn child, Tertullian did engage in a degree 
of allegorical interpretation of Scripture. He was not above using a scriptural allegory to 
explain the length of gestation, for instance.
241
 Perhaps Tertullian was inclined to offer 
allegorical interpretations regarding prenatal development and ensoulment due to the general 
reticence of the New Testament on these matters. 
The extent to which Tertullian made use of the Vetus Latina is not entirely certain. All 
of Tertullian’s quotations from Scripture were presented in Latin. The question is whether he 
approached the texts in Latin, or whether he made his own translations from the Septuagint 
and the Greek New Testament.
242
 There is no doubt that Tertullian knew Greek as well as 
Latin. He said directly that he was fluent in both tongues.
243
 Moreover, he was sufficiently 
versed in the language to produce Greek versions of De Baptismo and De Spectaculis.
244
 
Tertullian also hinted in the opening lines of De Virginibus Velandis that he had completed 
an earlier draft in Greek, since he said that he had already declaimed on the veiling of virgins 
and would now do so again in Latin.
245
 It would have been superfluous to point this out 
unless the previous version was in a different language.  
Though Tertullian was clearly literate in Greek, his grammatical points pertained 
mostly to the Latin. Indeed, reading Tertullian, one could gain the impression that the Bible 
was originally written in Latin.
246
 For example, Tertullian built arguments in De Carne 
Christi based upon the correct use of the preposition ex in Matthew 1.20.
247
 In De 
Praescriptione Haereticorum, Tertullian commented on the pronoun haec in 2 Timothy 
2.2.
248
 For De Oratione he commented that his text of 1 Corinthians said that mulieres should 
be veiled but did not specify that this injunction applied to virgines.
249
 
It made sense for a man of Roman Carthage to make points from the Latin rather than 
the Greek. Latin was the lingua franca of North Africa, and Tertullian could not perhaps 
count upon his reader’s knowledge of Greek. While Carthage had a strong tradition in the 
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acculturation of young people in Latin, Carthage was an intellectual backwater in regard to 
Greek higher education. Apuleius had gained his formative education in Latin letters, 
grammar, and rhetoric in Carthage, and was introduced to the rudiments of Platonic 
philosophy there.
250
 However, he travelled to Athens for his further Hellenic acculturation.
251
 
He eventually made his way to the salons of Rome and probably Alexandria, before 
eventually returning to Carthage.
252
 It was quite typical for a second-century African who 
sought recognition for his education to travel abroad. For instance, Fronto left Cirta early in 
life to be educated at Rome, and never returned.
253
 If a young man of the Romano-African 
elite wanted to reach the upper echelons of Greek paideia, he went elsewhere. It is possible 
that Tertullian felt he could reach his reader more effectively by appealing to the common 
tongue, rather than risk confusing his argument by making grammatical points from the 
foreign Greek. 
The findings of Aalders (1937) provide a helpful guide to answering the question of 
whether Tertullian customarily used the Bible in Latin or Greek. Aalders compares 
Tertullian’s quotations of Luke to several versions of the Vetus Latina, and concludes that 
‘often they strikingly correspond with some of those versions.’254 Moreover, he argues that 
Tertullian ‘was not unacquainted with a Latin version of St Luke that was current in 
Africa.’255 On the other hand, Aalders also finds that there were more cases where 
Tertullian’s quotations did not agree with the Old Latin, or where there was a closer 
correspondence with the Greek. Aalders thus reasons that Tertullian normally used the Greek 
and created his own translations for quotations. In the process of translation, Aalders argues, 
he also consulted a pre-existing Latin version where one was available.
256
 In his monograph 
surveying Tertullian’s use of the Bible, O’Malley generally agrees with Aalders. He writes: 
‘There is no doubt but that Tertullian is in contact with Latin renderings of some parts of the 
Scriptures.’257 Yet O’Malley also recognises that Tertullian did not restrain himself to the 
Vetus Latina version:  
Just as Jerome and Augustine and others witness to variety of 
renderings of the same locus, and reflect upon the translations which 
                                                          
250
 Apul. Flor. 18.5; 20.3. 
251
 Apul. Flor. 20.4. 
252
 Apul. Flor. 17.4; Apul. Apol. 72.1-6. 
253
 Champlin 1980: 19. 
254
 Aalders 1937: 279. 
255
 Aalders 1937: 281. 
256
 Aalders 1937: 282. 
257
 O’Malley 1967: 62. 
138 
 
they knew, Tertullian is already engaged in the same process. 
Sometimes with greater acumen than his successors showed, with 
independence which permits him to examine the Greek and translate 
it for himself, and always with an eye for clarity and precision of 
language.
258
  
For the purpose of this dissertation, the question of whether Tertullian used the Vetus Latina 
will be investigated in instances where his reading of the Bible on the question of the unborn 
child clearly diverged from that of the Greek, and where it is possible to compare his 
quotations to a text of the Old Latin.  
Tertullian was unique in that no previous Christian literature had rigorously discussed 
prenatal development or abortion. Though the condemnation of abortion had become a well-
established literary trope for Christian writers by Tertullian’s period, there had not been any 
extended exegeses on the biblical basis for the construction of the unborn child as a human 
being. As discussed above, the references in prior authors were few and passing. This lacuna 
afforded Tertullian an extraordinary opportunity to break new ground as a Christian writer. 
Expounding upon prenatal life in an unaccustomed manner made Tertullian appear more a 
more dynamic polemicist than his patristic forbears such as Athenagoras and Clement of 
Alexandria. Yet neither abortion nor the status of unborn children were over-riding concerns 
to Tertullian; he was like his patristic forerunners in this regard. Though abortion and foetal 
life were occasional themes of his rhetoric, Tertullian did not dedicate any particular treatise 
to the subject. Like Athenagoras, Clement, and Minucius Felix, Tertullian simply used 
abortion as evidence to furnish much broader arguments, as previously discussed in the first 
chapter. His arguments against abortion were subsidiary to his overall rhetorical agenda. It 
was this agenda which led him to cite explicitly the authority of multiple specific Scriptures 
to back up his ideas. 
The paucity of specific scriptural references in Ad Nationes and the Apologeticum 
may be explained by the fact that he intended them for pagan readers.
259
 Attempting to appeal 
to the authority of Christian texts in his arguments on the unborn would have undermined 
Tertullian’s argument, since his target reader would not have been familiar with them.260 
Appealing to the authority of texts sacred only to Jews and Christians would only have 
highlighted their otherness. However, it is worth pointing out that in each of these cases 
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Tertullian based his refutation of abortion upon the idea that Christians valued human life. 
Likewise, Tertullian appears to have based his idea of Christian refusal to kill upon their 
observation of the Decalogue’s proscription of murder. The Judaeo-Christian idea that human 
life was inherently worth preserving was intrinsic to his argument. Moreover, Tertullian’s 
Apologeticum appears to embrace a tradition similar to that of the aforementioned Christian 
authors in that he linked the concepts of abortion and infanticide. He placed the discussions 
of the two issues in the same chapter, linking them inextricably. Tertullian therefore implied 
that for a Christian, the antenatal offspring held the equivalent value of an infant postpartum.  
Without mentioning it openly, Tertullian here insinuated that Christians held a greater 
degree of compassion and love for the helpless than their non-Christian neighbours. 
Tertullian thus underpinned his argument with the concept of agape, though he eschewed 
mentioning it openly. The idea of agape was peculiar to Christianity. The word carried 
metaphysical connotations about the relationship between God and the human race.
261
 
Introducing the idea in a polemical treatise intended to advocate Christianity’s place in the 
Roman world would once again have made Christianity appear too alien. Moreover, it would 
have required a lengthy explanation, perhaps along the lines of 1 Corinthians. Such a lengthy 
exposition on the nature of love would have been better suited to proselytising than polemic. 
The discussion of induced miscarriage in Exodus also seems to have underpinned 
Tertullian’s understanding of abortion in the Apologeticum. He never technically argued that 
an undeveloped embryo was a human being in this work. Rather, Tertullian described it as a 
futurus homo, or a ‘human yet to be.’ Tertullian thus maintained that even if the nascent flesh 
of an unformed embryo had not yet attained a sentient soul, it still held a potential soul. Or as 
he put it: ‘the fruit is already in the seed.’262 On this basis, Tertullian argued that even if 
abortion was not homicide in a legal sense, its results were effectively identical.
263
 This 
conceptualisation of the embryo also heavily echoed Aristotle’s conception theory, as 
discussed in the next chapter. However, it is worth noting that Tertullian’s valuation of the 
embryo here may have also been influenced by the demand in Exodus that induced 
miscarriage should be redressed by capital punishment in instances when the child had taken 
on a recognisably human form, but beforehand should be dealt with like a loss of property. 
Once more, however, Tertullian did not mention the scriptural basis for his ideation of the 
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embryo. To do so would weaken his position before his non-Christian reader. It is also worth 
noting that Tertullian gave no indication that abortion was permissible at any stage of 
gestation. Introducing such an argument would have brought a degree of ambiguity into his 
construction of Christian views of abortion, and thus weakened its efficacy as a source of 
proof. 
Tertullian was also the first to link Paul’s views on marriage to the issues of 
propagation and abortion. In Lindemann’s opinion, the silence of the New Testament 
regarding the issues of procreation and abortion is especially surprising in light of Paul’s 
emphasis upon marriage.
264
 In his letters to fellow Christians at Corinth, Paul offered the 
opinion that although marriage was a God-given institution, choosing a life of celibacy would 
make it easier to serve as a Christian. In his words: 
I want you to be free from preoccupations. The unmarried man should 
be preoccupied about the things of the Lord, and the means by which 
to find favour with the Lord. On the other hand, the married man is 
preoccupied about things of the world, the means by which to find 
favour with his wife, and he is divided. And the unmarried woman or 
virgin is preoccupied about the things of the Lord, in order to be pure 
in both body and spirit; but the married woman is preoccupied with 
things of the world, the means by which to find favour with her 
husband. I say this for you, not so as to cast a noose upon you, but (in 
the name of) decency and (for your) undistracted attention to the 
Lord.
265
 
To this effect, Paul urged his readers to follow his example and remain single.
266
 Paul’s 
opinions on marriage were intimately linked to his eschatological expectations; he framed his 
discussion of marriage with a view towards the looming apocalypse.
267
 For Paul, it was idle 
to alter one’s marital status since the end of the world was imminent. It was preferable for his 
readers to maintain their current marital status, and not to seek remarriage following 
bereavement or divorce.
268
 However, this should not suggest that Paul was against marriage. 
In fact, Paul promoted the virtue of Christian monogamy, and espoused that Christians should 
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not divorce.
269
 He went so far as to suggest that in the event that a Christian was incapable of 
remaining celibate, it was better to remain married to a non-believer than to divorce.
270
 
However, the link between Paul and procreation was tenuous. Paul made no mention of 
children as a consequence of marriage in any of the surviving manuscripts.  
In Ad Uxorem and De Exhortatione Castitatis Tertullian interpreted Paul’s references 
to the ‘anxieties’ of marriage as a reference to the responsibilities of parenthood, urging 
Christians not to reproduce if they could avoid it, since the responsibilities of raising children 
would serve as a distraction from service to God.
271
 Moreover, Tertullian suggested that 
Christians should avoid begetting children, since it would be easier to endure martyrdom 
without the anxieties of parenthood.
272
 Tertullian seems to have connected Paul’s 
eschatological expectations with the apocalyptic prophecies iterated in the Gospels of 
Matthew and Luke.
273
 Tertullian here applied a layer of interpolation to Paul’s views on 
marriage, recasting his ideas in light of procreation. Indeed, for Tertullian, Paul’s call to 
celibacy was of such power that it cancelled out the commandment towards fertility in 
Genesis.
274
 Yet as always, it is ambiguous whether his exhortation to abstain from child 
rearing was a reflection of his personal experiences or whether it was simply rhetorical.
275
 It 
is of course possible that Tertullian was reading a Latin text of 1 Corinthians which did 
mention child-rearing. Unfortunately, once again only Sabatier’s edition is available for 
comparison, as the Institut Vetus Latina has thus far published only Uwe Fröhlich’s (1995, 
1996, 1998) introductory material on 1 Corinthians. Sabatier’s text does not feature any such 
digression on childrearing.
276
 
Tertullian’s De Exhortatione Castitatis was also the first in which he seemed inclined 
to argue that abortion was sinful from the moment of conception. The medicamen he 
mentioned clearly referred to abortifacients, such as pennyroyal and silphium, which were 
most commonly taken in the first trimester.
277
 Likewise, the fact that he referred to the 
progeny as conceptus rather than infans perhaps suggests that it was recently conceived, and 
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had not yet taken on the physical characteristics of an infant. If Tertullian was suggesting that 
induced abortion was murder from conception onwards, he seems to have made a break from 
Exodus as iterated in the Septuagint and Vetus Latina. As previously noted, these versions of 
Exodus suggested that induced miscarriage should be treated as homicide only in cases where 
the child had reached a certain degree of physical maturation in the womb. However, it was 
not out of character for Tertullian to bend his theology so that it would serve his rhetorical 
ends. Tertullian carefully avoided extended exegesis in this work. In De Exhortatione 
Castitatis, Tertullian’s allusions to Scripture seem off the cuff, perhaps deliberately. He did 
not directly invoke the authority of Scripture to back his argument on abortion as he later 
would in De Anima. By avoiding extended explanation, he cleverly gave the impression that 
his view of abortion was so obvious that it needed no explanation. 
In De Exhortatione Castitatis Tertullian drew upon the conceptualisation of God as 
the regulator of fertility. He sarcastically suggested that after an unplanned pregnancy had 
occurred, his Christian reader might have prayed to God for an end to the pregnancy. 
Tertullian’s argument here rested upon the idea that God’s will concerning procreation could 
not be bent by human intervention. Tertullian then suggested that an alternative might be to 
court a woman incapable of conceiving children. However, even this would have been no 
protection, since there were numerous examples from the Old and New Testaments of God 
miraculously granting barren women the ability to bear children.
278
 In his words:  
I guess that some woman will be sought after faithfully and with 
sufficient deliberation, who is actually already frigid by age. After all, 
we believe in no woman who brought forth (a child) by God’s will, 
although she was sterile or aged! Which is exactly what He is more 
likely to do, if somebody by the presumption of his own 
foreknowledge, challenges God by emulating him. In fact, we know 
(of an instance) among the (Christian) brothers, in which one of them 
took a sterile wife in second marriage on account of his daughter, and 
he was made a father again, as well as a husband again.
279
 
In fact, Tertullian wryly suggested that God was more likely to punish a man who married an 
infertile woman to avoid fatherhood by granting him offspring.  
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De Virginibus Velandis differed from Tertullian’s other condemnations of abortion 
because it expressed anxiety that women, rather than their lovers, were responsible for ending 
pregnancies. In De Exhortatione Castitatis, Tertullian reproached the paterfamilias for 
(hypothetically) procuring drugs to terminate his nascent offspring; but here, the onus was 
clearly upon the mater. Tertullian again drew upon the conceptualisation of God as the 
overseer of prenatal development in De Virginibus Velandis. No human agency could prevent 
God from bringing a child to fruition, according to this treatise. Tertullian here implied that 
any attempt to intervene in God’s work was futile. Moreover, Tertullian also echoed his 
previous De Exhortatione Castitatis in that he suggested that God would punish attempts to 
affect the process of human development by causing unwanted pregnancy.  
 Once again, however, it is not clear whether Tertullian meant that the unborn child 
should be assigned human status from conception in De Virginibus Velandis. Indeed, he did 
not describe it as homicide at all, though he was obviously convinced of the immorality of 
abortion. He expressed a clear sympathy for the unborn, portraying it as the helpless victim of 
its mother.
280
 However, Tertullian did not delineate the point in pregnancy at which these 
abortions supposedly occurred. This was no impediment to his thesis. Tertullian’s indictment 
of unmarried women who ended their pregnancies was one slender component of his case 
against women who went unveiled. Getting bogged down in unnecessary detail in one of his 
ancillary arguments would have drawn attention away from the issue at hand.    
 De Anima featured Tertullian’s most thorough digressions on the unborn. It was the 
first attempt to present an extended examination of pregnancy and the process of embryonic 
development in the history of Christian literature.
281
 Tertullian was also the first author to 
employ scriptural exegesis to support his view, drawing upon a rich array of scriptural 
ammunition.
282
 However, it is worth re-emphasising that Tertullian did not do so for the 
purpose of arguing against termination of pregnancy, but rather to prove his views on 
psychology. In De Anima, Tertullian did not make use of his earlier interpretation of Paul’s 
views on celibacy and childrearing. Instead, he relied upon the idea that children were a 
divine blessing, not a curse. To support this view, Tertullian invoked the authority of God’s 
commandment towards fertility, not once, but twice.
283
 He described the desire to procreate 
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as status, or the ‘normal condition.’284 Far from reproaching Christians for having children, 
he ebulliently celebrated the female role in procreation.
285
 Upholding reproduction as a 
normative aspect of Christian marriage enabled Tertullian to promote his thesis on the 
development of the soul. De Anima was significantly different from his earlier treatises on 
marriage because of his argument; it would have been difficult to promote a traducian view 
of ensoulment without referring to pregnancy. Tertullian could hardly use pregnancy as an 
exemplum and downplay procreation in the same treatise.  
In order to prove that Stoic and Platonist influence upon the Christian ideas of 
ensoulment were heretical, Tertullian drew heavily upon biblical references to the unborn 
child. Employing evidence from the Greek embryological and philosophical traditions 
without reference to the Bible would have made him appear hypocritical, leaving him open to 
challenge.
286
 In particular, Tertullian explicitly linked his conceptualisation of the unborn 
child to Genesis. He grounded his description of the unborn child in terms of First Creation. 
Tertullian was the first patristic writer to make clear the association between God’s moulding 
of Adam and Eve and His moulding of the embryo. In De Anima, he often employed the 
imagery of God as moulder and shaper of the embryo.
287
 By alluding to the scriptural 
tradition of God as the moulder of the unborn child, Tertullian increased the authority of his 
argument. Though his arguments about the nature and origin of the soul had little correlation 
with Scripture, Tertullian made it appear as though his arguments proceeded naturally from 
Genesis by borrowing its language. In 27.1-9 particularly, he argued that body and soul were 
formed simultaneously upon conception via a scriptural analogy. Tertullian likened the moist 
clay from which God crafted Adam to male semen, which, according to Tertullian, formed 
the physical make-up of the embryo. He further likened the soul of the father, passed on to 
the child through orgasm, to the breath of God. ‘Therefore that whole overflow of souls 
comes from the one man-- nature of course is observant of God’s commandment, “increase 
and multiply.”’288 
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Tertullian also drew upon narratives of miraculous pregnancies to prove that the 
foetus was in some way receptive to the presence of God. He used the story of Rebecca’s 
carrying Jacob and Esau, and their ‘striving’ in her womb to prove that infants were animated 
even prior to birth. The relevant section of Genesis reads: 
Isaac prayed to the Lord concerning Rebecca, his wife, because she 
was sterile. And the Lord heard him, and Rebecca conceived in her 
belly. The babies leapt within her, and she said, “If it is so with me, 
then why is this happening to me?” So she went to ask of the Lord. 
The Lord said to her, “Two nations are in your belly, and two peoples 
will be separated from your womb; one people will be stronger than 
the other, and the older will serve the younger.” And the days passed 
for her to give birth, there were twins in her womb. The first to come 
out was red, and hairy all over like a hide. So she named him Esau. 
After this, his brother came forth, and his hand grasped Esau’s 
heel; so she named him Jacob.
289
 
In Tertullian’s view, the fact that Rebecca could feel the infants stirring within her alone 
would have been sufficient for him to prove that infants were animated prior to birth. On the 
other hand, their movement could have been taken as an aberration or a prodigy. However, 
Tertullian added a further detail, saying that Jacob grabbed Esau’s heel while they were still 
in the birth canal, before either had taken their first breaths.
290
 Since the contest between the 
two brothers had begun before either was breathing, the Stoic and Platonic theory that breath 
was the first point of ensoulment was clearly wrong.
291
  
In the same chapter, Tertullian also drew upon the evidence of Luke and Jeremiah. He 
was the first Christian writer to justify his theory of foetal consciousness by Luke’s narration 
of John’s ‘leaping’ in the womb. As Luke said: 
In those days Mary got up and went off with speed into the hills 
towards a Judean city, and (there) she entered into the house of 
                                                          
289 
Gen. 25.21-26. ἐδεῖτο δὲ Ισαακ κυρίου περὶ Ρεβεκκας τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ, ὅτι στεῖρα ἦν· ἐπήκουσεν δὲ 
αὐτοῦ ὁ θεός, καὶ ἔλαβεν ἐν γαστρὶ Ρεβεκκα ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ. ἐσκίρτων δὲ τὰ παιδία ἐν αὐτῇ· εἶπεν δέ Εἰ οὕτως 
μοι μέλλει γίνεσθαι, ἵνα τί μοι τοῦτο; ἐπορεύθη δὲ πυθέσθαι παρὰ κυρίου, καὶ εἶπεν κύριος αὐτῇ Δύο ἔθνη ἐν τῇ 
γαστρί σού εἰσιν, καὶ δύο λαοὶ ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας σου διασταλήσονται· καὶ λαὸς λαοῦ ὑπερέξει, καὶ ὁ μείζων 
δουλεύσει τῷ ἐλάσσονι. καὶ ἐπληρώθησαν αἱ ἡμέραι τοῦ τεκεῖν αὐτήν, καὶ τῇδε ἦν δίδυμα ἐν τῇ κοιλίᾳ 
αὐτῆς. ἐξῆλθεν δὲ ὁ υἱὸς ὁ πρωτότοκος πυρράκης, ὅλος ὡσεὶ δορὰ δασύς· ἐπωνόμασεν δὲ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ 
Ησαυ. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐξῆλθεν ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ χεὶρ αὐτοῦ ἐπειλημμένη τῆς πτέρνης Ησαυ· καὶ 
ἐκάλεσεν τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ Ιακωβ. 
290
 Fischer’s edition of the Old Latin Genesis (1952: 267-269) gives no indication that this detail was in the 
Vetus Latina. In all likelihood, it was an interpolation of Tertullian. 
291
 Tert. An. 26.1-3. As Dunn (1998: 119-122) points out, Tertullian’s interpretation of the passage here was 
quite different from that presented in other works. In Adversus Iudaeos 1.4-1.7, for instance, Tertullian argued 
that the struggle between Esau and Jacob represented the triumph of Christianity over Judaism. In De Pudicitia 
8, on the other hand, Tertullian examined the narrative of Jacob and Esau’s contention as a means of explaining 
the significance of Jesus’ parable of the prodigal son in Luke 15.11-32. 
146 
 
Zechariah and warmly greeted Elizabeth. When it came to pass that 
Elizabeth heard Mary’s greeting, the child leaped in her womb. And 
Elizabeth was fulfilled with the Holy Spirit and she said shouting with 
a great shout, ‘You are blessed among women, and the fruit of your 
womb is also blessed. And from where has this come to me, so that 
my Lord’s mother comes to me? Behold, for right as it came to pass 
that the sound of your greeting reached my ears, the child in my 
womb leaped in great joy. And the woman who believed that there 
would be a fulfilment of the things said to her by the Lord is 
blessed.
292
  
This passage had many layers of significance. Playoust and Aitkin (2008) suggest that Luke 
utilised the narrative of John’s recognition of Jesus as the Messiah in utero to reconcile the 
rivalry between the followers of Jesus and the followers of John. By iterating the narrative, 
the author made it clear that John held a favoured position in the eye of God, albeit one 
subordinate to that of Jesus.
293
 Unlike the other Gospels, Luke intertwined the infancy 
narratives of Jesus and John. The fact that John leaped ‘for joy’ in Luke signified John’s 
recognition of God’s presence as incarnated in Mary’s womb.294 However, the text also 
allowed Tertullian to argue that the unborn child was sensitive to God’s presence, and thus 
alive even before birth.
295
  
Tertullian quoted Jeremiah to prove that the foetus was fully formed and animated by 
God in the womb.
296
 In the Scripture, God Himself came to Jeremiah, telling him: ‘Before I 
moulded you in the womb, I knew you; and before you came out from the womb, I made you 
sacred; I prepared you as a prophet to the peoples.’297 Tertullian’s main point here was that 
the unborn child was clearly alive, as expressed by his comment:  
Since God moulds us in utero, He also breathes upon us, as from First 
Creation, when "the Lord God formed man, and breathed into him the 
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breath of life." Nor could God have known man in the womb, if not in 
full: "before you came out from the womb, I sanctified you."
298
 
According to Tertullian, the unborn child thus clearly knew God and was sensitive to His 
presence even prior to birth. Moreover, God had moulded the embryo in the womb and gave 
it life just as he did Adam, as shown by Tertullian’s quotation of Genesis 2.7: et finxit deus 
hominem et flauit in eum flatum uitae. 
Tertullian’s argument in De Anima that abortion constituted homicide throughout 
pregnancy again seems to have diverged somewhat from the Greek Exodus and its Old Latin 
translation. As he said: ‘We recognise life from the point of conception, and because of this 
we claim that the soul (also begins) from conception; for (from the beginning of) life there is 
a soul.’299 Strangely, Tertullian later cited the authority of the ‘Law of Moses’ to back up his 
rejection of abortion. Here, he recognised a distinction between the formed and unformed 
offspring. In Tertullian’s words:  
Therefore, the offspring becomes a human being in utero from the 
point when its form is completed. Indeed, at that point the Law of 
Moses sentences the man guilty of abortion to retributive punishment, 
while as yet there exists the beginning (causa) of a human 
being, when the condition of both life and death have been assigned 
to it, although (I realise that) because it lives as yet inside its mother, 
it mostly receives its lot along with its mother.
300
    
In this passage, Tertullian appeared to contradict his earlier argument that the embryo 
possessed human status from the moment of conception by suggesting that it became human 
only after its form had been completed. It is tempting to follow Lindemann’s suggestion that 
Tertullian was citing Exodus in his arguments against abortion.
301
 Yet in arguing that the 
embryo was fully hominised at all stages of gestation, Tertullian’s argument differed from the 
Septuagint and Old Latin renditions of Exodus, which described induced miscarriage as 
murder only from the point at which the foetal offspring had attained human form. If 
Tertullian was indeed alluding to the Septuagint version of Exodus or the Old Latin as 
represented in Sabatier, he was being somewhat disingenuous.  
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It is worth evaluating the possibility that Tertullian was working from a Latin version 
of Exodus that allowed for this variant reading. Yet elements of the discussion of miscarriage 
in the Septuagint’s Exodus do remain visible in De Anima.302 Even within this tract, 
Tertullian occasionally seemed inclined to favour a more gradualist approach to antenatal 
development, and did not appear to see any contradiction between this and his previous 
advocacy of immediate hominisation. For instance, Tertullian openly constructed the unborn 
child as imago Dei once it had completed seven months’ maturation:  
But I would recognise the honour of the Sabbath, inasmuch as birth is 
fulfilled upon the seventh month more easily than upon the eighth, 
because it corresponds with the day from which God’s creation was 
founded; and on that month the Image of God is sometimes produced. 
It is conceded that it speeds up the birth and that the birth finally 
occurs most suitably upon the seventh month, (which) is a sign of the 
resurrection, and both our repose and the kingdom (of God).
303
 
If the unborn child attained the Image of God only in the seventh month, then that implied 
that in his view it did not bear the Image of God beforehand. It is safe to conclude that he was 
indeed working either from the Septuagint directly, or that he was working from a Latin 
tradition which echoed the Greek text. 
One may reconcile the differences between De Anima 27.3 and 37.2 by 
acknowledging that Tertullian may not have been referring to Exodus 21.22-21.23 precisely 
in his appeal to the lex Mosei.
304
 Tertullian was perhaps deliberately vague in his wording. 
The ‘Law of Moses’ could refer to any of the numerous Mosaic precepts laid down in the 
Pentateuch, as all five books were ascribed to the authorship of Moses. He could simply have 
been referring to the Decalogue’s ban upon murder.305 The impreciseness of his reference to 
Mosaic Law was perhaps meant to bring the discussion of miscarriage in Exodus and the 
distinction between the formed and unformed offspring to mind, without inviting detailed 
analysis. Tertullian’s appeal to the authority of the Law here perhaps came about due to his 
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grounding in legal rhetoric, which led him to cite the Law as laid down in Scripture.
306
 It was 
not necessary for him to explicate on it at length.    
On the other hand, Tertullian’s choice of conception as the point of ensoulment in De 
Anima was not arbitrary, as it served his agenda of arguing against the assimilation of pagan 
philosophical theories of ensoulment into Christian theology. Tertullian probably adopted the 
idea that abortion was immoral from the inception of pregnancy for De Anima because 
conception represented a discrete point at which to begin his narrative of the soul’s 
development. It was simpler, and thus more defensible, to argue that the human soul was 
shaped immediately upon the sowing of the mother’s womb than some imprecise point 
during gestation, or at some point after birth. By offering a more concrete point of 
ensoulment, Tertullian declared that he had demolished the vagueness that had hitherto 
plagued philosophical discourse on the timing of animation.
307
     
In De Carne Christi, Tertullian made points pertinent to the unborn which were based 
upon Scripture. In chapter twenty, for instance, he relied heavily upon Psalm 22.
308
 Tertullian 
ascribed this text to David, ‘the most illustrious saint and well-known prophet.’309 The author 
lamented that God had abandoned him, although he had lived according to His will from 
birth. As the text says, ‘you are the one that pulled me from the belly. You are my hope from 
my mother’s breasts. I was thrown upon you from the womb, and from my mother’s womb 
you are my God.’310 Tertullian’s interpretation of the passage was typological. He argued that 
David had provided the antecedent for Christ’s conception and birth.311 The psalm indicated 
that the infant Christ was at some point attached to Mary’s womb, otherwise God could not 
have brought Him out of it. Christ had to have been formed of Mary’s flesh, otherwise it 
would not have been necessary for His body to be severed from hers.
312
 The words ‘hope 
from my mother’s breasts’ also indicated that Mary had carried Christ, otherwise she would 
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not have been lactating.
313
 The novelty of Jesus’ birth was that He was born of a virgin, and 
that He was therefore virginally pure in His flesh.
314
 
Yet the docetists would contend that Christ was conceived of God alone, without the 
influence of Mary’s flesh; Tertullian countered this proposal by once more using the narrative 
of the infant John’s recognition of Christ.315 However, he employed the exemplum in a 
manner somewhat different from that of De Anima. Tertullian’s point was not so much that 
infants were receptive to God’s presence as a general rule, but particularly that John 
acknowledged Jesus even as He was within Mary’s womb. As he said: 
The flesh does not speak of a mother's uterus if it is not itself the child 
of the uterus; furthermore, (the child) is not the offspring of the uterus 
if it has been born (only) of itself. Thus even Elizabeth must be silent 
while she is carrying in her womb the prophetic infant (who is) 
already conscious of his Lord, and she is filled with the Holy 
Spirit. For she says without cause, "And whence is this to me that the 
mother of my Lord should come to me?" If Mary carried Jesus in her 
womb not as her son, but only as a guest, how is it that she says, 
"Blessed is the fruit of thy womb?” What is this fruit of the womb, 
which was not germinated from the womb, and which did not take 
root in the womb, which is not hers whose is the womb? And who 
was Christ, if He was not in fact the fruit of the womb?
316
  
Since Mary was acknowledged as the bearer of Christ, it followed that His substance was 
derived from her womb. The flesh of Christ had not sprung from a vacuum, after all. Any 
attempt to suggest otherwise would deny the messianic prophecy iterated in Isaiah and its 
fulfilment as heralded in Matthew: ‘Behold, a virgin shall conceive in the womb.’317    
Adversus Marcionem was the only work in which Tertullian explicitly argued on the 
basis of a distinction between the formed and unformed child. He did so to argue against 
Marcionite views of Jesus’ conception.318 According to Tertullian’s view here, the embryo 
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was considered human once it had taken on a recognisable human form.
319
 This might well 
have been influenced by the Septuagint version of Exodus, though he did not cite it openly. 
However, his recognition of the distinction between the simple flesh of the embryo and the 
divided flesh of the foetus did not necessarily have any bearing upon his attitude towards 
abortion. He did not mention the procedure in this work. Though Tertullian construed the 
early-stage embryo as mere caro ante formam, introducing abortion into the discussion would 
have been beside his main point of discrediting Marcion’s text of Luke.  
This chapter has furthered Jones’s refutation of Dunstan’s view concerning the degree 
to which Tertullian’s arguments against abortion might be considered ‘dissentient.’ It has 
provided a fuller analysis of Tertullian’s work and its relationship with Christian tradition. 
Previous Christian literature such as the Didache, the Epistle of Barnabas and the Apocalypse 
of Peter, as well as the works of Clement of Alexandria, had identified the unborn child as a 
human being and argued against abortion. Tertullian’s arguments against abortion in the 
Apologeticum were perhaps influenced by Athenagoras. Minucius Felix either echoed 
Tertullian’s ideas concerning the unborn child or influenced them. It is difficult to reconcile 
these findings with Dunstan’s attempt to characterise Tertullian’s views as being contrary to 
early Christian thought. Yet Tertullian innovated in three main areas. He provided the first 
scriptural exegesis to support views on the unborn child. Tertullian’s use of Scripture was 
occasional, predicated by the demands of rhetoric. Moreover, Tertullian was the first to argue 
for the humanity of the early stage embryo. Lastly, he addressed the topics of prenatal 
hominisation and the morality of abortion in some detail, whereas the patristic authors had 
thus far dealt with these issues in brief. The next chapter will turn from Tertullian’s use of 
Scripture towards his artful use of prenatal biology to support his ideas.   
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Chapter III: Tertullian’s Understanding of Prenatal Biology 
 
This chapter explores Tertullian’s background in prenatal biology and the medical 
ethics of antenatal infancy. The main argument for this part of the dissertation is that 
Tertullian did not endorse any particular theory of prenatal development. He borrowed, 
modified, and discarded embryological traditions according to their usefulness to individual 
treatises. First, it is identified that Soranus of Ephesus and Aristotle were Tertullian’s main 
sources for understanding the biology of nascent growth. Next, it is contended that Soranus’ 
preformationist view of embryological development informed Tertullian’s understanding of 
ensoulment as presented in De Anima, and that Soranus’ sober attitude towards abortion also 
perhaps influenced De Anima’s condemnation of the termination of pregnancy. It is also 
likely that Tertullian’s theories on the length of gestation resulted from his reading of 
Soranus. Finally, it is argued that Tertullian did not adhere to Soranus’ theories alone, as he 
also leaned upon Aristotle’s conception theory in De Carne Christi and Adversus Marcionem. 
At times, Tertullian also rejected the tenets of both authors. 
Before embarking upon an exploration of Tertullian’s sources concerning the physical 
nature of the unborn, his motives for using them should be noted. It is worth re-emphasising 
the centrality of rhetoric in Tertullian’s treatises. His main purpose for citing literary 
authorities, including medical authors and natural philosophers, was to demonstrate his 
learning.
1
 By doing so, he lent weight to his own authoritativeness, rendering himself as a 
contender in the competitive world of polemic writing. Tertullian was influenced by ideas 
contained in non-Christian sources concerning human development. Yet at the same time he 
was also exploiting them to bolster his rhetorical clout. Moreover, no earlier Christian 
literature had seriously engaged in the scholarly discourse surrounding prenatal development. 
Therefore, dealing with a topic covered by renowned authorities such as Hippocrates, 
Aristotle, and Soranus of Ephesus gave Tertullian an unprecedented opportunity to break new 
ground as a Christian writer. 
As Heyne indicates, there is very little evidence that Tertullian had read the works of 
Galen (AD 129-c. 216).
2
 Unlike the other medical authorities on whom he relied, Tertullian 
never mentioned Galen by name in his entire corpus. Likewise, when discussing Jonah’s 
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windpipe in De Oratione, Tertullian appeared unaware that Galen had proven that the 
respiratory and circulatory systems were separate.
3
 This does not necessarily indicate a 
conscious decision to reject Galen’s ideas, however. Since Tertullian and Galen were rough 
contemporaries, working in totally different parts of the empire, it is likely that Galen’s works 
simply had not circulated as far as Carthage by the time Tertullian was researching and 
writing his treatises. 
Likewise, it is improbable that Tertullian was heavily influenced by the Hippocratic 
Corpus. Granted, he did make references to Hippocrates occasionally in De Anima.
4
 
However, all of his references to Hippocrates probably came second-hand through Soranus, 
since his references to Hippocratic ideas corresponded closely to discussions of Hippocrates 
in Soranus’ Gynaecologia. Moreover, Tertullian did not give Hippocrates the sort of attention 
to detail he afforded Soranus or Aristotle. Nor did Tertullian ever display the humorist 
understanding of the human body typically favoured by Hippocratic authors.
5
 All of these 
factors suggest that Tertullian’s reading of the Hippocratic Corpus was cursory at most. 
However, this should not suggest that Tertullian was entirely unaware of the 
Hippocratic Corpus or the general tenets held by the Hippocratic schools. It is well worth 
considering Sider’s argument that the depth of Tertullian’s knowledge about history and 
philosophy was ‘due less probably to broad reading than to the custom of the rhetorical 
schools of learning lists of examples.’6 The same may hold true for his knowledge of 
Hippocratic medicine. Tertullian mentioned Hippocrates by name on more than one occasion 
in De Anima. He was aware that Hippocratic writers argued that the soul lay in the brain, and 
that Hippocrates described techniques to induce abortion.
7
 The name of Hippocrates—the 
eponymous father of medicine—held substantial currency as an authority. Tertullian 
increased the authority of his own works by showing an awareness of the Hippocratic corpus. 
Even if Tertullian did not read the Hippocratic corpus directly, he at least had a passing 
familiarity with the ideas ascribed to him, perhaps gained from doxographic writers.
8
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As Waszink, Perrin and Heyne have pointed out, Tertullian’s main source for prenatal 
biology was Soranus of Ephesus (AD c. 98-c. 138).
9
 Tertullian was more than amenable to 
citing Soranus as a source regarding embryology, obstetrics, and ensoulment. He described 
Soranus as a ‘well-educated authority of medicine.’10 Tertullian also often attached the 
demonstrative pronoun ipse to Soranus, thus differentiating him from other medical writers 
and highlighting his importance.
11
 Tertullian’s continual citation of Soranus added to the 
strength of his rhetoric. Since he could compose arguments that were sympathetic to those of 
a well-respected medical authority, Tertullian imbued his work with stronger clout.  
Soranus’ sole extant book, Gynaecologia, is hence an indispensible source for 
Tertullian’s understanding of the subjects of embryology, obstetrics and abortion. Soranus’ 
work was published sometime during the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian (AD 98-138), shortly 
before Tertullian’s lifetime.12 Concerning reproduction, Soranus did not rely solely on the 
Hippocratic corpus. Indeed, at certain points he flagrantly rejected theories based on 
Hippocratic humorism, but rather based his assertions on evidence gained through medical 
practice.
13
 As Prioreschi (1998) points out, the accuracy of Soranus’ anatomical knowledge 
regarding the uterus raises the possibility that his knowledge was based on dissection.
14
 
However, it is worth noting that most of Soranus’ other works besides Gynaecologia 
are lost, notwithstanding Caelius Aurelianus’ fifth-century Latin epitomes of Celerum Sive 
Acutarum Passionum and Tardarum Sive Chronicarum Passionum.
15
 The loss of Soranus’ 
De Semine and De Anima is particularly lamentable for the present chapter. Any judgements 
made on Soranus’ opinions in these works are based on fragments, many of which come from 
Tertullian himself. Indeed, it is probable that Soranus’ De Anima was actually more 
important to Tertullian than his work on gynaecology; Tertullian’s direct references to 
Soranus most often appeared in discussions of the nature of the soul.
16
 In fact, at some points, 
he ranked Soranus as a philosopher rather than a physician.
17
 Considering that the soul was 
Tertullian’s main topic in De Anima, this was perhaps inevitable. 
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However, Tertullian’s knowledge of embryology was derived not from Soranus alone, 
but also from natural philosophy. For Tertullian, the line between philosophy and medicine 
was perhaps somewhat blurred. For Latin authors, medicine was in equal measure a science 
and an art.
18
 The distinction between natural philosophy and medicine is particularly artificial 
in the case of Tertullian, who in De Anima and De Carne Christi presented the idea that the 
human soul was corporeal.
19
 Moreover, it is quite possible that for Tertullian’s readers who 
were steeped in classical culture, rhetorical examples drawn from natural philosophers held 
power equal to those of medical authors regarding embryology and human reproduction. An 
illustration for this comes from Aulus Gellius’ Noctes Atticae. When the emperor Hadrian 
was called upon to adjudicate in a case where a woman claimed to be eleven months 
pregnant, he only offered judgement after consulting both natural philosophers and medical 
practitioners concerning the length of human gestation.
20
 Gray-Fow suggests that in this 
particular instance, the philosophers probably held more sway.
21
 
On more than one occasion in De Anima, Tertullian expressed dissatisfaction or even 
outright anger against writers of natural philosophy regarding reproduction. He stated that his 
reason for such rancour was the frequent inaccuracy in natural philosophers’ works, 
particularly those who drew broad surmises about human anatomy from observation of 
animal species.
22
 Yet it is equally worth considering that Tertullian’s strong rhetorical streak 
also might have led him to reject these philosophical testimonies, since the evidence of 
certain writers on human generation did not tally with the views he was trying to promote, 
and he was ostensibly targeting Christian adoption of philosophical ideas as a whole.
23
 
Perhaps Tertullian was attempting to set up natural philosophy as a straw man in order to 
make his own arguments appear more valid.  
Nevertheless, Tertullian could hardly be said to have rejected philosophical testimony 
wholesale, for he selectively relied upon Aristotle’s biology. As will be discussed below, 
Tertullian drew upon Aristotle’s conception theory, and borrowed from his ideas on 
spermatogenesis heavily. Tertullian’s relationship with Aristotle is somewhat ambiguous. On 
the one hand, Tertullian lambasted Aristotle repeatedly throughout his corpus. In De Anima 
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particularly, Tertullian attacked Aristotle as Platonis amicum, a ‘friend of Plato.’24 Waszink 
points out that Tertullian here was maliciously ridiculing the widely known proverb, amicus 
Plato, magis amica veritas, ‘Plato is a friend, but the truth is a greater friend.’25 In light of 
Tertullian’s low estimation of Platonic concepts of ensoulment, it would appear that he had 
an equally dim view of Aristotle. However, Moffat pointed out briefly in 1916 that there were 
many parallels between Tertullian’s rationalism and that of Aristotle, suggesting that 
Tertullian may not have been as hostile to Aristotle as he would have readers believe.
26
 Sider 
took up Moffat’s argument in 1980, arguing that there was a distinct parallel between 
Aristotelian logic and that of Tertullian, and that Tertullian did not reject philosophy per se.
27
 
Rather, Sider believes that Tertullian rejected what he regarded as deceits, whether from 
philosophers or otherwise.
28
 
Wherever possible, Tertullian attempted to complement Soranus and Aristotle’s ideas 
on prenatal development with exempla from Scripture. It was hardly out of character for 
Tertullian to justify scriptural exegeses with scientific theories, and vice versa.
29
 Tertullian 
never argued that science and faith were in conflict, nor did he aspire to produce consistent 
theological doctrines on human development.
30
 Rather, he alluded to embryological and 
sacred texts as evidence to support whatever argument he was pursuing. Instances of synergy 
between Greco-Roman scientific works and biblical passages allowed Tertullian to appeal to 
secular and Judaeo-Christian readers simultaneously. Examples will be considered below. 
Soranus’ Gynaecologia contains relatively little information concerning Soranus’ 
outlook on spermatogenesis, the process of conception, or the extent to which each parent 
contributed to the genetic make-up of their children. Soranus’ discussion of this matter was 
likely held in his De Semine, which is no longer extant.
31
 However, from a close reading of 
Soranus’ sole surviving work, Waszink concludes that Soranus favoured the one-seed 
theory.
32
 Soranus insinuated that embryos originated from male sperm alone. Although he 
identified the ovaries, Soranus was not of the opinion that women contributed any form of 
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gamete to reproduction.
33
 Moreover, Soranus stated that the female body was simply a 
receptacle for male seed.
34
 Often, he compared the female body to an agricultural field, 
waiting to be sown with the seed of a man.
35
 In his analogy of a mother as a ‘furrowed field,’ 
Soranus was not unusual: Boylan points out that the ‘furrowed field’ theory held great 
currency in antiquity from Aeschylus onward.
36
 For De Anima, Waszink, Noonan, and Heyne 
believe that Tertullian employed Soranus’ view that the embryo arose from male sperm 
alone.
37
 This is supported by Tertullian’s assertion that the corporeal soul, derived from the 
father, came to fruition ‘by agency of the woman, to whose furrow it has been commended.’38 
In the same section, Tertullian likened the growth of the soul within the womb to the growth 
of a root within the ground, just as Soranus had.
39
 As far as Waszink is concerned, Tertullian 
argued in this treatise that children inherited their physical person only from their fathers.
40
 It 
should however be noted that Tertullian never explicitly stated that offspring owed their 
physical substance entirely to their fathers. Rather, the presence of the one-seed theory in De 
Anima was implicit. 
Tertullian justified the one-seed model of conception by a digression on Genesis. He 
put forward the view that since Adam was the father of the human race, it followed that the 
circumstances of his creation would be projected onto his progeny. Tertullian argued that the 
clay from which God crafted Adam and the divine breath by which He gave Adam life were 
antecedents of the moistness and the warmth of human seed. Since Adam was crafted from 
these alone, Tertullian held that the same should be true for his descendents.
41
  
Tertullian’s adoption of Soranus’ ‘one-seed’ theory suggests that his understanding of 
embryology was underpinned by preformationism. If the seed of only one parent was 
necessary for procreation, it followed that it would contain all the components of a completed 
being, either in a dismembered state or as a homunculus. Once implanted in the womb, this 
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tiny organism would simply become larger, without any significant change in its 
development. As Boylan puts it, the homunculus, ‘only grows but does not become; for if it 
became, then the mother would contribute something to the offspring.’42 Boylan’s summary 
of preformationism tallies perfectly with Tertullian’s argument throughout De Anima that 
human embryos attained human form immediately upon conception.    
If Tertullian did follow a concept of preformationism, this might account for an 
apparent discrepancy in chapter thirty-seven of De Anima. In this section, Tertullian appeared 
to sabotage his prior argument that the human soul came into existence at the moment of 
conception, by stating that a foetus should be regarded as human only at the point that its 
body was fully formed.
43
 Applying current understandings of embryology to Tertullian, 
modern scholars have attempted to reconcile this incongruity in several ways.
44
 Gorman and 
Jones attempt to deal with the issue by suggesting that Tertullian actually meant that although 
embryos may not have had the full status of human beings, they held the potential to become 
so.
45
 According to their interpretation, Tertullian meant that embryos should be treated as 
though they were fully developed human beings due to this potential.
46
 On the other hand, 
Waszink’s indispensible commentary on De Anima suggests that Tertullian might simply 
have been unaware that his argument was self-defeating.
47
  
Neither of these explanations is particularly satisfactory. Waszink’s rationalisation is 
undermined by Tertullian’s rhetorical abilities: it is unlikely that a skilled rhetorician like 
Tertullian would have weakened his rhetoric by blatantly contradicting himself within a 
single treatise. A simpler explanation is possible. The view that the body was in some way 
preformed within the seed might account for Tertullian’s argument that the soul and body 
were both fully formed at the moment of conception. Since Tertullian adopted Soranus’ 
understanding of spermatogenesis for De Anima, he more than likely believed that foetuses 
were fully formed at the moment a mother was inseminated. For Tertullian, there was thus no 
incongruity in suggesting that the human soul only emerged with the maturation of the body, 
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since according to the model of generation he adopted in De Anima, both were fully 
developed at conception.                         
However, there were several points in De Anima where Tertullian altered Soranus’ 
arguments. For instance, Tertullian modified the one-seed theory to rectify the inherent flaw 
in the idea that children received their physical being from their fathers alone: children could 
resemble their mothers and maternal forebears as well as their fathers.
48
 Tertullian was hardly 
unaware of the resemblance of children to their parents, since he mentioned it twice in De 
Anima.
49
 While attempting to refute the Stoic theory of metempsychosis on a physiological 
basis, Tertullian also suggested that bruises or contusions on a pregnant mother’s body would 
be inherited by a foetus in her womb.
50
 Waszink suggests that the simplest explanation for the 
problem of maternal resemblance is that Tertullian was influenced by the Stoic view that the 
conditions under which the embryo was subjected in the womb would affect its final form. 
He also pointed to Soranus’ comparison of the woman to the ‘furrowed field,’ pointing out 
that just as the quality of soil would affect the growth of plants, so too would the uterus in 
which an embryo was cultivated.
51
 
In De Anima, Tertullian’s arguments diverged further from Soranus concerning the 
point of development at which an embryo became physically human.
52
 Unlike Tertullian, 
Soranus endorsed a gradual hominisation of the embryo. He argued that upon conception, the 
embryo was initially unshapen. He recognised that the confluence of male and female seed 
resulted in some sort of zoon, or living being. Yet Soranus argued that this nebulous matter 
would only take human shape and gain a human soul slowly over the course of time.
53
 
Conversely, Tertullian argued in De Anima that embryos became physically and spiritually 
human from the point of conception.
54
 Tertullian rejected Soranus’ paradigm of hominisation 
due to his central argument in De Anima. In this work, Tertullian was arguing against the 
Gnostic Christians’ adoption of the Platonic and Pythagorean theories of the transmigration 
of souls: namely, that infants acquired the souls of the departed through air upon their first 
breath.
55
 As Waszink suggests, Tertullian rejected the idea of transmigration because it 
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contradicted the Christian dogma of Resurrection.
56
 Soranus’ idea of conception did not 
correlate with that of the Platonists. Nor did it provide a discreet point at which the soul came 
into being, since Soranus was quite vague on the precise timing of ensoulment. However, 
Tertullian’s theory that the human body emerged immediately upon implantation in the 
womb provided him with a much more concrete platform on which to base his subsequent 
arguments in De Anima.  
On the other hand, Tertullian’s arguments in De Anima concerning the medical ethics 
of terminating pregnancy were fairly sympathetic to those of Soranus. The relationship 
between Tertullian’s arguments on the ethics of abortion and those of Soranus will become 
particularly important in the final chapter of this dissertation, which examines the influence 
of pagan literary traditions upon Tertullian’s views on the termination of pregnancy. 
However, it is necessary first to place Tertullian within the context of ancient medical ethics 
attached to the unborn, and the ethical dilemma that abortion presented to physicians. The 
discussion below of medical ethics related to abortion in the ancient world is very general, 
and is greatly indebted to the studies by Riddle (1992, 1997) and Kapparis (2002). 
Tertullian wrote in a culture where medical practitioners, such as doctors and 
midwives, exercised complete autonomy regarding their ethical principles.
57
 The absence of 
any standing policies of ethical conduct and a governing body to enforce such policies meant 
that practitioners were answerable only to their own individual consciences for their 
standards of practice.
58
 While this afforded practitioners immense personal liberty when it 
came to the treatment of their patients, it also meant that their work was not subject to any 
official regulations. Often, they would have been called upon to make heavy ethical decisions 
without guidance from superiors. To some extent, the immense power that practitioners held 
over their patients accounted for the crossover between classical medicine and moral 
philosophy, since some surely felt compelled to ground their training in ethical discourse.
59
  
The relevance of moral philosophy to the art of medicine in antiquity is evident in the 
proliferation of texts that aimed to give ethical guidance to doctors. Kapparis points to the 
Hippocratic De Morbo Sacro, De Arte, De Decente Habitu, De Medico, as well as the 
Galenic treatises Quod Optimus Medicus Sit Quoque Philosophus and De Methodo Medendi 
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as evidence that such guidance was sought.
60
 However, discretion still solely lay in the hands 
of practitioners concerning their interpretation of these texts, the degree to which they 
followed ethical advice from medical textbooks, and the extent to which they familiarised 
themselves with ethical concepts. Since doctors under the empire were often working-class 
freedmen or slaves, it is probable that many would not have had the leisure to absorb 
literature dealing with medical ethics at length.
61
  
Practitioners were encouraged, but by no means obligated, to follow certain 
philanthropic ideals such as those embodied in the Hippocratic Ius Iurandum, henceforth 
referred to as the Oath.
62
 In particular, followers of the Oath pledged not to harm patients, 
and not to exploit them or their households.
63
 Rather, the Oath called upon its followers to 
alleviate suffering and to be generally beneficent towards their patients.
64
 The extent to which 
the Oath was taken and followed in antiquity has been heavily debated. However, whether or 
not doctors took the Oath directly, it would have behoved them to aspire towards similar 
philanthropic ideals. Though doctors theoretically could make ethical judgements with 
complete impunity, their livelihoods depended upon establishing and maintaining trust with 
their patients.
65
 The distrust that many Roman authors held for practitioners suggests that not 
all doctors practised such philanthropic ideals.
66
  
 It is open to question, however, whether the Oath’s concept of the ethical treatment 
of humans extended to the unborn child. The Oath called upon its followers quite specifically 
not to provide a woman with pessaries to procure abortion.
67
 It did not specifically prohibit 
mechanical, pharmaceutical or surgical means to induce abortion. Riddle suggests that the 
Oath therefore did not require its subjects to eschew the termination of pregnancy 
categorically due to any concern for the foetus or the embryo.
68
 Though he does concede that 
other interpretations are possible, Riddle suggests that this section of the Oath probably 
sought to contain the dangers associated with the use of pessaries in antiquity.
69
 Conversely, 
Kapparis reads the Oath’s prohibition of abortifacient pessaries as a proscription against 
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abortion as a whole. This view is argued on the basis that the injunction against administering 
abortifacient pessaries was coupled with one against administering lethal poisons. Kapparis 
interprets the context of this passage as an indication that the Hippocratic author of the Oath 
called upon doctors to terminate neither foetal nor adult life.
70
  
The ambiguities of the stipulation concerning abortion in the Oath also left it open to 
interpretation in antiquity. Soranus indicated that his contemporaries interpreted the Oath in 
multiple ways. Many held that the Oath unconditionally forbade abortion, and practised 
accordingly. Others accepted the general premise, but on a conditional basis. As Soranus 
said:  
But a debate has come into being. For some reject abortifacients, 
because they invoke the witness of Hippocrates, who says: “I will not 
give an abortifacient to anyone,” and also that the guarding and 
protection of what has been generated by nature is the precise role of 
medicine. Conversely, others prescribe them, but with a limitation, 
that is, they do not prescribe them in cases where someone wants to 
destroy the conceptus because of adultery, or because of (desire to 
hold onto) the fruits of youth...
71
 
Due to the risks that abortion posed to a mother’s physical wellbeing, Soranus urged that 
pregnancy should be terminated only as a last resort and never frivolously.
72
 It was only 
hesitantly therefore that Soranus listed pharmaceutical, surgical, and mechanical means of 
procuring abortion in his work.
73
 Rather, Soranus argued that it was preferable to administer 
contraceptives and thus prevent unwanted conception in the first place.
74
 Soranus argued in 
Gynaecologia that midwives ought to exercise careful discretion in the prescription of 
abortifacients, preferably only assisting to terminate pregnancy in cases where bringing a 
foetus to term would prevent parturition.
75
  
Tertullian’s regard for Soranus’ caution concerning unwarranted abortion is 
particularly visible during his discussion of abortion in De Anima. When discussing various 
medical writers’ approaches to abortion, Tertullian moderated his censure of Soranus by 
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using the comparative adjective mitior, ‘gentler.’76 Admittedly, Tertullian had argued earlier 
in his pre-Montanist Apologeticum that the practice and concept of abortion were homicide 
and thus anathema to any Christian.
77
 Modern scholars often impress this standpoint onto De 
Anima, with Gorman going so far as to suggest that the two works were in perfect 
accordance.
78
 On the other hand, close examination of De Anima does not entirely bear out 
his view, as Tertullian’s rhetoric concerning abortion by the time of De Anima appears to 
have moderated, at least to some extent. Soranus’ cautious approach to abortion may have 
resonated with Tertullian, resulting in his recognition that embryotomy could be necessary in 
cases where the foetus would impede parturition and therefore engage in matricide.79   
Though Tertullian echoed Soranus’ guarded attitude towards abortion, his general 
stance on the subject was dramatically different. Soranus’ aversion to abortion was framed 
not by a desire to preserve embryos, but by recognition that abortion carried definite risks to 
the physical wellbeing of women.
80
 Tertullian diverged further from Soranus concerning the 
ethical acceptability of early-term abortion. Soranus listed early-term abortifacients alongside 
contraceptives, suggesting he viewed them as synonymous.
81
 This is unsurprising, 
considering his aforementioned views concerning the hominisation of the embryo. Yet for 
Tertullian to adopt anything but an absolutist view would have weakened his rhetoric 
concerning abortion considerably. 
It is also worth considering that Tertullian was writing in a literary environment far 
removed from that of Soranus. Tertullian’s condemnation of abortion was largely based upon 
a theoretical understanding. His knowledge of abortion as presented in his rhetorical treatises 
was probably drawn from books rather than personal experience. He would not have 
observed an abortion firsthand since he was neither a doctor nor a woman. He was somewhat 
detached from the often difficult circumstances that medical practitioners and patients faced. 
Soranus, on the other hand, was writing a practical guideline for midwives and doctors. 
Perhaps Soranus had experienced the harsh reality that patients’ interests sometimes 
compelled practitioners to be flexible concerning the ethics of abortion, especially when they 
                                                          
76
 Tert. An. 25.5; Perrin 1991: 106. Hoc et Hippocrates habuit et Asclepiades et Erasistratus et maiorum quoque 
prosector Herophilus et mitior ipse Soranus, certi animal esse conceptum atque ita miserti infelicissimae 
huiusmodi  infantiae, ut prius occidatur, ne uiua lanietur. 
77
 Tert. Apol. 9.8. 
78
 Gorman 1982: 58. 
79
 Tert. An. 25.4. Atquin et in ipso adhuc utero infans trucidatur necessaria crudelitate, cum in exitu obliquatus 
denegat partum, matricida, ni moriturus. This passage has been discussed in greater detail in Chapter One. 
80
 Sor. Gyn. 1.60. 
81
 Sor. Gyn. 1.64. 
164 
 
treated patients of diverse backgrounds and circumstances. For medical writers, there were no 
absolute ethical values attached to the unborn, nor were there uncontested ideas regarding 
prenatal development.
82
 In cases where pregnancy endangered a mother’s life, any theoretical 
conceptualisation of the unborn that physicians might have held perhaps came secondary to 
the philanthropic ideal of preserving patients’ wellbeing.83  
Yet Soranus was the most likely source for Tertullian’s views concerning the length 
of human gestation in De Anima and other works. Waszink suggests that all of Tertullian’s 
suggestions for the ideal length of pregnancy were based on Soranus, due to the similarity 
between these ideas and fragments of Soranus in Muscio and Vindicianus.
84
 Tertullian argued 
in De Anima that it took between seven and ten months to bring a foetus to term, while 
eschewing the idea of an eight-month pregnancy.
85
 For Adversus Marcionem, Tertullian 
repeatedly asserted that the length of gestation was ten months.
86
 Conversely, Tertullian 
stated the length of gestation to be nine months in De Carne Christi.
87
 Heyne seems to 
consider Tertullian’s various ideas on the length of gestation incongruent.88 However, 
although Tertullian argued that only a ten-month foetus was fully mature, he did point out 
that babies born from seven months onward could be viable.
89
 Thus, his views in De Anima 
on the length of gestation were not entirely incompatible with those presented in De Carne 
Christi and Adversus Marcionem.  
As usual, Tertullian justified his ideas on the length of gestation with Scripture. In this 
case, he saw a correlation between the proposed number of months of gestation and numbers 
used in holy texts, ‘so that the numeration of the time needed for us to be born should equal 
the numeration of the disciplines (required) for us to be regenerated.’90 For instance, the ten-
month pregnancy matched up to the Ten Commandments. He justified the idea of a seven-
month pregnancy with an example from Genesis: just as the Earth was completed in seven 
                                                          
82
 Kapparis 2002: 196. 
83
 Kapparis 2002: 199. 
84
 Waszink 1947: 428.  
85
 Tert. An. 37.4. 
86
 Tert. Marc. 4.21.11; 4.23.7. 
87
 Tert. Carn. 4.1. 
88
 Heyne 2011: 153. 
89
 Tert. An. 37.4. 
90
 Tert. An. 37.4. Ego ad deum potius argumentabor hunc modum temporis, ut decem menses decalogo magis 
inaugurent hominem, ut tanto temporis numero nascamur quanto disciplinae numero renascimur. 
165 
 
days, so should its children be completed in seven months.
91
 Oddly, Tertullian did not here 
give a reason why a baby might be completed in nine months. 
On the other hand, Tertullian’s adoption of Soranus’ ideas on embryology was 
restricted to De Anima, since he more commonly borrowed the ideas of Aristotle concerning 
generation. First, it is worth noting a possible reference to Aristotle’s theory of 
spermatogenesis in Tertullian’s earlier Apologeticum. The haematogenous model of 
spermatogenesis, made popular by Aristotle’s De Generatione Animalium, held that the 
origin of sperm lay in blood.
92
 Aristotle was not the originator of this theory, for a simpler 
version of it is found in fragments of pre-Socratic philosophical works by Diogenes of 
Apollonia.
93
 Since a version of the haematogenous theory of spermatogenesis may be found 
in an earlier source, Aristotle was probably simply elaborating on a pre-existing notion 
through his teleological method.
94
 Aristotle argued on the basis of his observation of various 
animal species that blood was formed from the ‘concoction’ or ‘ripening’ of foodstuffs in the 
belly.
95
 Once liquefied by what Aristotle identified as ‘vital heat,’ the fluid underwent further 
processing in the heart.
96
 The Aristotelian theory held that a surplus of blood was produced 
by this process. In the cardiovascular system en route to its final site of excretion, this excess 
blood was in turn fermented into various practical fluids. Among these were sperm in men, as 
well as menstrual fluid and breast milk in women.
97
 
Leyerle (2001) points out that in the Apologeticum, Tertullian asserted that the ‘blood 
of the Christians is seed.’98 This startling statement comes from the amplificatio of 
Tertullian’s conclusion to the Apologeticum. It was intended to give a last word on 
Tertullian’s central thesis, that the repression of provincial Christians was unwarranted.99 
Tertullian was warning the provincial governors whom he was addressing that martyrdom 
would only swell Christian ranks. However, it is possible that Tertullian’s imagery of blood 
as seed was borrowed from Aristotle. It is not possible to offer a definitive conclusion in this 
matter, since Tertullian did not devote much space to scientific questions in the 
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Apologeticum. Certainly, Tertullian made references to Aristotle in the Apologeticum, but did 
not engage in the rigorous biological exegeses of his later works.
100
   
Aspects of Aristotle’s model of conception were more strongly echoed in Tertullian’s 
De Carne Christi.
101
 Aristotle’s conception theory is best understood in terms of its own 
internal logic, namely that of Aristotelian teleology.
102
 Therefore, before describing the 
theory and Tertullian’s employment of it, it is necessary to sketch the principles behind it. In 
his Analytica Posteriora, Physica, and Metaphysica, Aristotle articulated his view that nature 
is best understood in terms of four aitiae, or ‘causes.’103 For Aristotle, the telos, or ‘Final 
Cause’ was the underlying logos behind nature. The Final Cause should be interpreted as the 
finished product of nature, whose creation all other Causes inexorably advance.
104
 Aristotle 
determined the process of generation by making deductions from observation of nature’s final 
products and working backwards. In other words, as George (1982) puts it, ‘the final product 
determines the process, not vice versa.’105 Concerning human reproduction, this final product 
was a full-term baby. Aristotle’s other three Causes, which served to bring about the Final 
Cause, may be summarised as follows: the Formal Cause characterised the process of the 
formation of the finished product. On the other hand, the Material Cause provided the 
physical substance from which the final product is fashioned. The Motive Cause, however, 
was that which actuated a process that culminated in the final product.
106
     
As discussed above, Aristotle argued that male sperm was derived from blood that 
had undergone transformation through subjection to vital heat. Aristotle viewed females as 
being incapable of producing the same level of vital heat as males, and thus not able to 
concoct blood to the same level of refinement as sperm.
107
 Instead, women produced menses, 
which Aristotle viewed as the inferior counterpart of male seed. However, Aristotle reasoned 
that both menstrual fluid and male semen contributed to the final form of an infant. Menstrual 
blood, Aristotle tells us, constituted the raw material of an embryo: the Material Cause.
108
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Conversely, Aristotle viewed male seed as the sole generative force in human 
conception, imbuing the embryo with connate pneuma, or a sentient soul.
109
 The pneuma, 
derived from the embryo’s father, would bring to the inert substance of menstrual fluid the 
faculty of movement, dynamis.
110
 Once the soul had been transmitted through sperm, it was 
mixed with the matter held in the menses. Combined, they would thicken into an embryo in a 
process that Aristotle likened to the curdling of milk combined with fig-juice.
111
 According to 
Aristotle’s theory of conception, men therefore furnished both the Formal and Motive 
Causes.
112
  
Tertullian’s employment of the Aristotelian conception theory was most apparent in 
his treatise on the Incarnation, De Carne Christi.
113
 As mentioned previously, Tertullian was 
arguing against contemporary Christians such as Hermogenes, Marcion, Apelles, Alexander, 
and Valentinus concerning the question of whether Christ’s person was composed of human 
flesh and therefore subject to Original Sin. Tertullian’s central thesis in this particular work 
was that Christ did in fact have a human body.
114
 He supported this thesis with a range of 
complex theological and metaphysical arguments, outlined in the first chapter of this 
dissertation. However, Tertullian’s physiological defence of the concept of Christ’s Virgin 
Birth is of greatest importance to this chapter. For De Carne Christi, Tertullian essentially 
borrowed Aristotle’s theory that male parents provided their children souls, while female 
parents provided them bodies. As far as Tertullian argued in De Carne Christi, Christ’s flesh 
was derived from the blood of his mother, Mary, while His soul came directly from God.
115
  
Tertullian made a further reference to Aristotle’s theories of generation in De Carne 
Christi during his discussion of the Gospel of John. The author of John stated that Jesus 
granted power to believers who ‘were born, neither out of blood nor from the will of the flesh 
nor from human will, but from God.’116 Tertullian pre-empted the argument that Christ 
himself was therefore not born of blood, by suggesting that John’s Gospel referred to sperm 
created through haematogenesis:  
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In fact, the denial of the birth which is natural to our formation 
pertains to the flesh and not to the Word,
 
because it was as flesh that 
(Christ) had thus to be born, not as the Word. Now, whilst the passage 
in fact refutes that Christ was born by the will of the flesh, why did it 
not also refute (Christ’s birth) from the substance of the flesh? For it 
did not refute His fleshly substance when it denied His being "born of 
blood." Rather (it denied) only the material of the seed, which is 
widely agreed to be the warm blood that is changed by ejaculation
 
into the coagulum of the woman's blood. For in (the case of) cheese, 
the vigour of the substance is from the binding together of the milky 
substance by steeping it with rennet. Ergo, we comprehend that (the 
passage) denies the birth of the Lord from a sexual union, which is 
understood (by the words), “the will of man and of the flesh,” but 
does not (deny) that He was part of the womb.
117
 
Like Aristotle, Tertullian here described male seed as resulting from heated blood, and 
Tertullian’s reference to conception taking place by the introduction of male seed into ‘the 
woman’s blood’ is almost directly lifted from Aristotle.118 Tertullian’s idea that Mary’s milk 
originated from her blood was also directly borrowed from Aristotle.
119
 
Aristotle’s views on the point at which an embryo gained personhood may not have 
been entirely dissimilar from those of Soranus. For Aristotle, both the mother’s menses and 
the father’s sperm contained potential souls, though of different types. The menstrual blood 
contained the most basic form, the nutritive soul, which was akin to the life-force of a plant. 
The father’s semen, on the other hand, contained the rational soul. However, until these two 
components were joined into an embryo, neither could be fully actualised. In the Historia 
Animalium, however, Aristotle was unwilling to hazard a guess as to how long this process 
actually took. While the confluence of sperm and egg was clearly a zoon, a living creature, 
Aristotle was uncertain how long it took for an embryo’s rational soul to become fully 
actualised. As he said: ‘Nature passes from lifelessness into life by such small increments 
that, due to the continuity, it escapes us in which of the two is the boundary and the middle 
between them.’120  
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Yet as Connery points out, Aristotle did make a tentative suggestion in Historia 
Animalium that it took approximately forty days for a male embryo to exhibit signs of 
movement, while a female embryo would take ninety days. Before this movement occurred, 
Aristotle believed that the embryo was simply ‘unarticulated flesh.’121 It is tempting to 
suggest that the point at which a foetus exhibited signs of movement represented a discrete 
point of hominisation in Aristotle’s view. But as Feen (1983) proposes, there was not 
necessarily a causal relationship between signs of foetal movement and ensoulment.
122
 
Moreover, Aristotle was at pains to qualify that his argument was imprecise, because the 
length of time until a foetus could be felt moving varied tremendously from case to case.
123
 
Regardless, although Aristotle did not espouse any particular view on the precise length of 
the process by which an embryo attained a rational soul, it is clear that he did not view it as 
having taken place upon conception as Tertullian did in De Anima.       
As mentioned above, aspects of Aristotle’s gradualist view of hominisation may also 
be found in the much earlier Apologeticum. While defending Christians against the charge of 
infanticide, Tertullian maintained that abortion was forbidden to Christians. This was true 
even at the earliest stages of embryonic development, when the offspring was sustained by its 
mother’s blood. As mentioned above, Tertullian did not strictly speaking argue for the 
humanity of the embryo from conception onward in the Apologeticum. Instead, he 
constructed the early-stage embryo a futurus homo, endowed with a potential soul.
124
 
Tertullian thus argued that abortion constituted murder according to the spirit of the law, 
though it did not according to the literal word of the law.
125
 
Tertullian appears to have also favoured a gradual process of hominisation in his 
polemic work directed against the heretic, Marcion. In the fourth book of Adversus 
Marcionem, Tertullian continued his argument against the Marcionite view that Christ was a 
being of pure spirit, rather than a human being. Sarcastically, Tertullian suggested that 
Marcion’s ideation of Christ, ‘was never considered to be flesh before he was formed, and 
was not called a foetus after His figuration.’126 By attacking contrary opinions, Tertullian 
implied that the correct view is that an embryo was at its earliest stages mere caro, and it was 
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only with the passage of time that this amorphous flesh was formed into a pecus, or foetus. 
As Heyne points out, this idea bears more than a passing similarity to Soranus’ ideas on the 
process of conception.
127
 The apparent inconsistency between this work and Tertullian’s 
others may be explained by his literary intentions in Adversus Marcionem. Since Adversus 
Marcionem was an invective, Tertullian most likely sought to belittle Marcion’s lack of 
education in the field of embryology.
128
  
However, it is also worth considering that in this passage Tertullian also perhaps 
bolstered Aristotle’s ideas concerning conception with allusions to similar scriptural ideas.129 
After his discussion of the Aristotelian idea that conception began when male seed was 
combined with menstrual blood, Tertullian combined Aristotle’s comparison of conception to 
the curdling of milk with a very similar passage from the Book of Job. Like Aristotle, the 
author likened the process of embryological development to the curdling of cheese.130 In the 
same section of Adversus Marcionem, Tertullian also seems to have combined Aristotle’s 
image of the embryo being shaped from the coagulation of maternal blood with a scriptural 
allusion, this time to the Wisdom of Solomon.131 Tertullian probably recognised the similarity 
between Aristotle’s conception theory and these passages of Scripture, and thus integrated 
them fairly seamlessly. By doing so, he demonstrated familiarity not only with works of 
higher learning, but also with Scripture. Since Adversus Marcionem concerned fellow 
members of the Christian community, scriptural allusions in this work were probably more 
relevant for his readers.    
The lack of unity in Tertullian’s views concerning embryology becomes particularly 
clear when considering the chronology of his works. It is characteristic of Tertullian that De 
Carne Christi, Adversus Marcionem, and De Anima were probably produced around the same 
time, but feature completely different views on the physical process by which the embryo 
was fashioned. According to Barnes’s proposed chronology of Tertullian’s literary output, 
these three works were composed between AD 206 and 208.
132
 Though the precise 
chronology of Tertullian’s corpus remains debatable, there is no doubt that the treatises came 
at the height of Tertullian’s Montanist period. Conversely, the Apologeticum is universally 
agreed to have emerged prior to Tertullian’s joining the Montanists. Barnes proposes that 
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Tertullian’s apology was written in ‘autumn 197 or later.’133 Waszink finds it ‘very 
remarkable’ that Tertullian’s view of conception appears to shift back and forth between the 
views of Soranus and Aristotle. In De Anima, Tertullian appeared to have ‘lost sight of his 
former view,’ but by the end of his career, ‘the theory of Soranus has not been able to subvert 
Tert.’s (sic) former opinion.’134 Another possibility is that Tertullian simply did not favour 
any particular theory of generation, but adapted them as necessary to support his arguments. 
He was not a scientific writer, but a polemicist. For instance, Tertullian could not have 
employed Soranus’ one-seed conception theory for De Carne Christi, since his entire treatise 
was based on the idea that Christ was conceived of a virgin. On the other hand, Tertullian’s 
theory in De Anima that an embryo’s soul originated with its father synchronised nicely with 
Soranus.
135
      
This chapter has argued that Tertullian did not consistently espouse a particular model 
of embryonic development. He borrowed, adapted and rejected the ideas of Soranus and 
Aristotle concerning prenatal biology as his rhetoric demanded. For De Anima, Tertullian 
adopted Soranus’ preformationist approach to embryology and his cautious attitude towards 
abortion, while Aristotle’s conception theory helped to shape the Apologeticum, De Carne 
Christi, and Adversus Marcionem. Soranus probably formed the basis of Tertullian’s ideas on 
the length of human gestation. Yet in De Anima, Tertullian also rejected the views of both 
Soranus and Aristotle that the embryo gained personhood gradually. Instead, he argued that 
an embryo’s physical person was completed along with its metaphysical being upon 
conception. However, this view is not evident in Adversus Marcionem, De Carne Christi, or 
in the earlier Apologeticum. All of these seemingly contradictory views are best understood in 
view of the fact that Tertullian was a polemicist rather than a scientific or dogmatic writer; he 
readily adapted the opinions of Soranus and Aristotle so that they would suit the arguments of 
his treatises. The final chapter will move on from the influence of Soranus and Aristotle to 
consider the influence of pagan legal and lay opinions upon Tertullian’s views of abortion. 
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Chapter IV: The Pagan Context 
 
This final chapter counters Noonan (1970) and Gorman’s (1981) theory that 
Tertullian formed his position against abortion in opposition to the prevalent views of pagan 
Rome. This is accomplished by comparing his attitude concerning the unborn child to that of 
previous pagan authors, paying particular attention to Roman hostility towards abortion and 
evidence that the Romans did care for their unborn children. It is argued that although 
Tertullian presented his arguments as opposite to Roman traditions, he actually differed very 
little from pagan authors in denunciating the termination of pregnancy and in his valuation of 
the unborn child. The nature and legal standing of the unborn child may have been nebulous 
among the Romans, yet no pagan source ever condoned abortion. Roman authors did not 
often attribute the unborn child human status, and very rarely condemned abortion as murder. 
However, this does not suggest that abortion was customarily practised in the Roman world. 
The maintenance of patria potestas and the civic obligation to replenish the citizen 
population likely convinced many Romans of the evil of abortion, as did the medical 
complications the procedure often entailed. As discussed below, many pagan authors 
recognised the unborn child as the spes, or hope of a human being, and prepared for its 
emergence into family life. It is difficult to reconcile the idea of Roman ‘indifference’ 
towards foetal life with death-notices for miscarriages, Artemidorus’ records of mothers’ 
dreams concerning forthcoming offspring, the literary blurring of abortion and infanticide, 
and the numerous deities of the Roman religion whose task was to watch over the developing 
foetus. Contrary to the arguments of Gorman, it is argued that Tertullian’s derogatory 
comments about abortion in his Christian writings had no influence over the criminalisation 
of abortion during the Severan period. By referring to abortion in his apologetic works, 
Tertullian was actually arguing that Christians exceeded their pagan peers in maintaining 
Roman family traditions.  
At first glance, one could easily gain the impression that Tertullian was actively 
rebelling against Roman customs concerning the unborn child. As explored in greater detail 
in the first chapter of this dissertation, Tertullian often constructed abortion as an immoral 
practice in which pagans habitually indulged, and from which Christians abstained. In reality, 
the gulf between Christian and pagan attitudes towards the unborn was not as wide as 
Tertullian would have had his readers believe. The barrier between Roman and Christian 
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attitudes to abortion was largely an artificial one. It served Tertullian’s interests as a 
polemicist to construct pagan social mores as antithetical to Christianity. In his apologetic 
treatises, such as Ad Nationes and the Apologeticum, referring to abortion as a pagan 
perversion lent weight to his portrayal of Christians as morally and ethically superior.
1
 In his 
treatises written for fellow Christians, such as Ad Uxorem, it was expedient for Tertullian to 
demonise abortion as a routine practice among pagans in order to provide a negative 
exemplum, a straw man against which he could argue.
2
 Yet Tertullian himself had been raised 
and educated as a non-Christian. Moreover, he lived within a community dominated by 
Roman social customs and values. In his condemnation of abortion and his valuation of the 
unborn child, it was therefore inevitable that he drew upon Roman traditions as much as 
Christian ones.    
The child in the womb received very little attention from non-Christian Roman 
authors; its nature was ambiguous. This is illustrated by the Latin terminology used to 
describe the child in the womb, as discussed previously in the introductory chapter of this 
dissertation. Much of the vocabulary for describing the unborn child may be found in Ovid’s 
poems. Ovid provides an illustrative example of the vagueness of Latin terminology for the 
child in the uterus. In his Metamorphoses, he described the immature embryo as mere 
semina, or ‘seed.’3 It would seem that Ovid subscribed to the ‘furrowed field’ theory of 
conception, according to which the embryo lay inert within male sperm, to be sown in the 
female body through coitus. At this early juncture in its development, the embryo held no 
identity. Rather, Ovid simply called it spes, the ‘hope’ of a future child.4 The word fetus, 
from which is derived the English term ‘foetus,’ was generally used adjectivally to describe 
pregnancy.
5
 Yet Ovid twice applied the term fetus to the unborn child in a substantive sense 
in the Amores.
6
 However, he most commonly used the term as a metaphor for fruit.
7
 It is not 
difficult to see the link between the imagery of fruit—a growth from plant life—and antenatal 
growth. 
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At times, Ovid used the term infans or ‘baby, infant,’ to describe the unborn child.8 
Given the lack of a more precise term, the use of a generic word for an infant is unsurprising; 
it is common even for speakers of English, a language which features vocabulary specifically 
to denote antenatal offspring, to refer to their progeny in the womb as ‘the baby.’9 Ovid’s use 
of the term could indicate some degree of sentimental attachment to the foetus in the womb. 
Perhaps Ovid conceptualised the antenatal infant as having equivalent status to a postnatal 
baby, since he applied a term often associated with later stages of childhood development. As 
Manson points out, the term infans was often applied until the child was around seven years 
of age.
10
 However, it should be recalled that the term infans was not actually meant to convey 
childhood specifically. Rather, the noun was derived from a compound of the present 
participle active of the verb for, ‘to speak,’ along with the preposition in. Literally, the term 
infans simply meant ‘unspeaking.’11 It was not a reference to the child’s age, but to its ability 
to communicate. In very rare instances, tombstone inscriptions could employ the term infans 
to commemorate mute adults.
12
 It would therefore be hazardous to read any values into 
Ovid’s employment of the word. 
Other, somewhat rarer terms also existed, some of which were based upon passive 
participles. Partus was similar to fetus in that it served a variety of functions. It usually 
applied to the process of childbirth and to the postpartum infant.
13
 However, the use of partus 
for a foetus resembles the English idiom, ‘unborn’ indicating that the foetus had not yet been 
brought forth. At times, the term conceptus ‘something conceived’ could be applied to a 
nascent child, as in the case of Suetonius’ biography of Domitian.14 Celsus used partus in a 
substantive sense to denote a miscarried corpse removed in an embryotomy.
15
 Tacitus, on the 
other hand, used conceptus and partus for a living foetus, describing Livia as carrying ‘a 
child conceived and not yet born’ by her previous husband.16 Occasionally, authors referred 
to the late-term foetus as onus, a ‘burden’ carried in a woman’s belly.17  
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Outside of the corpus of Christian works, it was very rare for a Latin writer to 
describe the child in the womb as a homo, a ‘human.’18 In his Saturae, Juvenal described 
aborted foetuses as homines.
19
 Juvenal suggested that richer women employed abortifacient 
medicines to conceal the results of adultery. He acidly suggested that husbands actually ought 
to encourage their wives to abort these illicit pregnancies, lest they suffer public ignominy by 
accepting children fathered by other men as heirs. As he said: 
These women undergo the crisis of giving birth, and they bear all the 
labours of breast-feeding thrust upon them by fortune, but scarcely 
any woman lies giving birth upon a gilded bed. The skills are so great 
and the medications are so effective of she who renders (women) 
sterile, tending to the killing of human beings in the womb. Rejoice, 
you unhappy man, and yourself offer the (draught) for her to drink, 
whatever it might be. For if she were willing to stretch and vex her 
uterus with twitching children, you could possibly be the father of an 
Ethiopian, and soon a coloured heir might fill your will, (who will) 
never be seen by you in the morning.
20
 
Ostensibly, Juvenal assigned the foetus the value of a human being by calling it a homo. 
However, it is best not to read too much into his use of the word. It must be kept in mind that 
Juvenal was a satirist. Juvenal aimed to elicit an emotional response by inverting 
contemporary social mores through humorous vignettes. He hardly sought to advocate the 
unborn’s place in Roman society by elevating it to the status of a human being. Juvenal’s 
adulteress compounded her indiscretion by murder. He thus rendered his denunciation of 
supposed contemporary decadence all the more shocking. 
Terminology for the foetus continued to be ambiguous into Tertullian’s period. 
Censorinus’ De Die Natali, written in AD 238, was a short doxographic work intended to be 
a birthday gift for his patron, Quintus Caerellius. In it, Censorinus detailed a miscellany of 
facts concerning birth, detailing various philosophical viewpoints concerning embryology, 
foetal development and ensoulment. He was one of the few Latin authors close to Tertullian’s 
lifetime who paid the foetus any extended attention. Like Ovid, Censorinus occasionally 
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tended to describe the foetus as partus.
21
 However, he also called it infans, both for the 
unformed embryo and for the more developed foetus.
22
 
As Tertullian wrote in Latin, it was perhaps inevitable that the same ambiguous 
terminology denoting the foetus and embryo was reflected in his work. Tertullian only 
explicitly called the foetus a homo in the Apologeticum and the De Anima.
23
 As in the case of 
pagan authors, it was far more common for Tertullian to describe the foetus by means of 
circumlocution and idiom. In Ad Nationes and the Apologeticum, he simply called the unborn 
child futurus, ‘one yet to be.’24 It was most common for Tertullian to refer to foetuses and 
embryos simply as infantes, ‘infants,’ or ‘unspeaking ones.’25 In Ad Uxorem, he called the 
foetus a sarcina, a ‘burden,’ or ‘bundle.’26 This is quite similar to the use of onus in Ovid and 
Phaedrus, mentioned above. Tertullian sometimes called the foetus conceptus in a substantive 
sense.
27
 Like Ovid, Tertullian also used terminology typically associated with the growth of 
fruit for the foetus, including fructus and fetus.
28
 In his treatise against Marcion, Tertullian 
quite explicitly described the embryo and foetus using terms that denoted their lack of human 
status. As mentioned previously in the dissertation, Tertullian called the early-stage embryo 
caro, ‘flesh,’ and described the foetus a pecus, or an ‘animal.’29 Tertullian was thus the first 
surviving Latin author to distinguish between different stages of prenatal development, as 
well as being the first to argue for the humanity of the nascent embryo. 
It is not surprising that the unborn occupied a nebulous place in Latin, as a child 
theoretically did not hold an identity until he or she had undergone a naming ceremony, thus 
being officially welcomed into the family. A neonate’s dies lustricus, or ‘lustral day,’ was of 
paramount importance for confirming their place in the Roman family.
30
 During this 
occasion, the child was received into the household, ritually purified, and assigned a nomen. 
Macrobius and Festus attested the details of the ceremony.
31
 Due to constraints of space, the 
exact procedure of the ritual will not be discussed here.
32
 However, it is noteworthy that the 
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naming ritual only occurred a few days postpartum. Plutarch’s Quaestiones Romanae 
suggested that female infants did not undergo a naming ceremony until they were eight days 
old, while male infants received their name upon their ninth day.
33
 It would be difficult to 
overstate the significance of the dies lustricus for the Romans. All the available evidence 
suggests that newborn Romans were not publicly acknowledged until a name had been 
conferred upon them.
34
 ‘As far as society was concerned, the child did not exist prior to the 
dies lustricus,’ Laes argues.35 Until the dies lustricus, the child was not formally 
acknowledged in society or the family, and nominally held an indistinct identity.
36
 
Burial practices also suggest a degree of vagueness in Roman views concerning 
newborn babies, which likely also applied to the unborn. The custom of not cremating babies 
like older children could be taken as evidence that the Romans did not always consider them 
a part of the human community until they had reached a certain stage of development. For 
instance, the Elder Pliny indicated that babies were not normally cremated before teething 
had commenced.
37
 Moreover, it was customary for babies who died before reaching the age 
of forty days to be buried beneath the foundations of houses.
38
 Archaeological evidence 
shows that it was also not unusual for children who died in their first twelve months to be 
interred in amphorae. This could be interpreted as heartlessness on the parents’ part, as 
though the child was not worthy of a proper burial. Yet Stevens (2013) argues for the 
opposite. She believes that the amphora was intended to represent a uterus, indicating the 
child’s continued attachment to his or her mother. Amphora burials, in her opinion, were a 
special class of burials used to show to distinguish the very young from other children.
39
 
Juvenal too revealed something of the emotional process behind burying a newborn. On the 
one hand, he showed that infants were inhumed rather than cremated before they had reached 
maturity: ‘By order of nature we moan, when the funeral of an adult virgin occurs, or when a 
baby too young yet for the pyre’s flames is enclosed in the earth.’40 On the other hand, 
Juvenal also showed that it was considered normal to grieve for a child even before he or she 
had been formally acknowledged as part of the community. While a child might not have 
                                                          
33
 Plut. Quaest. Rom. 288c. 
34
 McWilliam 2013: 268. 
35
 Laes 2011: 66. 
36
 However, as discussed below, individual parents could nevertheless form strong attachments to their offspring 
in utero. 
37
 Plin. HN 7.16.72.  
38
 Wiedemann 1989: 179. 
39
 Stevens 2013: 625-630. 
40
 Juv. Sat.15.138-140: Naturae imperio gemimus, cum funus adultae uirginis occurrit uel terra clauditur infans 
et minor igne rogi. 
178 
 
held a formal place in the community, he or she could still occupy a place in the parents’ 
hearts. As discussed below, the same was true for the unborn. 
The status of the unborn child was similarly indefinite in the eyes of Roman law. 
Admittedly, the evidence for the legal standing of the unborn child is very slim. A handful of 
fragmentary remarks preserved in the Digesta of Justinian represent the sum total of extant 
evidence concerning the legal status of the unborn child. The Digesta is a problematic source 
for reconstructing Roman law. The text was originally compiled in the early sixth century AD 
under the orders of the Byzantine emperor Justinian. It was an assemblage of snippets from 
earlier Roman judicial commentators concerning laws still upheld in the Byzantine Empire.
41
 
The Digesta is perhaps more useful as a source for Byzantine law than Roman, for Justinian’s 
methods were destructive. He intended the Digesta not to provide elucidation on Roman legal 
commentaries, but to supersede them.
42
 To this effect, he ordered the destruction of the 
original judicial texts, eliminating the many points on which the original authors of the 
fragments disagreed. This unfortunately precludes the possibility of examining the original 
text in situ. A mere five percent of the original sources remain intact in the Digesta.
43
 As 
Justinian himself said:  
While we were researching everything, it was suggested to us by the 
aforementioned excellent man that almost two thousand books and 
more than three million disorderly lines had been written by the old 
(lawyers), all of which it was necessary to read and thoroughly 
scrutinise and choose from them whatever might be best. This, by the 
grace of Heaven and the favour of the Supreme Trinity, was 
completed following our mandates such as we gave from the start to 
the aforementioned excellent man, and everything most useful was 
collected into fifty books, and all ambiguities were decided upon, 
with no quarrelsome passage remaining. We assigned these books the 
name of Digest or else Pandects, because they have in them all 
matters of disputes and legal decisions which were collected from all 
sides. This they have held back in their essence, so that they complete 
the entire task in about one hundred and fifty thousand lines.
44
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Moreover, the editors of the Digesta removed the extracts from their original contexts, and 
redistributed them under many sub-headings. These extracts were often edited together to 
form a seamless whole. At times, this resulted in the application of the authors’ ideas to 
topics far removed from that of their original treatise.
45
 Nor did the text of the Digesta remain 
static over the course of Byzantine history. It was continually edited and re-edited with 
numerous interpolations throughout the medieval period, in order to accommodate changes in 
Byzantine law.
46
  
There are particular difficulties in using the Digesta as a source for Roman law 
concerning the unborn child. Johnston (1999) points out generally that the Digesta ‘can 
indicate which problems arose, but not how often or how pressing they were.’47 Johnston 
suggests that historians should ideally adopt a more holistic approach to Roman legal history, 
using archaeological and documentary evidence in tandem with the Digesta, rather than 
accepting it at face value.
48
 Unfortunately, little such evidence exists for the status of unborn 
offspring. There is hence scant indication in any literary or epigraphic source whether or not 
any of the laws mentioned had an effect in reality.  
Roman law granted considerable autonomy to the paterfamilias regarding the 
treatment of his family.
49
 Ulpian, in a fragment from Ad Sabinum, provided clear evidence 
that the unborn child was under the potestas of its father in matters of ius civile.
50
 The state 
did not regularly intervene in the affairs of an individual household.
51
 Etienne argues that the 
Roman legal system generally avoided issuing edicts on unborn children since doing so 
would have conflicted with the authority of the paterfamilias.
52
 Thus, it is perhaps to be 
expected that written litigation involving infants in the womb did not crop up regularly.  
There is also an overwhelming bias in the Digesta towards presenting unusual cases 
that were legally challenging, or whose novelty the authors thought might interest their 
readers.
53
 Often, the content does not deal with standing laws concerning the treatment of the 
unborn child, but comprises comments from jurors concerning rescriptiones: the emperors’ 
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answers to specific enquiries in instances of legal controversy. These cases had to be unusual 
to warrant a petition to the emperor.
54
 It would therefore be perilous to use the Digesta as a 
source for reconstructing the everyday treatment of the Roman infant. 
While there are sound reasons to be cautious in using the Digesta to extrapolate the 
precise legal situation of the unborn, it remains a useful source for evaluating individual 
authors’ attitudes towards the foetus and embryo, especially when its extracts are 
contextualised. The Byzantine editors of the Digesta helpfully provided the names of the 
authors and titles of each of their excerpts. In the late nineteenth century, the German scholar 
Otto Lenel grouped together each author’s fragments to provide a theoretical reconstruction 
of their original content. Though Lenel’s work is at times speculative, it remains extremely 
valuable for using the Digesta critically.
55
 If possible, it is also important to consider the 
fragments in the context of the life and work of each author. Of the authors cited in the 
Digesta who commented on the status of the unborn child, the most prodigious were 
Tertullian’s contemporaries, the Severan jurists Julius Paulus (Paulus) and Domitius Ulpianus 
(Ulpian). The career and literary output of each man are considered below, as far as they are 
relevant to this study. 
A Roman Tyrian by birth, Ulpian pursued a distinguished legal career in Rome, 
serving Septimius Severus as secretary of petitions at least as early as AD 205.
56
 He was 
therefore responsible for the text of the imperial rescripts issued in Severus’ name; his insight 
is thus invaluable. Ulpian’s literary career was exceptional.57 Many of his works revolved 
around Caracalla’s proclamation of universal citizenship, being didactic treatises intended to 
educate the influx of new citizens in Roman legal proceedings.
58
 Of particular note 
concerning the legal position of the unborn child is his Ad Edictum Praetoris, a mammoth 
commentary on the extent of a provincial praetor’s powers, and the correct manner in which 
to appeal to a praetor.
59
 Ulpian’s advice on the extent to which a praetor could intervene in 
cases of disputed inheritance sheds light on the unborn child’s capacity to be named as heir, 
and also on the circumstances in which a praetor might punish abortion. His Ad Sabinum was 
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a manual on the applications of civil law.
60
 Ad Sabinum is also a useful source for the place 
of the unborn child in Roman civil law. 
Little is known of Paulus, though it is clear that he was an influential figure in his own 
lifetime. He was a contemporary of Ulpian; however, it is unlikely that the two knew one 
another, as Syme (1979) points out.
61
 His place of origin has not been identified.
62
 He served 
Septimius Severus as praetorian prefect and a member of the consilium iuris.
63
 As a ranking 
member of the imperial court, the surviving fragments of his works are invaluable. Paulus’ 
literary output was profuse; the Digesta ascribed over three hundred separate works to him.
64
 
He is particularly helpful for this study, because he was privy to rescripts issued in the name 
of the Severan emperors. His Imperiales Sententiae provided his thoughts on many rescripts 
passed under Severus.
65
 Included among these were Severus and Caracalla’s rescript 
concerning abortion. 
The Digesta recorded a remark from Ulpian’s commentary on the praetorian edict, in 
which he indicated his view that the foetus was not a discrete entity. Rather, Ulpian 
considered the foetus or embryo to be an offshoot from its mother.
66
 Ulpian related a divorce 
case in which a certain Rutilius Severus appealed to his local praetor for assistance in settling 
a custody dispute. Rutilius Severus demanded that his ex-wife should be placed under his 
custody on the basis that she carried his unborn child, to whom he laid claim. However, 
Rutilius’ ex-wife denied that she was pregnant at all. Apparently, the praetor sent away to the 
emperors, most likely Caracalla and Geta, for advice. Their solution was a rescript, sending 
three midwives to investigate; if the midwives reached the consensus that she was pregnant, 
the woman was to be handed over to the custody of her ex-husband. However, if they 
discovered that she was not pregnant, the husband ‘would not undeservedly seem to have 
tried this for (the purpose of) some injury against his wife.’67 In Ulpian’s opinion, this 
rescript brought into question the legitimacy of unborn infants as heirs, since a woman could 
deny that she was pregnant in order to refute her husband’s claim:  
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From this rescript, it is quite evident that the senatorial decrees 
concerning the acknowledgement of children are not pertinent if the 
woman lied that she was pregnant, or else that she said that she was 
not. This is not undeserved. For before it is brought forth, the child is 
part of the woman, or of her womb. Following its birth, the husband 
plainly and according to his rights is able to request that his child be 
shown to him through an interdict, or that he should be allowed to 
take the child. Therefore the princeps aids (the husband) through an 
extraordinary arrangement in cases (where it is) necessary.
68
 
It would be hazardous to take Ulpian’s remark as a suggestion that the foetus had no legal 
rights whatsoever. Noonan, Connery, and Gardner (1986) interpret Ulpian’s suggestion that 
the foetus was physically a part of its mother as a sign that, in a legal sense, the Romans did 
not view the unborn child as an entity discrete from its mother. They believe that Ulpian’s 
view constituted a legal confirmation of the Stoic view that a child was a growth from its 
mother.
69
 However, when read in context, it is clear that Ulpian simply meant that the father 
had a clearer claim to his custodial rights after his baby was born, since the child could be 
physically separated from its mother. In any case, Ulpian’s remark was hardly clear-cut 
evidence that this was the Romans’ entire legal perspective on the unborn child, since he was 
merely offering his interpretation of one specific case. 
Extracts from the Digesta also gave clear evidence that in certain instances the unborn 
could hold status independent of its mother. In an extract from the Institutiones of the third-
century commentator Marcian, the Digesta indicated that the mother’s status at the time she 
gave birth was not always conferred upon the child.
70
 Normally, a child born of a slave 
mother would have shared her status. However, Marcian also indicated his opinion that in 
cases where a mother lost her freedom during the pregnancy, the child still ought to hold the 
status that it had held at the time of its conception, for ‘the misfortune of the mother should 
not harm that which is in the womb.’71 In other words, according to Marcian, a slave woman 
could theoretically carry a free foetus if she had lost her freedom during gestation. Marcian’s 
contemporary, Julian, similarly suggested in his Digesta that in cases where a pregnant 
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woman was captured and enslaved in war, the child should retain the status it would have 
otherwise held under the principle of the ius postlimini, even if this status differed from that 
of its mother. This legal principle served to protect the property rights of those in conquered 
territories.
72
 Moreover, Julian indicated that in cases where a pregnant slave was stolen, the 
slave owner could claim the baby as his or her property as they normally would under the 
rights of usus, as the child was considered stolen goods.
73
 Since the slave-owner had to make 
a separate claim for the child, it is clear that the child was a legally discrete entity even prior 
to birth, at least in Julian’s opinion. 
The Roman legal system never formally conferred upon the foetus or embryo the 
status of a human being by virtue of its existence, yet that did not preclude it from certain 
protections in the world of civil law.
74
 These protections were conferred upon the child in 
anticipation of its role in society after reaching maturity postpartum. For instance, in his 
Digesta, Julian suggested that ‘those who are in the womb, in almost the entirety of civil law, 
are considered to exist in the world.’75 Gardner believes that Julian was engaging in 
hyperbole when he made this statement.
76
 Paulus was rather more measured in his judgement, 
identifying that whatever rights the child possessed in the womb related solely to its potential 
ability to claim them upon achieving sentience later in life. While discussing the allotment of 
property to the children of condemned criminals, he opined, ‘that which is in the uterus is 
protected, just as if it were in human affairs, (emphasis added) when anything is asked 
regarding the benefit (of the child) once it is born; however, before (the child) is born it is 
does not by any means benefit another (person).’77 According to Paulus, the child in the 
womb was evidently not a fully actuated human being. Even so, its burgeoning potential to 
enter society made it legally necessary to assign value to the foetus equivalent to that of a full 
human, particularly in cases where the child’s biological father was absent.78  
When it was practical, Roman civil law treated the foetus as though it were fully 
hominised. There is ample evidence that the legal system did make certain provisions for the 
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foetus concerning its right to inherit.
79
 The Digesta contained numerous references to women 
claiming property on behalf of their antenatal child, and also to the penalties of making such 
claims under false pretences.
80
 In their respective commentaries on the application of the 
praetorian edict, Paulus and Ulpian suggested that filing false claims could attract the 
punishment of being marked with infamia.
81
 Though it was not perceived as a developed 
being in itself, inheritance laws allowed the foetus to be named in a will, with a view towards 
its potential capacity to claim inheritances upon maturity. 
While civil law protected the unborn child’s future ability to enter into its rightful 
inheritance, its physical wellbeing was not often considered in criminal law. There is no 
indication that the Romans considered abortion to be homicide in the late Republic or early 
Empire.
82
 Indeed, it is open to question whether the Romans ever considered abortion a crime 
prior to the reign of Septimius Severus and Caracalla.
83
 Admittedly, Plutarch’s Vita Romuli 
does record a tradition that Romulus allowed a man to divorce his wife for pharmakeia: ‘He 
laid down certain laws, and among them a very harsh one, which forbids a wife to leave her 
husband, but permits a husband to throw out his wife for the use of poisons on her children, 
or for substituting (the children), and also for adultery.’84 It is possible that abortifacients 
were among the drugs a wife was forbidden to use. However, this cannot be taken as a 
sweeping criminalisation of abortion. In this case, it is not certain that the pharmakeia 
referred to abortifacients at all; Romulus likely condemned the poisoning of children 
generally. Moreover, even if the law did give a husband leave to divorce his wife for aborting 
their child, it did not give the state the authority to punish her for a crime. Musonius Rufus 
also mentioned that ‘ancient law’ held that abortion was punishable, but did not specify 
which law he was actually referring to.
85
 This could be interpreted as a confirmation that 
Romulus criminalised abortion, but this is by no means certain. As Kapparis argues, it is 
probable that Rufus hoped to increase the authority of his ideas by appealing to a long-held 
tradition.
86
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The first solid evidence for the criminalisation of abortion came through an imperial 
rescript issued during the joint reign of Septimius Severus and Caracalla. As mentioned in the 
dissertation’s introduction, Gorman has suggested that this change came about due to 
Christian influence.
87
 The likelihood of Gorman’s idea will be discussed below. It is not 
possible to offer a firm date for these laws. The rescript could have been issued any time 
during the joint reign of Severus and Caracalla, AD 198-209. Unfortunately, the 
circumstances that prompted the rescript are not known, nor can its effectiveness be gauged. 
Though Kapparis theorises that the laws probably were enforced widely throughout the 
empire, no evidence has survived of punitive measures undertaken against abortion up to 
Tertullian’s time.88  
It is questionable whether the Severan laws targeted abortion as a concept.
89
 It is 
clear, moreover, that the Severans did not fight against abortion out of deference to an 
ideology that attributed human identity to the unborn, as is often the case when abortion is 
criminalised in the current period. Rather, as Gardner argues, the Severans’ law only aimed to 
criminalise abortion under a very specific set of circumstances.
90
 There is no evidence that 
the laws prevented single women from ending pregnancies out of wedlock. The laws 
enforced long-held social traditions and concerns about paternal rights to regulate fecundity 
within marriage. The state sought to protect paternal interests, lest Roman wives rob their 
husbands of the prospect of children.
91
 Three fragments from the Digesta support this idea. In 
a passage of his Regula, which Lenel indicates probably originally dealt with the effect of 
status upon inheritance, Marcian said:   
The divine Severus and Antoninus have issued a rescript that a 
woman who has brought on an abortion on purpose must be handed 
over into temporary exile by the governor; for it seems intolerable 
that it is possible for a woman to cheat her husband of children 
without punishment.
92
 
Very similarly, Ulpian advised readers that a provincial praetor was empowered to exile 
women who had procured abortions: 
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If a woman has inflicted violence upon her womb in order to expel 
the foetus, he decided that the governor of the province will send her 
out into exile.
93
 
Unlike Marcian, Ulpian did not actually specify what the woman was being charged with.
94
 
Tryphoninus, however, connected the legislation to Cicero’s earlier employment of abortion 
as a rhetorical exemplum in Pro Cluentio.  
Cicero wrote in the oration On Behalf of Cluentius Habitus, that while 
he was in Asia a certain Milesian woman was condemned to capital 
punishment because she had accepted money from the next heir (in 
line to inherit) and she herself had aborted the foetus by means of 
medications. But (nowadays), if she were to inflict violence upon her 
womb while she was pregnant after a divorce, so that she would not 
beget a son for her ex-husband, then she is to be disciplined with 
temporary exile, as ruled in the rescript by our exceptional 
emperors.
95
  
From the context, Ulpian and Tryphoninus each seemed to be discussing the extent to which 
a praetor could intervene in disputes over the redistribution of dowries in cases of divorce.
96
 
Their point was probably that in cases where marriage was dissolved because of abortion, 
wives would not be entitled to reclaim their dowries. Marcian and Tryphoninus suggested 
that the Severan abortion laws served the interests of fathers and not their unborn children. 
The relative mildness of the punishment upon the mother—temporary exile—suggests that 
women who ended their pregnancies were not considered guilty of parricide or murder. If 
they had been guilty of parricide, their punishment would have been substantially more 
severe. Instead, the commentators indicate that their crime was defrauding their husbands of 
children. 
In order to comprehend the patriarchal values that underpinned the laws fully, it is 
helpful to examine the speech of Cicero to which Tryphoninus referred, Pro Cluentio. 
Cicero’s horror at abortion likely informed the Severan laws; the close similarity of Cicero’s 
vocabulary and syntax and that of Tryphoninus in discussing abortion clearly indicates a 
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connection between the texts. Pro Cluentio was a forensic speech delivered in 66 BC. Cicero 
was defending his client, Aulus Cluentius Habitus, against the charge of poisoning his 
stepfather, Oppianicus the Elder.
97
 Previously, Cluentius had successfully charged 
Oppianicus with attempting to poison him.
98
 Popular opinion held that Cluentius had secured 
his victory in court through bribery.
99
 Before he could prove his client’s innocence, Cicero 
needed to demonstrate that Cluentius’ ethos was of such high standing that he could never 
have abused the law. To do so, it was necessary to revisit the details of the previous trial and 
show that Oppianicus’ character had been so degenerate that it was indeed necessary for 
Cluentius to prosecute him.
100
 To this effect, Cicero narrated how Oppianicus had poisoned 
each of his other stepchildren so that they would not inherit his estate.
101
 However, Cicero’s 
evidence was weak. Much of it may have been the product of invention. According to 
Quintilian, he later bragged that he had won his case by ‘throwing dust in the eyes of the 
jurors.’102 Cicero resorted to the use of an exemplum comparable to the case in question, 
where a woman of Miletus had been charged with aborting her children by means of poison. 
There is insufficient evidence to determine whether or not Cicero's story was genuine. As he 
said: 
I sieze upon my memories of a certain Milesian woman who was 
condemned to capital punishment, while I was in Asia, because she 
had accepted money from the (next) heirs (in line to inherit) if she 
would abort her foetus herself by means of medication; (she suffered 
the penalty) not unjustly, for she had stolen the father’s hope, the 
memory of his name, the reinforcement of his race, the heir of his 
household, a citizen appointed for the commonwealth. To what 
degree is Oppianicus worthy of a greater penalty? Indeed, if she put 
herself through torture by inflicting this violence upon her own body, 
this man committed the same (crime) through the death and torture of 
another person.
103
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Cicero’s tone was one of revulsion and righteous indignation at the termination of the 
offspring, ‘not wholly unlike the revulsion attached to murder.’104 However, it is quite 
explicit that his outrage was not because he considered it murder.
105
 Rather, the Milesian 
woman’s crime was that she had gone against her late husband’s wish that the child should 
inherit his estate. She had deprived him of his spes, or expectation of children. The injured 
party was not the foetus, but the legacy of its father. As with the inheritance law, the foetus 
did not hold an inherent value. Rather, its value was contingent upon the father’s expectation 
of progeny.
106
 According to Cicero, the Milesian woman had reneged upon her duty to her 
husband and to her community. She had been disloyal in upholding her responsibility to her 
deceased spouse by failing to perpetuate his memory, and to her state by not providing a new 
citizen.
107
  
Here, Cicero was drawing upon core Roman family values, attempting to draw out a 
powerful emotional reaction from the jurors. But Cicero’s intended target was not the 
anonymous woman who had supposedly ended her pregnancy. Rather, he aimed to show that 
even her use of poison paled in comparison to that of Oppianicus. Cicero sought to 
demonstrate that Oppianicus’ murder of his children was a crime even more inhumane 
because his children had reached maturity. Cicero very clearly argued on the basis that the 
Milesian woman had committed a morally reprehensible act, but not one as severe as the 
parricide Oppianicus had committed. The late Oppianicus had supposedly murdered others. 
By implication, the Milesian woman had not, as far as Cicero argued.  
Similar patriarchal anxieties manifested in Ovid’s famous love poems that dealt with 
abortion. As Watts points out, these elegies were not intended as polemics against abortion.
108
 
Indeed, abortion appears to have been a subsidiary issue for Ovid, as it was for early 
Christian writers. It is likely that the poet used abortion as a talking point, depicting an 
imagined incident to explore passion and love. Ovid’s primary focus was upon the concept of 
erotic love, and indeed upon its power to inspire poetry. Ovid opened and closed the Amores 
with elegies that self-consciously discussed these literary themes. As portrayed in the elegies, 
Ovid’s desire was fixed upon his mistress, Corinna. Yet there is a strong possibility that 
Corinna was fictional. In his Tristia, after all, Ovid said that the love-affair described in the 
                                                          
104
 Watts 1973: 97. 
105
 Waszink 1950: 57. 
106
 Watts 1973: 97.  
107
 Cic. Clu. 11.32. 
108
 Watts 1973: 100-101. 
189 
 
Amores was contrived.
109
 It is thus also open to question whether Ovid was speaking in his 
own voice, or whether he adopted that of a fictitious persona.
110
  
According to the story laid out in the poem, Corrina had betrayed the Ovidian 
protagonist by aborting his baby, thereby placing her life in peril.
111
 Corinna’s crime was not 
so much killing her unborn child, but doing it without his knowledge. In this poem, Ovid’s 
character did not express grief at the loss of the foetus. Rather, the speaker was angry at her 
violation of his trust, and for threatening their bond by placing herself in danger.
112
 However, 
out of deference to his infatuation with Corinna, he was willing to set aside his anger and 
pray fervently to the goddess Isis for her recovery.
113
 Yet the valuation of the foetus, and 
indeed of Corinna herself, was relative to the Ovidian protagonist’s feelings of self-worth.114 
He implicitly expressed anxiety that Corinna had deprived the world of his progeny.
115
 The 
speaker enumerated several outstanding figures from Rome’s mythological history, without 
whom contemporary society would not exist.
116
 In doing so, Ovid’s character seems to have 
shared Cicero’s sentiment that Corinna had failed in her duty to the community by averting 
the existence of potentially productive citizens. On the other hand, the protagonist also 
implicitly indicated that Corinna had undermined the perpetuation of his family legacy by 
cheating him of offspring. Whatever great things these children might have achieved would 
have reflected well upon him, as they would have extended his posterity.
117
  
The Severan laws were also influenced by anxieties about the circulation of deadly 
poisons. Paulus provided evidence to suggest that the legislation targeted dangerous love 
potions, which happened to include abortifacients:   
Those who provide a draught for (causing) abortion or love, even 
though they may not do so for the purpose of deceit, because the 
matter is an example of evil, should be relegated to the mines (in the 
case of) obscure people, (while the) more distinguished ones, (should 
be relegated) to an island, having lost a portion of their property. If a 
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man or a woman has perished in this manner, then (the guilty) are 
struck down by the ultimate punishment.
126
 
Watts suggests that Paulus’ extract originally came under a discussion of the Lex Cornelia de 
Sicariis et Veneficis in his Sententiae.
127
 The Lex Cornelia, originally issued under Sulla, 
banned the sale of poison. This context seems to indicate that Paulus identified the legislation 
as part of a broad crackdown upon destructive elixirs, whether they were being deliberately 
used for poisoning or not.
128
 Paulus suggested that the punishment for the supplier of 
abortifacients was significantly harsher than that for the user, and increased in the event of 
the user’s death. The fact that the law targeted dealers more heavily than users perhaps 
indicates that it aimed to protect the Roman populace from these dangerous treatments.
129
     
There were practical reasons for outlawing abortion and the provision of abortifacient 
drugs in a world where medicine was as likely to kill as to cure. Ovid’s Amores provide an 
apt illustration of the danger of abortion. Ovid wrote: ‘Corinna lies fatigued and in doubt of 
her life,’ because she had undergone the procedure, which had gone disastrously wrong.130 
He concluded his poem bemoaning the fact that death and posthumous ostracism were the 
usual consequences for women who ended their pregnancies. ‘Often she who kills her own 
(offspring) in the uterus perishes herself. She perishes herself, and is borne out to the funeral 
pyre, her hair loosened, and they cry as they see her, “She deserved it!”’131 Ovid’s attitude 
towards abortion will be discussed in further detail below. 
The fact that abortion was not actively penalised for much of Roman history should 
not indicate a callous or dismissive attitude towards the foetus or embryo. After all, the law 
seems to have made specific provisions to protect the foetus from accidental harm. As with 
inheritance law, there were legal provisions in place to protect the foetus as a human being in 
potentia. Marcellus, a lawyer of the mid-second century, cited a ‘royal statute’ which forbade 
the interment of a pregnant woman without first removing her foetus, in case it was still 
viable. As he said, ‘a person who acts contrary to this rule is seen to have disposed of the 
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hope of a living being along with the pregnant woman.’132 Likewise, Ulpian argued that a 
pregnant woman condemned to death ought not be tortured or executed until she had given 
birth to her child.
133
 Most likely, this law was meant to protect the child from being harmed 
along with the woman, if it was a legitimate heir.
134
 Very unusually, there is evidence that 
this law was indeed enforced. The Passio Perpetuae records that the execution of Perpetua’s 
fellow martyr, Felicitas, was delayed until she had brought forth her child.
135
 Inadvertently 
harming the child in the womb was presumably an offence against its father, rather than an 
attribution of the intrinsic value to the life of the child. However, it is clear that Roman 
lawyers sought to protect the child and its interests, in preparation for its entry into the family 
and wider community. 
It is probable that there was simply no need for legislation for or against abortion, as 
the issue did not likely arise often. Assuredly, any discussion of the frequency of abortion in 
antiquity is bound to be speculative. However, the written evidence does not support the 
theory that the Romans practised abortion as a regular means of birth control. Surely if 
abortion was such a routine occurrence, Augustus would have outlawed it as part of his 
legislation against adultery.
136
 There is, quite plainly, no mention in any of the pagan sources 
of a father ordering his wife to abort her pregnancy when she was carrying his legitimate 
offspring.
137
 The extreme danger of intervening in pregnancy would often have been a 
sufficient deterrent.
138
 Though many of the means of abortion mentioned in the medical 
sources may well have been effective, the numerous folk remedies, amulets, and magical 
recipes for ending pregnancies would not have been. The Elder Pliny, for instance, suggested 
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that a violent sneeze would be sufficient to end a pregnancy in the early stages, as would a 
whiff of smoke from an oil-lamp.
139
 Ovid’s Heroides also provide evidence that even 
chemical abortifacients were not always effective, as Prioreschi points out.
140
 Ovid had the 
mythological figure of Canace lament the impotency of the liquids she had imbibed to 
terminate her offspring before birth.
141
 Admittedly, the ancient sources mentioned methods of 
abortion far more frequently than contraceptives. Hopkins (1965) believes that this indicates 
abortion was more regularly employed as a way of family planning.
142
 However, the proof 
that it was ever used as such is lacking.
143
 
There were also demographic reasons for the Romans not to limit the size of their 
families by means of abortion. As Parkin (1992) points out, high mortality rates in the Roman 
world necessitated corresponding high levels of fertility in order to maintain the 
population.
144
 Given the remarkable rate of infant mortality, Roman parents could reasonably 
expect to lose children.
145
 Those who survived could not always look forward to a long life. 
The result was what Parkin calls a ‘high pressure regime,’ in which Roman parents had to 
have more children than they planned to raise if they wished to sustain their family line.
146
 In 
this situation, it made little sense for Roman society to idealise the limitation of fertility, 
particularly among the elite. In reality, this ideal would not have stopped individuals from 
practising or attempting to control their family size through contraceptive or abortive 
measures, as well as infanticide.  
It is questionable how much first-hand information the ancient authors had concerning 
abortion, since it appears that women were primarily responsible for the provision of abortive 
measures. Although Roman men theoretically held exclusive authority over the female body, 
it is curious that Roman sources routinely constructed abortion as a feminine misdemeanour. 
Ovid and Juvenal said that it was quae, ‘she’ who was responsible for the production of 
abortifacients.
147
 Soranus seems to have had female midwives rather than male doctors 
specifically in mind when he dispensed advice on the use of abortifacients.
148
 It was perhaps 
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inevitable that midwives and female apothecaries were primarily responsible for providing 
drugs designed to induce miscarriage, as they had superior understanding of the female 
reproductive system, and the means to curtail the dangers of ending a pregnancy.
149
 
Moreover, the practice was routinely described as one that occurred in secret, away from 
male eyes. Dixon points out that the authors often described abortion in terms of ‘secrecy and 
deceit.’150 Ovid used the word clam to describe Corinna’s abortion.151 Several sources 
described abortion as fraus, ‘deceit’.152 If abortion was indeed a secret, then the ancient 
authors’ knowledge of it should be viewed sceptically.  
In a world so heavily geared towards the protection of paternal interests, it is perhaps 
surprising that women exerted such control over the availability of abortive techniques. 
However, it is worth bearing in mind that the ancient sources were often more interested in 
appealing to the ideals of their period, rather than explaining the realities.
153
 The issue is in 
many ways comparable to the ideal of the housebound wife in classical Athenian literature. 
According to the ideal of sophrosyne, or ‘self-control,’ a virtuous Athenian woman lived in 
seclusion, and was not permitted to leave her home.
154
 However, there were a large number 
of accidental references to women leaving their houses for business and to socialise.
155
 Cohen 
(1989) finds an explanation for the contradiction between ideals and realities in modern 
anthropological studies of twentieth-century Mediterranean societies. Traditionally, male 
anthropologists had recorded observations of women as being housebound in Mediterranean 
cultures, and generally having little agency in their daily lives. However, female 
anthropologists recorded vastly different findings from their fieldwork. They found that 
modern Greek women exercised a greater level of personal freedom and influence in the 
community than had been previously attested.
156
 In traditional Mediterranean societies, men 
and women frequently operated in discrete spheres of influence; men did not have any first-
hand experience of the realities of women’s lives. Male anthropologists’ reports were based 
upon their interactions with men, male estimations of feminine experience, and patriarchal 
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ideologies.
157
 Conversely, women were more comfortable sharing their own personal 
experiences with female anthropologists.
158
 The same likely held true in antiquity: if abortion 
was ‘secret women’s business,’ male Roman authors did not actually have any first-hand 
knowledge or experience of abortion, since they operated in a separate sphere of influence.  
Perhaps this accounts for the vagueness of detail concerning methods of abortion in 
the sources. As originally pointed out by Hopkins, there was a frequent conflation and 
confusion of abortion and contraception among Greek and Roman authors. Analysing a wide 
range of medical and encyclopaedic sources, Hopkins finds that ancient sources often viewed 
abortion as a form of contraception.
159
 For example, Soranus described early-term 
abortifacients as having a contraceptive effect, as discussed in the previous chapter.
160
 
However, he had earlier made a clear distinction between abortifacients and contraceptives. 
‘A contraceptive has a different effect from an abortive,’ he wrote, ‘for the one does not 
allow the conception to begin, while the other obliterates that which has been conceived. 
Therefore, let us say that the one is “abortive” and the other is “contraceptive.”’161 Soranus 
may have treated poisons intended to dislodge the early-term embryo as a form of 
contraception because he did not view the destruction of the unformed offspring as an act of 
taking human life.
162
  
However, it is sometimes clear that the authors were genuinely confused between the 
manner in which abortifacients and contraceptives worked.
163
 Pliny the Elder, for example, 
believed that cedar gum could bring about an abortion if it were smeared on the penis in 
anticipation of coitus: surely, if it was applied before sex, the gum would serve to prevent 
conception from occurring in the first place.
164
 The confusion between contraception and 
abortion may have resulted from the fact that the process of conception was invisible to the 
naked eye, and it was not always easy to calculate the date of conception. However, the 
authors were also not privy to the intimate details of the female reproductive system; it is 
possible that women had a better grasp on the matter than men.
165
 Unfortunately, the views of 
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Roman women concerning birth control do not remain extant. Although Flemming has 
pointed out that females often practised medicine and midwifery in the ancient Roman 
community, no medical writings by female authors have survived.
166
 
Whenever abortion was mentioned in the Latin sources, it was always described as a 
depraved and subversive activity, just as it was in Tertullian. As Den Boer (1979) puts it, 
‘what was not forbidden by law could still be felt to conflict with morals.’167 Latin authors 
associated abortion with issues of adultery, vanity, and licentiousness. Infrequently, writers of 
imperial history used abortion as a literary trope to impugn the characters of emperors. 
Tacitus, for instance, utilised abortion to portray Nero as cruel and inconsistent. He narrated 
that Nero divorced his wife Octavia on grounds that were probably fictitious. Among these, 
Nero apparently claimed that Octavia was infertile, and at the same time that she had secretly 
aborted a baby in order to hide the products of an adulterous affair.
168
 It is clear that Nero was 
the subject of Tacitus’ ire, rather than Octavia. Tacitus used the episode to illustrate the 
falsehood of Nero’s accusations, for Octavia could not be simultaneously infertile and 
pregnant with the child of her lover.
169
 Moreover, Tacitus insinuated that Nero had failed in 
his duties as paterfamilias to maintain adequate control of his wife’s fertility. Most 
importantly, Tactitus sought to show that Nero acted as a cruel tyrant even to his own 
spouse.
170
 
Suetonius, Juvenal, and the Younger Pliny likewise used abortion to render the 
emperor Domitian as malicious and sexually depraved. In his biography of Domitian, 
Suetonius narrated that Domitian, married to Domitia, had impregnated his niece Julia in an 
incestuous affair. According to Suetonius, Domitian then forced her to induce a miscarriage. 
Julia supposedly died as a result, her reputation ruined by her cruel uncle.
171
 Juvenal and 
Pliny also mentioned Julia’s abortion briefly.172 Kapparis overall accepts the story of Julia’s 
abortion as plausible, saying that she would have wanted to conceal the adultery from her 
husband Titus.
173
 However, Jones and Milns (2002) argue that the historicity of Domitian and 
Julia’s relationship is doubtful. Shortly after the death and deification of Julia, the 
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contemporary author Martial (AD 40 – c. 104) dedicated an epigram to Domitia, in which he 
declared his hope that she would bear the emperor an heir named Julius, who would be 
watched over by his deified aunt, Julia.
174
 Martial would not have likely embarrassed the 
empress by urging her to name her prospective child after her husband’s mistress. Nor would 
Martial have urged Domitia to offer sacrifice for her child’s protection to a goddess who had 
been translated to the pantheon through abortion gone awry.
175
 It was in the political interests 
of each of these authors to darken the name of Domitian, the last emperor of the Flavian 
dynasty. Each wrote under the guidance of the subsequent regime, the Nervan-Antonian 
dynasty. By demonising the previous ruler, Suetonius, Pliny, and Martial rendered their 
imperial patrons in a better light by comparison.   
However, the shame attached to male instigators of abortion was not as severe as that 
which applied to women. Often, Roman authors discussed abortion to illustrate the manner in 
which contemporary women had fallen into corrupting luxury. The ancient authors also 
imagined that female vanity was one of the main motives for terminating a pregnancy, 
insinuating that women sought to avoid the stretch marks that would inevitably arise if they 
brought their pregnancies to term.
176
 According to the ancient authors, the other main reason 
a woman might end her pregnancy was to conceal the evidence of adultery, as evident in the 
example of Juvenal above. Alternatively, an author might use abortion to illustrate 
mythological episodes where Roman women rebelled against the patriarchal norms of their 
society. This tendency is evident in the incident narrated in Ovid’s Fasti, wherein matrons of 
the early Republic went on a fertility-strike in order to overturn a decision by the Senate to 
bar them from using carriages: 
Before, the Ausonian mothers were riding in carriages... Soon, this 
mark of esteem was snatched away from them, so all the matrons 
resolved not to replenish the bloodline of their ungrateful husbands, 
and so that they would not have to provide offspring. By means of a 
secret blow, the rash woman expelled the burden coming to life from 
her womb. The fathers rebuked their brides for their cruelty, yet they 
restored the right of which (the matrons) had been deprived: and they 
decreed two equal consecrated (days) for the Tegean mother, for the 
procreation of both boys and girls.
177
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Moreover, it was a common trope of Latin literature that women who procured abortion were 
chastened for rebelling against patria postestas by dissolving their pregnancies without 
permission from their husbands.
178
 By denying the father’s traditional control over the bodies 
of his wife and offspring, women who ended their pregnancies undercut the patriarchal ideal 
of the Roman household.
179
 
Tertullian adapted this trope to some extent in De Virginibus Velandis, substituting 
God in the place of the child’s biological father.180 By doing so, he rendered abortion a much 
more serious transgression. Where previously, women who ended their pregnancies were 
answerable to their husbands, Tertullian here implied that Christian women had violated the 
will of God by terminating progeny in the womb. Unlike other treatises such as the 
Apologeticum, Tertullian did not denounce abortion here because he considered it murder. 
Rather, he abraded females who ended their pregnancies because, according to his argument, 
they acted against the will of God.  
Seneca’s Ad Helviam aptly illustrates the link between abortion and the corrupting 
influence of luxuria and vanity.
181
 This text was a consolatory letter meant to bring comfort 
to Seneca’s mother Helvia during his exile. In it, Seneca warned his mother that she could not 
give in to grief, for such effeminate weakness would be out of her character. After all, Helvia 
had never fallen prey to the luxuries in which women of her day supposedly indulged 
themselves. As Seneca wrote:  
...You have no womanly failings. Shamelessness, the greatest evil of 
our generation, has not swayed you into the category of most 
(women); neither gems nor pearls have softened you; riches have not 
dazzled you as though they were the greatest possession of the human 
race; since you were raised well in a time-honoured and severe home, 
that imitation of the lower (sort), which is dangerous even to honest 
women, has never perverted you. Your fecundity has never shamed 
you as though it reproached your age: (unlike) the character of other 
women, all of whose commendable qualities come from their beauty, 
you never hid your swollen uterus like it was an indecent burden, and 
you did not strike out the hope of children conceived within your 
womb. You never degraded your face with colours or alluring make-
up: clothing which did nothing more than strip you when put on was 
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never pleasing to you: your one ornament has been a very lovely 
appearance and none of the guilt of our age; your modesty has been 
regarded as your greatest glory.
182
   
Seneca did not take issue with abortion as such, but rather the impudicitia, or shamelessness, 
in which he imagined contemporary women engaged.
183
 He constructed abortion as a social 
crime insofar as it reflected materialistic values and sexual promiscuity. Seneca clearly 
viewed abortion with distaste, but did not express horror or anger at the ending of antenatal 
life. In fact, he dedicated considerably more space to other signs of female vanity meant to 
entice men, such as a love of money, jewellery, make-up, and transparent clothing. These 
were more shocking to his readers than the idea of abortion. However, Seneca did not intend 
this passage to inform. His aim was to glorify his mother’s moral conduct by comparing her 
favourably to the women of his time. In order to render his mother as a chaste and dutiful 
matrona, Seneca denigrated all other women as her polar opposite. While Seneca constructed 
Helvia as a paragon of virtuous womanhood, he discussed females of his generation in terms 
akin to prostitution. 
Roman males’ distaste for abortion revealed itself in descriptions of the procedure in 
terms of violence and warfare. This tendency is particularly apparent in Ovid’s Amores on the 
subject. In the poem, Ovid’s protagonist accused Corinna of making war upon her own body, 
striking at her innards with iron.
184
 The author described her body by using warlike 
vocabulary in feminine form: he calls the abortion bella, ‘war,’ pugna, ‘combat,’ and militia, 
‘warfare.’185 Ovid metaphorically described the surgical tools for the procedure as 
weapons.
186
 By his very choice to focus upon the lurid and gory details of surgical means of 
procuring abortion, Ovid made it clear that he disapproved.
187
 If the poem was not describing 
a real-life incident, Ovid could have just as easily expounded upon non-invasive means of 
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procuring abortion, which were far safer and more likely to have been employed. Since the 
speaker was unaware of Corinna’s pregnancy, it is probable that Ovid was depicting her in 
her first trimester, before pregnancy became outwardly visible.
188
 At this point, ending the 
pregnancy by means of drugs would have been a far safer option than inducing abortion by 
means of surgery. The surgical removal of the foetus ‘was a dangerous and painful 
undertaking, employed only in extreme circumstances.’189 However, presenting the procedure 
as surgical afforded Ovid the opportunity to conjure lurid imagery of bloodshed, and thus 
provoke a stronger emotional response in his reader. These factors lead Balsdon (1968) to 
characterise Ovid’s poems on abortion as ‘singularly tasteless.’190 Ovid depicted abortion as 
surgery gone wrong to increase the emotional punch of the poem; in poetic terms, the grisly 
details of botched surgery were a far more effective choice. It made for a more heart-
wrenching narrative, and a greater test of his character’s devotion to Corinna.  
Ovid also expressed disapproval for abortion and sympathy for the unborn by likening 
the process to infanticide, as Tertullian would in the Apologeticum. Through his speaker, 
Ovid compared Corinna’s behaviour to that of various mythological child-slayers including 
Medea and Philomena, the mother of Itys.
198
 In fact, he wrote that these mythological figures, 
while unsavoury, were not as cruel as Corinna. They at least could justify their actions by 
saying that their lovers had driven them to madness. Corinna had no such excuse, according 
to Ovid, for she had a loving and devoted partner.
199
 Once more, Ovid’s purpose in 
denigrating Corinna was to magnify the image of his character’s love.200 However, it is worth 
noting that he made an explicit link between abortion and infanticide. While he did not 
strictly view the foetus as a fully hominised being, the speaker still recognised its potential to 
become one after birth. Moreover, he expressed sympathy for the foetus, to the extent that he 
recognised that he himself had been a foetus at some point in his development, and Corinna 
likewise.
201
 Therefore, Ovid wrote, it was unjust for Corinna to deprive the foetus of its 
potential to enter into life properly. ‘Why do you cheat the vine of thriving grapes, and why 
do you cruelly rip the unripened fruits from the tree? Its ripeness will flow of its own 
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volition; allow things produced by nature to come into being.’202 Though the narrator’s 
valuation of the foetus was relative to his own self-worth, Ovid constructed him as valuing it 
nevertheless. 
Though the two men wrote in completely different genres, Ovid’s rhetoric against 
abortion was comparable to that of Tertullian in several ways. The similarities were deeper 
than the terminology used to describe the unborn. Indeed, Ovid’s appeals against abortion 
were as grounded upon the principles of rhetoric as Tertullian’s.208 Both authors 
metaphorically described the developing embryo as a burgeoning fruit. The destruction of 
this fruit denied the offspring’s potential to enter into life.209 The authors were alike in that 
they saw the destruction of the unborn as akin to infanticide.
210
 Tertullian’s De Anima and 
Ovid’s Amores focused upon the most horrific form of abortion, late-term embryotomy, and 
in doing so demonstrated that they found the procedure morally repugnant.
211
 They each 
discussed in harsh detail the sharp needle which would pierce the body of the unborn, in 
order to create sympathy for the helpless child.
212
 The two writers both described abortion as 
a matter of a mother waging war against her own body, using terms normally employed to 
depict a battle.
213
 Furthermore, Tertullian and Ovid had a very similar point that the targets of 
their ire ought to consider their own births before refusing it to another. Just as Marcion 
showed that he despised humanity by denying the birth of Christ, Corinna deprived the 
community of a potential citizen by depriving her child of birth. Both Marcion and Corinna 
showed that they cared nothing for themselves, let alone anybody else.
214
       
 Aulus Gellius too argued against abortion by comparing it to infanticide. As 
mentioned above, it was unusual for a Latin author to use the word homo to describe the 
unborn child; aside from the aforementioned Juvenal, the only other exception was Aulus 
Gellius. In his Noctes Atticae, Gellius quoted a treatise of the philosopher Favorinus (c. AD 
80-160). It is difficult to tell how much of the treatise on breastfeeding was authored by 
Favorinus himself, and how much was a product of Gellius. Regardless, it is clear that 
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abortion was not Favorinus’ main topic, but the virtues of breastfeeding. Like Seneca, he 
argued that women among his contemporaries avoided breastfeeding, in order to preserve 
their physical appearance. By depriving their infants of nourishment, these women committed 
an act as reprehensible as abortion. As written in the Noctes Atticae:  
For it is in this manner, (although) such a thing is naturally absent 
from your (nature), that many of those freakish women work to make 
dry and quell the most sacred fount of the body, the cultivator of the 
human race, even with the danger of stealing away and corrupting the 
milk, since it could mar the adornments of their beauty. By doing 
things of this sort, they demonstrate the same frenzy indeed as those 
who rely upon devices (contrived) in falsehood so that they can abort 
the foetuses conceived in their very bodies, lest the smooth surface of 
the belly be spoiled by the heavy burden or droop due to the hard 
work of pregnancy But inasmuch as it is deserving of public 
abhorrence and universal hatred to commit murder upon a human 
being at its beginning, while it is being moulded and animated and is 
still in the very hands of Nature the artisan, how far (removed) from 
this is it to deny (a child), by now completed, by now born, by now a 
son, of the sustenance of its own familiar and customary blood?
222
 
Gellius’ version of Favorinus’ speech thus compared the act of abortion to that of starving a 
baby. The connection to murder is much more explicit than in the case of Juvenal. The 
foetus’ value was equal to that of a child brought to parturition, as indicated by his use of the 
word homo. Once more, it is worth bearing in mind that neither Favorinus nor Gellius 
primarily intended the treatise as an invective against abortion. Rather, abortion was a 
convenient rhetorical commonplace by which to argue in favour of breastfeeding. 
Nevertheless, it was taken as common knowledge that abortion was immoral; there was no 
need for the author to expound upon the reasons he considered it depraved. It is open to 
interpretation whether Favorinus or Gellius considered it to be a crime in a legal sense. 
However, the author clearly considered the deliberate termination of pregnancy to be an act 
worthy of shame.     
The Romans did care about their unborn children, even if there was some ambiguity 
about the nature of the foetus or embryo. After all, they sought the advice of dream 
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interpreters concerning the fates of their offspring, and accepted their findings. Bradley 
(2001) identifies that Artemidorus’ manual of dream interpretation, the Oneirocritica, is a 
useful resource for reconstructing the Romans’ feelings about their children.223 An Ephesian 
of Lydian descent, Artemidorus was a near-contemporary of Tertullian. He lived in the 
second century under the Antonine dynasty, and travelled widely throughout the 
Mediterranean, including Italy.
224
 Artemidorus was concerned with the recording of subjects’ 
dreams, and catalogued the advice of numerous sages regarding the correct method of 
interpreting dream-symbols for the purpose of divination.
225
 Several of the dreams recorded 
related to childhood. As Bradley points out, Artemidorus is as relevant for reconstructing 
Roman attitudes as for those of the Greeks, since many of the dreams he collected originated 
from Rome itself. Moreover, Artemidorus meant his advice concerning dreams involving 
children to be applied universally. Bradley argues that Artemidorus generally affirmed a 
sentimental attitude towards children and childhood, recording dreams that demonstrated the 
desirability of procreation.
226
  
Artemidorus also attested to the anxieties of expectant parents for the safety of their 
progeny in the womb. For instance, Artemidorus offered predictions for the outcomes of 
pregnancies even for dreams that did not directly relate to childbirth. If a man dreamed that 
he had cut open his belly and found his organs functioning normally, Artemidorus suggested 
that his wife would give birth to healthy children.
227
 Dreaming of reaping pulse, on the other 
hand, indicated that a miscarriage would occur.
228
 Similarly, Artemidorus said that a sick 
woman who dreamed that she was pregnant consulted an oracle. The seer informed her that 
she had just conceived and would give birth in seven months.
229
 The fact that people accepted 
these predictions indicates not only that they trusted the word of fortune-tellers, but also 
attests to the high level of importance they placed upon the fate of their children in the womb. 
Artemidorus also offered advice on the interpretation of a pregnant woman’s dream of giving 
birth to a fish. He advised that the dream was a sign that the child might be stillborn, or that it 
might die prematurely.
230
 It would be hazardous to offer a psychoanalytical interpretation of 
the role of the unborn child in the unconscious mind of the woman. However, at the very 
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least, Artemidorus’ record of the dream indicates that mothers cared for their children in the 
womb sufficiently to consult oracles regarding their fates when troubled by dreams about the 
outcome of their pregnancies.  
Death notices for miscarriages also indicate that the Romans placed value upon their 
unborn children, in anticipation of the infant’s place in the family after birth. Admittedly, 
there are very few extant death notices for miscarried babies; only Cicero and the Younger 
Pliny expressed regret for the loss of the unborn in their published correspondence. One of 
Cicero’s letters to Atticus expressed polite sympathy for Tertia, the wife of Cassius and half-
sibling of Brutus, upon her miscarriage. He expressed his commiserations, ‘for we want as 
many Cassii produced as Bruti.’231 Though he did not express any particular attachment to 
the child itself, it is worth bearing in mind that he was not the child’s father. Therefore, he did 
not have a personal, vested interest in the child’s wellbeing. However, he did recognise that 
the loss of the child would be a blow to its family and to its father in particular. Even prior to 
birth, Tertia’s baby was expected to continue the family line. The father hung his hopes for 
the perpetuation of his name upon the child, expecting that it would reach full gestation 
safely.   
The Younger Pliny provides a more personal illustration of a father’s feelings of 
disappointment upon miscarriage. Pliny and his wife Calpurnia had been trying to conceive 
for some time. Unfortunately Calpurnia lost the baby, probably during the early stages of 
pregnancy. Pliny notified Calpurnia’s grandfather, the paterfamilias of her biological family, 
of their misfortune. In a somewhat more personal epistle, he also notified Calpurnia’s aunt, 
Calpurnia Hispulla. The letters read in full:  
To Calpurnius Fabatus, the grandfather of his wife, 
(Knowing) how greatly you desire to see a great-grandchild from us, 
you will be very sad when you hear that your granddaughter has 
suffered a miscarriage. In her girlish youth she did not know that she 
was pregnant, and therefore she did not employ the (proper) 
precautions for pregnant women, and she did some things which 
should have been left aside. She has atoned for her mistake by 
(learning) a harsh lesson, having been led into grave danger. 
Therefore, in your destitute old age it is necessary for you to accept, 
however reluctantly, (that you have been deprived) of a successor 
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who has been prepared for. But you thus ought to give the gods 
thanks indeed, for even though they have denied you a great-
grandson, they have protected your granddaughter’s life. They will 
grant us (children), and she has provided us certain hope for her 
fecundity, although this attempt has proven not at all fruitful. I advise, 
encourage and exhort you by the same means I use upon myself, for 
you cannot (desire) great-grandchildren more fervently than I desire 
children, whose ancestry from you and me should make their path 
towards (public) office easy; I will bequeath them a name which is 
widely heard and no obscure ancestral death-masks. Let them be born, 
somehow, and change our sorrow into elation! Farewell.
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To Calpurnia Hispulla, 
Since I understand that your love for your brother’s daughter is more 
tender than even (that of) a gentle mother, I feel that my second 
announcement should come first, so that joy can pre-empt anxiety and 
leave it no space. However, I fear that after rejoicing, you will return 
to dread, and thus even as you are delighted (at the discovery that 
Calpurnia) is free from danger, you might tremble at the same time on 
account of her peril. But now her cheerfulness begins to grow again, 
because she has been restored to herself and to me, (and she is 
starting) to measure (the extent of the) crisis she has undergone by her 
recuperation. The crisis was generally of the utmost severity— may it 
be permitted for me to say so with impunity— and it was through no 
fault of hers, except maybe her young age. Hence her miscarriage, the 
sad evidence of her ignorance (regarding) her uterus. Hence even if 
there is not the longed-for grandson of your brother reaching out to 
you or a grand-daughter to comfort your loss, do bear in mind that 
that child of ours has not been denied us, (but merely) postponed. 
(We) can hope, thanks to her, because she has been saved. In the 
meantime, explain the situation to your father; this sort of matter is 
more easily understood among women. Farewell.
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Pliny’s language may have been formal, but it is difficult to ignore the undercurrent of grief 
throughout these letters. He mourned the loss of his child, and expected that Fabatus and 
Calpurnia Hisulla would too be aggrieved. Theoretically, the child was not yet a part of the 
family, since it had not undergone its dies lustricus. Moreover, the miscarriage had probably 
occurred in the first trimester of pregnancy, since Calpurnia did not know she was pregnant. 
According to many philosophical theories of ensoulment, it had not yet been fully hominised. 
Yet it is significant that Pliny described the child not as a nebulous entity, but as a descendant 
‘who has been prepared for.’ He envisioned the foetus as already having a role to play in the 
family, and that upon reaching maturity the child would magnify the glory of its ancestors in 
the public eye. Pliny did not embellish the death notice with sentimental ideation of 
childhood. However, it is clear that Pliny ardently desired children, and publicly recognised 
the miscarriage as a tragedy. According to his self-representation, he sought to fulfil in his 
duty as Calpurnia’s husband to extend his and his family’s legacy. Even if he did not express 
a sentimental attachment to the child itself, the miscarriage stirred strong feelings within him.   
The Christians were not alone in their ideological opposition to abortion, since the 
Stoics also opposed the practice. In the second century, Stoic opposition was likely more 
influential upon Roman society, since Stoicism was more readily accepted among the elite.
234
 
It is not possible to tell how widespread Stoic opposition to abortion was, since the evidence 
is limited to a handful of authors. Seneca’s views have been discussed above. Like other 
authors, Seneca mentioned his opposition to abortion as part of his characterisation of women 
as flighty and promiscuous. The first-century philosopher Musonius Rufus, on the other hand, 
took a far more stringent stance against abortion. On principle, he opposed all attempts to 
limit fertility through artificial means, construing them as defiance of the family and contrary 
to nature.
235
 Musonius Rufus’ attitude towards abortion should be viewed as part of his 
promotion of fertility within marriage.
236
 In his twelfth lecture on the importance of sexual 
continence, Rufus argued forcefully that a moral man ought not to engage in non-procreative 
sex, even within marriage.
237
 He condemned the pursuit of sexual pleasure for its own sake as 
morally degrading. As far as Rufus argued, the chief object of marriage should be 
procreation, beyond all other concerns. ‘It is necessary for each married person individually 
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to come together for the purpose of making a life and child with the other,’ as decreed by 
Nature.
238
 
Rufus frowned upon abortion and contraception out of deference to such values. 
Unfortunately, the text of his lecture on the rearing of children survives only in fragments, 
albeit substantial ones. In Fragment 15, Rufus contended that fecundity was the object of 
marriage. He cited the vague precedent of ancient legislation, which he claimed forbade 
abortion and encouraged large families for the preservation of the state. He contended that 
since the earliest generations of humankind had enjoyed direct contact from the gods, failure 
to follow their example was an affront to society, nature and the gods. For Rufus, there were 
religious reasons to abstain from abortion also. The limitation of family size by abortion or 
infanticide, he argued, was an outrage to Zeus as guardian of the human race. More 
particularly, he argued, spurning even the prospect of children ran contrary to Zeus’ wishes as 
the patron deity of friendship, hospitality and family. In Rufus’ view, by averting conception 
or preventing birth, people acted as bad friends, abrogated the principle of guest-friendship, 
and failed to live up to society’s expectations of new citizens. Rufus then proceeded to extol 
the benefits of large families, invoking sentimental imagery of children participating in public 
worship. Economic concerns, he said, were insufficient grounds for limiting family size.
239
 
The parallels between Musonius Rufus’ views and those of the Christian authors are 
striking.
240
 As in many of the Christian sources, Rufus argued on the basis that married 
couples were morally impelled by a higher power to produce young. He argued that 
contraceptive sex was demeaning, in a similar fashion to Clement of Alexandria. Like the 
Didache and Letter of Barnabas, Rufus conceptualised the unborn child as equally deserving 
of assistance as an adult in need.
241
 Moreover, like Tertullian, he evaluated the foetus’s worth 
in light of its future role in society and its capacity to become a fully actuated human being; 
he perhaps sought to provoke sympathy for the unborn child by associating it with the image 
of happy, healthy children participating in processions. Rufus also connected the concepts of 
infanticide and abortion, perhaps indicating that, like Tertullian, he viewed the unborn child 
as holding equivalent status to a newborn. He condemned the refusal to uphold these 
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standards harshly, calling couples who did not procreate asebeis, ‘impious.’242 It is doubtful 
that Tertullian or any of the other Christian sources on procreation would have contested 
these ideas.
243
  
Though Rufus condemned abortion, he did not do so on the ground that he considered 
it murder, unlike Tertullian and many of the other Christian writers. Nor did he indicate that 
failure to uphold these principles would invite divine punishment, as in the case of the 
Apocalypse of Peter or Athenagoras.
244
 This may have been because of the peculiar views of 
the Stoics concerning the animation of the embryo. Musonius Rufus did not explain his own 
personal views of conception and the process of hominisation. However, other ancient 
commentators on Stoic doctrines indicate that it was commonly held that the child received a 
soul upon contact with air, since the soul was believed to be a form of pneuma.
245
 
Beforehand, the unborn child was considered to be a part of its mother, a view accepted by 
Ulpian.
246
 Since the Stoics did not likely view the foetus as being in possession of a soul, its 
destruction could not be viewed as homicide in the strictest sense. However, the distinction 
was of relevance only to philosophers. For the Stoics, there were other compelling 
ideological reasons to abstain from abortion. The cause for their distrust of abortion was 
somewhat different, but the effect upon the frequency of abortion among their families would 
have been identical.  
There was also a place for the unborn in Roman religion as there was in Christianity, 
with various obscure deities dedicated to its protection and nourishment in the womb. Much 
of the evidence for Rome’s patron deities of pregnancy and childbirth actually came from 
Tertullian himself, as well as the much later Augustine. Both authors used Varro as a 
source.
247
 Tertullian’s list in Ad Nationes of the many pagan deities associated with the 
protection of the foetus and embryo has been discussed in the second chapter of this 
dissertation. Yet it is also important to consider that De Anima featured a similar list, 
inscribed in service of a somewhat different point. Here, Tertullian acknowledged that pagan 
views regarding supernatural intervention in prenatal development were similar to those of 
the Christians. In this passage, he argued that the unborn child clearly possessed a soul prior 
to birth, otherwise the Romans would not have appointed deities for its protection: 
                                                          
242
 Muson. 15; Eyben 1980: 42. 
243
 Watts 1973: 98. 
244
 Apoc. Pet. Akhmim frg. 24-25; Athenagoras, Leg. 35.5-6. 
245
 Kapparis 2002: 43; Von Staden 2000: 96-99.  
246
 Dig. 25.4.1.1. 
247
 Tert. Ad nat. 2.1.8; August. De civ. D. 7.2. Unfortunately, Varro’s work has not survived. 
208 
 
However, the whole process of planting, making and moulding the 
human being in utero is certainly orchestrated by a power, (which is) 
attendant to the will of God, whatever the process that is elected (for 
it) to pursue. Even Rome’s irrational religion, by considering these 
things, invented the goddess Alemona for sustaining the foetus in 
utero, and also Nona and Decima, (named after) the more worrisome 
months (of pregnancy), and Partula, who governs childbirth, and 
Lucina, who leads (the unborn child) into the light. We believe that 
the angels (perform) these duties, (appointed) by God.
248
 
Here, Tertullian exploited the similarity between Christian and Roman views concerning the 
need to provide supernatural protection to the unborn. In other treatises he presented 
Christian and pagan views as polar opposites. However, for De Anima, it served Tertullian’s 
purposes to highlight the synchronicity between pagan and Christian views. He did not 
celebrate pagan deities, but used them to demonstrate that Christians should acknowledge 
that life began in the womb.  
It is, however, difficult to say whether the Romans would have believed that the unborn 
child had a place in the afterlife, as the evidence is very slim. Shanzer suggests that Virgil 
ascribed an eternal soul to the stillborn infant in the Aeneid.
249
 As Virgil wrote, the Trojan 
hero Aeneas encountered the screaming shades of dead infants during his passage to the 
underworld:  
Continuously voices were heard and an immense wail and the 
sobbing souls of babies upon the first threshold, whom a grisly day 
stole and submerged in bitter funeral-rites, having no share in the 
sweetness of life and violently snatched from the breast.
250
  
However, this interpretation is far from secure. As Waszink and Nardi point out, it is not 
clear that Virgil actually referred to the unborn child at all; in limine primo could simply 
denote their placement on the threshold of Hades.
251
 The fact that they were ‘snatched from 
the breast’ further supports the idea that they possessed a physical body, and their capacity 
for suckling suggests that they had died postpartum.  
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Since Christians and pagans were similar in their hostility towards abortion, it is 
difficult to accept Gorman’s conclusion that Tertullian meant for his apologetic treatises to 
sway the Severans’ opinions concerning abortion.252 The legal commentators made it clear 
that the motivations behind these laws were entirely secular, as discussed above. Moreover, 
Christian apologies were not intended to sway imperial policy concerning the family. Rather, 
Tertullian mentioned Christian censure of abortion to aid his refutationes of homicide 
accusations often levelled against Christians. Yet these arguments were hardly prescriptive. 
Despite Gorman’s claim to the contrary, Tertullian never actually addressed Severus or 
Caracalla in his apologies, and certainly did not seek to affect Roman family law through his 
Christian writing.  
It is worthwhile acknowledging that if Tertullian was the jurist quoted in the Digesta, 
then it is entirely possible that he was consulted on the laws. Indeed, the jurist Tertullian was 
particularly interested in inheritance law, as indicated by his focus upon the castrense 
peculium.
253
 Moreover, a fragment from Ulpian gave a hint that the jurist Tertullian dealt 
with the unborn child’s right to inherit in his Quaestiones.254 Nevertheless, the identification 
of Tertullian of Carthage as a jurist is less than certain, and the only available evidence for 
Tertullian’s attitude towards abortion (as opposed to the legal status of the unborn) came 
from his Christian works.  
At the time Tertullian was working, Christianity was still a persecuted minority. It 
would be more than a century before Christianity became the empire’s state cult. Offering 
instructions to the emperors about the governance of the Roman family would have 
undermined Tertullian’s arguments regarding the loyalty of the Christians. Far from berating 
his rulers with advice on how to run their empire, Tertullian was declaring in the 
Apologeticum how fully the Christians observed Roman traditions concerning the unborn 
child.  
It is tempting to suggest that Tertullian mentioned abortion in his treatises in response 
to the publication of the Severan anti-abortion laws. However, it is not probable that 
Tertullian was actually commenting on the laws directly. He did not cite them specifically, 
and the exact date of the legislation is unclear. As mentioned above, Severus and Caracalla’s 
anti-abortion laws could have been published any time during their three-year rule. The first 
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of Tertullian’s treatises to mention abortion, Ad Nationes and the Apologeticum, were likely 
published in AD 197, while Severus was still sole emperor.
255
 If Barnes’s chronology of 
Tertullian’s work is accurate, his employment of abortion as an exemplum would have begun 
prior to the inception of the laws. It is thus unlikely that he was commenting on them directly. 
Yet Tertullian’s point in these treatises was that the Christians not only conformed to Roman 
traditions, but they outmatched them. As demonstrated in this chapter, pagans and Christians 
were alike in their abrogation of abortion; the sole difference was that the Christians rejected 
it as a form of homicide out of deference to Scripture. By elucidating reasons for the rejection 
of abortion, Tertullian blended Christian and pagan traditions to provide a theological basis 
for Christian observance of Roman custom.  
This chapter has argued that Tertullian’s conceptualisation of the unborn child had 
more in common with that of pagan Rome than previously suggested. It has provided a fuller 
investigation of Tertullian’s relationship with pagan literary traditions. Tertullian’s 
construction of abortion as a regularly accepted feature of pagan society was a rhetorical 
smokescreen which served his ends as a polemicist. In fact, his denouncements of abortion 
were partially adapted from non-Christian literary traditions. Despite some uncertainty about 
the legal standing and nature of the unborn, no Roman author spoke well of abortion or its 
practitioners. Pagan writers did not often attribute the unborn child human status. However, 
patriarchal concerns and the social obligation to produce offspring led several authors to 
condemn abortion as abhorrent. Tertullian did not develop the idea that the foetus was a 
potential human being, or a futurus homo, in a vacuum. Many non-Christian writers 
acknowledged the nascent progeny’s capacity to enter society, and framed their views of their 
offspring accordingly. Stoic opposition to abortion was particularly strong. Finally, it has 
been argued that Tertullian probably did not influence the Severan legislation against 
abortion. Tertullian intended to show that the Christians exceeded their pagan neighbours in 
maintaining Roman traditions concerning the family. Tertullian seized upon an issue where 
Christian and pagan attitudes overlapped. Though his stance was more extreme, Tertullian 
did not diverge strongly from the prevailing attitudes towards abortion as expressed in Latin 
literature. Pagan opposition to abortion was strong, even if it was not dogmatic. 
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Conclusion 
 
Tertullian, himself a master of rhetoric, should not be employed in the rhetoric of 
today’s abortion debate. Unfortunately, his proclivity towards a pithy turn of phrase means 
that he lends himself to the often inflammatory language of the modern dispute. Modern 
commentators on both sides of the debate have cherry-picked selective portions of his 
treatises to persuade readers towards a political point of view. Using passages from Tertullian 
so selectively, isolating them from their original context, is a disservice to both the author 
himself and to scholarly understanding of his ideas. Embroiling Tertullian in the current 
political controversy has obfuscated the nuances in his attitude towards the unborn child. 
Tertullian has been cast as a dissident from Christian tradition concerning abortion, or 
alternatively as a champion of foetal rights. Yet the Romano-African author does not fit 
comfortably in either category. Tertullian was not an absolutist fighting against a society in 
which abortion was practised capriciously. Nor did he actively rebel against Christian 
traditions in his attitude towards the foetus or embryo. He was, first and foremost, a 
polemicist. 
It is difficult to see Tertullian as a particularly zealous defender of the unborn child. 
Abortion was not of sufficient concern for Tertullian to devote a treatise solely to the subject. 
Whatever arguments he made concerning the termination of pregnancy were subsidiary to his 
greater agenda of proving his thesis. To some extent, Tertullian’s limited interest in abortion 
may be attributed to the historical and literary context in which he wrote. No Greco-Roman 
author, Christian or otherwise, construed abortion as a positive outcome. The issue was not a 
politically sensitive one in antiquity as it is the modern West. It is even possible that the 
procedure of abortion was carried out only as a last resort. Quite simply, the topic of abortion 
was in itself of little consequence to Tertullian. Other concerns were more immediate for him. 
Tertullian dealt with issues of grave importance to an intellectually inclined Christian of late 
second-century Roman Carthage. He wrote three apologetic works addressed to pagans, 
which argued that the persecution of Christians was unwarranted. The other twenty-nine 
surviving treatises dealt with controversies within the Christian community, such as heresy, 
martyrdom, the impending apocalypse, and the sometimes wide gap between Christian 
orthodoxies and practices. Indeed, Tertullian was more concerned about improprieties in 
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female dress than he was in the question of whether women kept their babies. He dedicated 
whole treatises to the matter of feminine modesty, but none at all to the problem of abortion.  
Nor did Tertullian build his case against abortion upon any inflexible convictions 
concerning either the physical or metaphysical nature of the unborn. He modulated his views 
on the body and soul of the unborn child, using whatever theory suited the needs of 
individual pieces of rhetoric. It would be unfair for modern readers to expect him to provide a 
more definitive doctrine on such matters in a world that had no real means of testing the 
veracity of embryological theory. Moreover, it was entirely beyond the scope of his rhetorical 
agenda to provide concrete answers regarding the unborn. Tertullian’s prime ambition was 
absolute and total victory in the arena of persuasion, to leave his reader in no doubt that his 
view was the right one. The unborn child was simply one of the many exempla from which he 
drew to secure his triumph in debate, and an opportunity to show his prowess in the minutia 
of Scripture, medicine, and natural philosophy. Tertullian only discussed the unborn to 
support a broader point. If he needed to alter his supporting arguments about the nature of the 
unborn in service of his main thesis, Tertullian was willing to do so. There were simply no 
uncontested theories concerning prenatal development in antiquity, and it would have been 
moot for Tertullian to try and offer one unified premise. Tertullian’s attitude towards the 
unborn child, ultimately, was one of dispassionate and intellectual interest. 
Yet Tertullian also proves resistant to the label of dissentience concerning his attitude 
towards the unborn. Even if the procedure was not his main concern, Tertullian was 
employing a well-established trope in Judaeo-Christian literature by denigrating abortion and 
its practitioners. It is doubtful that any of the surviving Christian authors prior to or 
contemporary with Tertullian would have found anything particularly antithetical in his 
comments on the unborn. Whatever fluctuations there may have been in his arguments 
concerning the timing of ensoulment, it is also very difficult to envisage a scenario in which 
he would have approved of an abortion. If his remarks in De Anima (25.4-5) may be taken as 
an indication of his thoughts on the subject, Tertullian certainly saw that sometimes there was 
no choice but to terminate the offspring prior to birth, but he remained staunch in his 
disapproval. In short, Tertullian was a pioneer in the sense that he provided the first extended 
exploration of the unborn child in Latin literature, albeit drawing upon precedents found in 
Christian and Jewish writing. 
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By examining Tertullian’s works more comprehensively and placing them in their 
historical and literary context, this dissertation has provided a fuller picture of Tertullian’s 
attitude towards the unborn child than has been previously achieved. However, there remain 
several areas for future researchers to build upon, which were beyond the scope of this study. 
The extent of Tertullian’s influence upon concurrent and subsequent Christian thinkers 
remains to be determined. The comparison of Tertullian and Minucius Felix’s thought 
concerning the unborn child could potentially be employed to help settle the long-debated 
question of which author used the other, if either did. It would also be interesting to see 
whether Tertullian’s ideas on the unborn were well-received in the Nicene Church, which 
was so often hostile towards Montanism. In particular, a close comparison of Tertullian’s 
ideas and those of Augustine would likely prove useful in determining whether the Bishop of 
Hippo used Tertullian’s ideas or not. A similar study of Jerome’s thought on abortion might 
reveal the influence of Tertullian, especially given that the former read the latter’s work 
thoroughly. Such studies would help to illuminate Tertullian’s relationship with later 
Christian ideas on the unborn child, and also his limitations thereof. It is a complex 
undertaking to understand the Church Fathers’ thoughts on the unborn. It is even more 
difficult to do so without entangling them in today’s abortion debate. In many ways, this task 
is just beginning. 
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